certain action is moral and another immoral. This theory is known under the name of Nativism or Intuitionism. Carlyle, when he says, "Truly this same sense of the infinite nature of Duty is the central part of all of us; a ray as if of Eternity and Immortality immured in dusky, many-coloured Time, and its deaths and births, evidently belongs to the same school. This faculty is independent of environment, time, and education. It is an innate faculty, and can, consequently, not be acquired. It is an immediate knowledge that is part and parcel of our nature, given to us to realize moral distinctions in the same way that the eye has been given to us to see, and the ear with which to hear. Butler, who considered conscience the essential element in our nature, and who defines it as the "moral approving and disapproving faculty," belongs to this school of philosophers. Among the Germans Fichte and above all, Kant, belong to this school. Opposed to their view is the school of philosophers who maintain that our knowledge of moral distinctions, like all other knowledge, is derived from experience, and advances with the progress of age and thought. The sense of morality is not innate in man, but is the result of experience, which teaches him to judge certain actions as good or bad, right or wrong. This theory is termed Empiricism, or more frequently Evolutionism. It is based upon the developmenttheory of Darwin and Wallace, or the biological evolution which regards the complex forms of animate existence and the states of our mental life as having sprung from the simple forms. Thus the Darwinian theory of development has been applied by many philosophers to moral law and the science of morality. Carneri, Mill, Bain, and especially Herbert Spencer are the influential teachers of this school. Just as organism is the product of heredity, the result of selection and rejection of a process extending over many ages, so mind advances from the lowest states to the more advanced. The moral faculty is nothing but the tendency to bring about results judged to be good by experience. The continuity of the experience of the race is tending to modify the conceptions of morals from time to time. According to this school, there is practically no distinct moral faculty. Nothing but the exercise of intelli

gence is needed to guide us in our actions. It is more the end and motive of morality that it considers than the origin and faculty and moral distinctions. The moral

sense is the result of the process of evolution. Morality is only a product, one of the noblest, of evolution, which has been developed and crystallized, and still continues to evolve, together with the race, from the notions of the savage to the ideas of cultured and civilized men.

As

§ 3. The second question or problem to which moral philosophers directed their attention, and the answers to which have given rise to distinct schools, is that concerning itself with the end and purpose of human moral actions and conduct. By acting intentionally in a certain way, the human mind, as the agent, has an end or purpose in view, for the sake of which the action is done. rational beings, endowed with the power of thought, capable of foreseeing the connection existing between our single actions and the results to which they might lead, we are not prompted by mere impulse, but are guided and influenced by the desire to attain the end we have in view. Moral action, therefore, or moral conduct, is the means by which man endeavours to reach a certain end. What is that end to whose attainment moral conduct tends? What is that ultimate good sc desirable for man, so eagerly sought for by him? To this question the ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates and Plato, assuming that every man naturally and necessarily seeks his own good, replied that the ultimate good, the summum bonum," is Happiness or Pleasure, Eudæmonia or Hedone. This theory, known under the name of Eudæmonism or Hedonism, has been promulgated by the Greek philosophers, and appears in a variety of forms in the history of human speculations on morality. This Happiness, or Eudæmonistic theory, which, in opposition to Intuitionism, maintains that man becomes moral by rationalizing as to the pleasure or the happiness he wishes to attain, has been expounded in modern times by English philosophers. Paley, Jeremy Bentham, and Mill are the most prominent teachers of this school. Although based upon the Happiness theory, it is now known under the name of Utilitarianism. 66 Every writer," says J. S. Mill, in his

66

"Essay on Utilitarianism," "from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it not something to be contra-distinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things.' His definition of Utilitarianism is as follows: "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure. Thus this theory, estimating actions according to their true value as nothing but means towards securing happiness, is termed Utilitarianism.

