'To ordinary common sense the supposition that by any modification of matter we can explain mind, is absurd; because matter, as perceived or conceived by us, has none of the properties of mind; and mind, as perceived or conceived by us, has none of the properties of matter. Nevertheless, keen and powerful intellects are found maintaining that these two substances, diverse by every criterion we can apply, are at bottom identical. In the whole of nature, they tell us, we discover nothing but matter and force. Matter we know, and force we know; but what is spirit? It is a strange oversight for a philosopher to forget to count himself. Yet who does not see that in the words, "WE find," "WE know," that very element is interpolated in thought which is verbally denied? Atoms cannot say to themselves, We are atoms. Heat and gravitation and chemical affinity cannot say to one another, We are force.

Our next extract relates to the position held by Mill and Spencer, and a hundred years before by Hume -the positivist basis of metaphysical agnosticism, and therefore also of theological scepticism-that mind is only a series of states of consciousness :

'In its higher, or psychological, form the objection may be thus stated: Mind is nothing but a chain of states of consciousness, which states primarily originate in sensations, either of the individual himself or of his ancestors, whose "organized experience" he inherits." The one thing which any one knows as mind is the series of his own states of consciousness; and if he thinks of any other mind than his own he can think of it only in terms derived from his own. If I am asked to frame a notion of mind divested of all those structural traits under which alone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. I know nothing of thought save as carried on in ideas originally traceable to the effects wrought by objects on me."

This goes to the root. Admit this, and neither evolution nor any other theory is necessary to exclude the idea of Deity from the universe. But the first remark to be made is, that the statement (in appearance wonderfully simple) that "the one thing which any one knows as mind is the series of his own states of consciousness," is self-contradictory. In the words "his own" and "series" it implicitly asserts what it explicitly denies. What, or who, is "any one" who knows mind as a series of states of consciousness? And what constitutes these states a "series"? For a series is not a mere succession; it is

a succession governed by law and forming a whole. In addition, therefore, to the series of states of consciousness we have two other elements to account for: the unifying power or principle by virtue of which it is a series, and the knowledge that it is a series. Both these imply an enduring self, or self-conscious mind. For no one would be insane enough to say that our states of consciousness follow one another at haphazard with no inward link of continuity. Neither will it do to say that they are continuous, as any chain of events may be continuous, by the relation of cause and consequence. For it is only to a very limited extent that our states of mind follow one another in the sequence of cause and effect. They are chiefly produced by the action and reaction of our will, reason and sensitive faculties, on the one hand, and the outer world, on the other. In which process, moreover, it is a gross error to speak of "the effects wrought by objects on me," as if the mind were simply passive: its innate force contributes at least as much to every sensation as the tion; and in a multitude of cases (as in external force which occasions the sensadreams) the mind originates the sensation and invents the imaginary external object to which it refers it..........

'Still, it will be urged, this is at bottom nothing but the "association of ideas." A chain needs no cement or ligature to make it a chain-simply the fact that each link takes hold of its fellows at either end. Yes; but how comes it to do so? By the force of the skilful hand which welded link after link in that position, without which ten thousand links would never make a yard of chain. And when we speak of the force and skill of the workman's hand we really mean his thought, purpose and will. The iron cable that holds the ship at anchor is as truly bound together by the force of thought-the purpose of the man who invented it and the intelligence and will of the workmen who forged it as a chain of reasoning. What is "association of ideas"? What associates them? Nothing can be more empty verbiage, howsoever it may pass current for philo sophy, than to speak as though an idea (whatever that may mean) could have in itself any power to associate or league itself with any other idea. There must be a workman to forge the chain, a mind to associate ideas, an abiding conscious self to unify and appropriate experience; a permanent personality to recognize and accredit the representations of memory, distinguishing them from those of imagi nation with an intuition which is the last appeal in every practical affair of life, and affirming, with a certainty which can

neither be impugned nor augmented— "That is MY experience."

This fact, namely, that the mind is not a mere string of experiences, but a conscious unit, an abiding self, the cause, not the offspring, of its own experience, is so plain to ordinary common sense that to many it may seem lost time and labour to spend a sentence in refuting what is so obviously false. Only the artificial refinements of philosophy and necessities of system could ever lead any one to doubt it. If any one chooses, with ostrich-like placidity, to bury his head in the bush of his own system, admitting no facts but those which it has room for, his position is impregnable. But a philosopher in this posture does not constitute a landmark of progress, still less a barrier of thought.'

After sketching and criticizing in some detail the Spencerian principles of psychology and physiology, the lecturer sums up his conclusion in the following paragraph:

This, in briefest outline, is what we are asked to believe as a simple, scientific, nonmysterious explanation of the existence and activity of human minds. Feeling, Reason, Will, Poetry, Music, Painting, Architecture, Politics, Manufactures, Law, Morality, Religion, Science itself, are all explained by the vibration of molecules under the action of nerve currents. My objection to this explanation is, not that it is purely imaginary (for that it could not help being), but that it explains nothing, and is, when pressed fairly home to its exact meaning, totally unintelligible. Professing to do away with mystery by denying the existence of individual minds, distinct non-material centres of consciousness and will, it sets us face to face with two mysteries, than which none can be more stupendous or inscrutable. First, how can multitudinous atoms, obeying universal forces, produce a personal unity? Secondly, how can vibrations, whether of molecules or of ether, by any degree of rapidity and complication, become consciousness?"

THOSE who have studied Mr. Arthur's work, must be convinced that Pio Nono, with the aid of Veuillot, Manning, Ward, the Jesuit Fathers of the Civiltá and some others, organized, through a course of years, a conspiracy against all sovereignties and nationalities, and finally succeeded in establishing a powerful machinery for the attainment of his pernicious objects.

We have seen how the Pope, by persevering and skilful manœuvres, succeeded in attaining the utter centralization of all authority in himself, so that Bishops became mere Prefects, to be appointed or crushed according to his personal, irresponsible will. The Clergy, similarly at the mercy of the Bishop, subject to appeal to Rome, the Religious Orders also deprived of their comparative independence, becoming

mere Papal tools, useful for or against the Bishops as occasion might demand. We have seen the gradual process whereby ecclesiastics and ecclesiastical institutions everywhere have been deprived of all national and individual privileges and organized into a poisoned network for the entanglement of the world. The Papal Court proceeded with caution; for though caution was not one of the qualities of the outspoken, self-satisfied and self-confident Pio Nono, yet astute advisers, like Antonelli and some of the Jesuits, succeeded in somewhat checking his precipitancy. The Pope would have liked to bring about the subserviency of the laity as openly, as rapidly and as entirely as that of the Clergy, but his plans were somewhat crossed by the fears and prudence of

others. He partially succeeded, however, in the subjection of the laity; he subjected their mind and conscience. So long as he only claimed supremacy over all, it was possible for the laity to refuse obedience, and yet to live as Roman Catholics-to declare the Pope to be in error, and yet to approach the Sacraments. To obviate this, he schemed till the entire Papal Church had been induced to accept the dogma of his personal infallibility, to submit to the teachings and anathemas of the Syllabus and to the decision that any doubt on these subjects deliberately entertained would be a mortal sin, which must be confessed, and if persevered in or unabsolved would consign the soul to hell. Also it had to be admitted, under the same penalties, that the Popes, in former times, had never exceeded in the maintenance of their claims.