From this view some philosophers differ by declaring that moral actions are not means but ends in themselves. By being moral, we serve the purpose for which we have been destined; by our moral conduct we are cultivating the powers that have been given to us to acquire knowledge and to know what is True and Right. By our moral conduct we are exercising our moral faculties and developing them; and thus, by improving our intellectual powers and cultivating our moral sensibility, we are tending towards self-perfection, which is our aim in life. This idea is at the basis of Christian Ethics.

But whose happiness do we aim at? Some say our own happiness; others maintain that we desire that of others, or even of the greatest number. Jeremy Bentham summed it up in the sentence: "The greatest happiness of the greatest number.'

§ 4. Closely related to the question of end and purpose is the inquiry after the inner motives and springs of human moral conduct. Man is not only endowed with reason and thought, but also with feeling, which influences his mode of thinking, and through this his actions. The rational direction of our moral conduct is easily swayed by our natural disposition-by impulses that are not always rational and often bias our judgments. Feeling, thus

exercising a powerful influence on our voluntary determinations, inclines us to one action rather than another. The internal state or affection of mind influencing the agent is greatly dependent upon the natural disposition, temperament, and environment. Sometimes, also, an impulse is stronger in us, and will sway our reason at certain moments of our life, and lead to actions which at other times we should view differently, and make us either hesitate or hasten to act. Our voluntary determination, our moral conduct, therefore, although a means for the attainment of a certain end, is also dependent upon our natural impulse and upon the motive which induces us to seek for this end or purpose. The end not only harmonizes with, but is to a great extent dependent upon, the motive. We not only know, but we also feel, that we should act in one way and not in another. It is not only the perception of utility which shapes and directs our actions, but sentiment and feeling.

To discover the general impulse shared by all mankind, the common spring of human conduct, the moral feeling or sentiment which, independently of reason, sways and influences our determinations-and is at the root of our actions-is another of the important problems which moral philosophers have made efforts to solve. The answers to this question given by various philosophers differ. Some, like Hobbes, maintain that man only cares for his own happiness, that every man is fighting for his own hand, and that the spring of his actions is to be sought in egotism. The rule of his conduct is his own desire. His apparent love of his neighbour is nothing but a disguised egotism. He does a good action out of selfishness, because it affords him pleasure or serves his purpose. Man's ultimate reason for obeying moral laws is his own desire, his selfishness. Every so-called disinterested or benevolent action will, on closer inspection, be found to be the result of a desire for personal benefit, to be obtained immediately or in the future. Some, like Hume and Adam Smith, however, feel that man also possesses feeling for others. There is a feeling of sympathy in the human breast which makes us shape our actions so as to further the happiness of our fellow creatures. Their happiness and misery, and not

a selfish feeling and a consideration for our own pleasure, are at the root of our nature, and constitute the general principle of moral conduct-that is, the source of moral approbation and blame. This theory, in contradistinction to that of egotism, is termed (by A. Comte) Altruism, from the Latin alter, another-that is, consideration for the happiness of others rather than our own. Adam Smith and Hume are followers of this theory. There is a something within our nature which we prize more than our individual happiness. This something is the sympathy of the moral agent with the sentiments, pleasures, and happiness of the object of our benevolent actions. This is the ultimate element into which our moral sentiments can be analyzed. Our souls are quivering under a sense of sympathy with our fellow men, of pity for their sufferings, and of anger at wrongdoing, and an intense desire rises in us to promote their welfare and happiness. These feelings constitute a mighty power, springing from the consciousness of our nature and influencing our moral conduct, either in action or restraint from committing certain acts. To the first school, that of Egotism, belonged the ancient philosophers and those of the century of the French Revolution, and in modern times, Max Stirner and Nietzsche. In the school of Altruism we may count Kant, Fichte, and Schopenhauer. Adam Smith and J. S. Mill even demand self-sacrifice of the moral agent. "But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others?"

"The

"Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be found in man." Utilitarian morality recognizes in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum-total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means to happiness, of others, either of mankind collectively, or of