Thus the laity were deprived theoretically of all mental and moral liberty: we say theoretically, for it is obvious that one hundred and seventy millions of slaves must not be unceasingly reminded of their slavery, or made to feel it. In the West Indian plantations the slaves enjoyed a great a great deal of license, and those slaves who could render their masters great service or gratification, who surpassed in aptitude or in beauty, who were skilful in keeping others down, or who, if not cautiously handled, might get up a mutiny or run away, were often the recipients of so many decorations and favours that, excepting the fact of their being slaves, they were really quite as free as they cared to be. The Pope has subjected all the laity to himself, as to marriage, the education of children, the mode of spending Sundays, the articles of food on about one hundred and twenty days of the year, the books and periodicals to be read or rejected, and the societies to be entered or eschewed. He has obliged them to confess periodically to one of his sub-prefects every pri

vate thought and act and every domestic incident deemed by the confessor desirable to be known; he has obliged them all to believe that whenever he orders, it is morally dangerous to disobey; that whenever he teaches, and intends his teaching to be of universal import, and on any matter which can touch the conscience or the convictions, to question the legitimacy or truth of the principle announced, or the 'fact' commented on, would be to forfeit eternal salvation. For it has even to be believed that the Pope cannot err as to the accuracy of his statement as to 'facts' which become the subject of his anathemas, or 'apostolic' utterances. The laity are now compelled to regard the Pope as supreme over their own sovereign in all matters whenever the two authorities clash.

Any careful observer of the events recorded by Arthur, by Janus, by Friedrich (vide his invaluable articles in the Contemporary, exposing Manning's 'True Story') must be convinced that the Pope means, not less than he says, but more than he says; that the organization contrived and subjugated to himself is for political purposes, and not for mere scholastic disputations; that the prin ciples of ecclesiastical despotism and intolerance, laid down so clearly, are meant to be enforced whenever, wherever and so far as may be possible; that when the whole of the despotism and intolerance cannot be effected, at least a part can and must. Is there, however, any portion of human conduct, anything in the management of human affairs, wherein the laity have not yet been made to feel their dependence? There is though the Pope claims to be supreme legislator in all affairs touching property, and exercises that power as to ecclesiastics, England very important legal questions as to legacies have been overruled from Rome in a way opposed

so that in

to our national law, and the sufferers compelled to submit to the foreign decision under pain of 'mortal sin' and excommunication; yet as to the management of personal property in no wise regarding any ecclesiastical interest, the Pope has at present abstained from enforcing upon the laity any absolute ordinances. It 18 obvious that in a mixed community, wherein there are believing Roman Catholics interwoven with Liberal Catholics, with semi-believing Catholics, with Freethinkers and with adherents of opposing religious bodies, it would be impossible to enforce rules as to property deemed suitable for the Indians of Paraguay under their beneficent and able Jesuit despots. How can that difficulty be met? It is the only flaw in the system. The Pope may say to himself: 'I have secured their souls, their wives, their children, their schools, but I have not yet obtained their purses. I can get as much money from them as I want, but I have not as yet become the recognized disposer of their income. I am the lord of the earth, I can allot countries to the rulers I select, I can, by Divine right, depose those who displease me. in consequence of the prevailing wickedness of unbelief, I cannot just now put in force these my rights over nations; I cannot at present, therefore, place Henry V. or young Napoleon over France, or MacMahon over Ireland, or Don Carlos over Spain (should the young king prove unfit), or the Emperor Francis Joseph over Germany; I cannot, perhaps, just as yet put Cardinal Manning into the Privy Council and the House of Peers; I cannot expect all heretics to be fooled, though so many fortunately are so; but I ought to be able to have practically recognized my rights over all the private properties possessed by good, docile, believing Catholics, like those in England and in Scotland. How can that be

But

approached, if not as yet attained?"

En

In this way by 'direction.' courage the Jesuits as directors, until 'direction' has become universally submitted to through all the richer portions of society; and then, gradually get the Bishops and secular clergy into the spiritual office of the Jesuits.

What is 'direction'? How does it differ from confession and absolution, the component parts of the 'Sacrament of Penance'? In the Sacrament of Penance, the penitent is only bound to confess sins mortal and venial, dangers of sin and temptations; but the Jesuits teach their penitents to believe that for the soul to be thoroughly pleasing to God and quite secure of salvation, it is necessary to lay open to the confessor all personal, domestic, pecuniary and other affairs, and to be guided implicitly by him in everything, down to the minutest detail of expenditure and of daily life. This manifestation is not to be made to the ordinary confessor unless he acts as the 'director' as well. The confessor who is selected to overrule all the details of personal, domestic and public life is called the 'director.' For many years, the Jesuits were the only directors, they are still the chief directors to the aristocracy and the wealthier classes; but their system of direction has been imitated by others, and this infamous system, as fatal to all noble development of conscience as to all true domestic love and confidence, has now spread its accursed blight over the whole Church. Retreats and Missions help on that anti-Christian and inhuman system. Thus 'direction' is another instrumentality, not yet fully developed, but in use, for the utter prostration of whatever remnant of human liberty and conscience the Romish Church has spared.

The progress of Papal error is: first

a legend; then a counsel; last a precept. The legend is for the credulous; the counsel for 'the pious;' the precept for all The last two dogmas, the Immaculate Conception and the Infallibility, have gone through those stages; for long they were only 'pious opinions'; belief in them was counselled. Direction is now in the intermediate stage; when it has been rendered obligatory on all, throughout the Papal world, conscience will have no office, except in the selection of a director, and the minute revelation to him of every detail of the interior, domestic and social life of the penitent. At present, such minute surveillance is generally exercised over at least one member of each household above the grade of insignificance. Thus the Pope has now an absolute power centralized in himself, extending over all Roman Catholics who approach the Sacraments, and he has, moreover, an immense staff of spies whose information can be utilized whenever needed. Few persons have the audacity to pretend that this inhuman system of widespread despotism and surveillance is needed for the salvation of souls; it is generally frankly admitted that it is the ecclesiastical mode of maintaining and intensifying the imperial power of the Papacy over the temporalities of the world. Rome presented to Christianity the material empire which Jesus Christ rejected. in his sixth Eneid, says:

Virgil,

'Tu regere imperio populos Romane

memento

Hae tibi erunt artes.'

'Remember, O Roman, these shall be thy arts;

To rule the nations with thy empire.' Pagan Rome, as the capital of the ancient world, attracted to itself all energies, all ambitions, all schools of thought, all religions. Josephus tells us, in one of his exaggerated statements, that A.D. 66 two-and-a-half million of Jews resided on the Vati

can side of the Tiber. Juvenal, writing A.D. 120, complains in his fourteenth satire of the introduction of Jewish notions and practices into Roman education and customs. The Christian religion doubtless obtained many of its early converts in the midst of the Jewish emigrants. The traditions of the empire and of Judaism mingled in Roman Christianity. Jews judaized Christianity; Pagans paganized it. The influence of Rome was, however, the most fatal to Christianity. Memories of Psalms and of Prophets ever kept upon a higher level the least spiritual Rabbi. But between the Empire of Rome and the Church of Christ alliance signified corruption. Rome was the mistress of the world, and she imprinted on all she could touch the indelible seal of her domination.

Eastern Christian slaves introduced Christianity into Patrician families. Thus wealth and social prestige began to enter the simple ranks of the Primitive Church, which thus embraced the two extremes, the poorest and the most aristocratic. Proud of their converts, they began to yield to their influence. Pagan rites and customs began to enter the Catacombs. The Pagan mythology was re-enacted in Christianity, till fresh converts pouring in, found little changed except the name; and often not even that. Pagan Rome had its supreme Pontiff; his person inviolable. He was the head of a 'Pontifical College." In the days of Pagan Rome, the supreme Pontiff united in his own person spiritual and temporal dignity, was clad in garments of ecclesiastical splendour, was addressed in language similar to what is now used to the Pope, and signed his name with the same initials. When, in the Third Century, Christian Preachers from the Catacombs proclaimed that Evangel, before which Prætorian guards and courtiers of Cæsar bowed their face

and turned pale, they were already