charged with manoenvring in such a manner as to thoroughly reconnoitre the enemy's position, and oblige him to unmask his forces, and he perfectly succeeded in executing his instructions. He engaged in a brisk cannonade without cammon-shot, and which did little injury; but an Austrian battery of 24 pieces having leit its position to approach Duvernet's division, General Ornano ordered it to be charged by the red lancers of the guard; they took these 24 pieces and sabred all the artillerymen, but were only able to bring of the horses, two pieces of cannon, and an advanced train. On the 18th, Count de Lobau remained in the same position, occupying the village of Arbesan, and all the debouches from the plain. At four o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy sent a division to surprise the height above the village of Karwitz. This division was repulsed, l'épée dans les reins, and fired at with grape-shot during an hour.

On the 18th, at nine in the evening, his Majesty arrived at Pirna; and on the 19th, Comut de Lobau again resumed his positions before Hollensdorf, and the camp of Giesbubel. The ran fell in torrents.-The Prince of Neufchatel is a little indisposed by an access of fever.-His Majesty is very well.

The French government have pub lished the whole of the papers connected with the late armistice and the negociations at Prague. They would fill an octavo volume. We have subjoined the first note of the Austrian minister, Field Marshal Count Budna, whose remarkable observations in italics merit the notice of the people of Eng Jand; and also the last note of Count Metternich, with the comments upon it by the French government. It appears that the negociations did not proceed because the Austrian government insisted that no meeting should be held between the plenipotentiaries, and that the discussions should take place in notes and replies which were to be addressed to the Austrian minister, as mediator. To this form the French plenipotentiaries refused to accede, alledging that it was contrary to the original agreement, and to the usage of all times. It may be collected from these papers that Austria has not ceased to have a secret understanding with Russia, and that the Austrian auxiliary corps made way at Minsk, in November last, for that Russian army which intercepted the march of the French out of Russia. Such is the finesse and morality of modern politics!

The following was the first letter to the Austrian government from Field Marshal Count Budna, the Austrian plenipoten

tiary to negotiate the armistice, which was settled in Silesia on the 4th of June. Dresden, May 18.

"I have the honour to announce that I arrived at Dresden the day before yesterday, where I found the Emperor of the French. It is very agreeable to me to be able to state, that notwithstanding the suc cess which has just accompanied his arms (at Lutzen), the emperor appears to be disposed for peace, and wishes that the plenipotentiaries should assemble as soon as possible at Prague, or any other place. His majesty appears to me to partake the opinion of the Allies, and to consider a gene ral peace as the means of really tranquillizing the world. He would therefore with pleasure see there a plenipotentiary from England and one from America. He consents to admit one from the Spanish insnrgents, should it be thought possible to incline England to Peace. His majesty also seenis equally disposed for a continental peace, and consequently to send plenipotentiaries, as well as his Allies, as soon as the dispositions of Russia and Prussia shall be known.”

In the powers of the same date given by Napoleon to the Duke of Vicenza, he says, "we hope this congress will promptly lead to the re-establishment of peace, of which so many nations experience the want;" then, anticipating the battle of Bautzen, which took place on the 22nd, be goes on to say, "wishing to prevent the battle, which, by the position the enemy has taken, appears imminent, and to avoid, for humanity's sake, an useless effusion of blood, our intention is that you proceed to the Emperor Alexander to conclude and sign any military convention, having for its object the suspension of hostilities.

Final Declaration of Count Metternich.

"The undersigned, minister of state and for foreign affairs, is charged, by an express order from his august master, to make the following declaration to his excellency the Count de Narbonne, ambassador from his majesty the Emperor of France, King of Italy.

"Since the last peace signed with France in October, 1809, his Imperial Majesty and Apostolic King has directed all his solicitude, not only to the establishing with that power relations of friendship and confidence, which she made the basis of her political system, but made use of those relations to support the peace and order of Europe. She flattered herself that this intimate connexion, cemented by family alliance contracted with the Emperor of the French, would contribute to give it,in its political pro ceedings, the only influence it was jealous to acquire that which tended to communicate to the cabinets of Europe that spirit

of

of moderation, that respect for the rights and the possessions of independent states, which she herself possessed. His Imperial Majesty was not long able to indulge in such flattering hopes: a year had scarcely elapsed from the epoch which seemed to have roused the military glory of the sovereign of France to the highest pitch, and nothing appeared to be wanting to his prosperity, as far as depended upon his attitude and his influence abroad, when, new additioas to the French territories of states till then independent, new par celling ont and dismemberments of the Empire of Germany (A.), awoke the apprehensions of powers, and prepared, by their fatal reaction upon the North of Europe, the war which was kindled in 1812, between France and Russia. (B.) The French cabinet knows better than any other how much the Emperor of Austria had at heart to prevent its breaking out, by all the ways which his regard for the two powers, and for those who would find themselves drawn into the great contest which was preparing, dictated to him. It is not him which Europe will ever accuse for the incalculable evils which have been the consequence of it. (C.)

"In this state of things, his majesty the Emperor not being able to preserve to his people the benefits of peace, and maintain a happy neutrality in the midst of that vast field of battle, which on all sides surrounded his states, only consulted, in the part he adopted, his fidelity to relations so ecently established, and the hope he loved to still cherish, that his alliance with France, by affording him the most certain means of having prudent conneils hearkened to, would place bounds to inevitable evils, and serve the cause of the return of peace to Europe. (D.) Unfortunately it has not thus happened; neither the builliant successes of 1812, nor the unexampled misfortunes which marked the conclusion of it, were able to bring back into the councils of the French government that spirit of moderation which would have turned the first to advantage and diminished the effect of the latter. His majesty did not the less on that account take advantage of the moment when both parties, reciprocally exhausted, had slackened the active operations of war, to convey to the bellige rent powers pacific sentiments, which he still hoped to see received, on either part, with that sincerity which had dictated them. (E.)

"Persuaded, nevertheless, that he would only be able to make them be listened to by supporting them with forces, which would promise to the party with whom he accorded in views and principles, the support of his active co-operation to terminate the great contest, (F.) in offering bis mediation to the powers, he deter

mined upon the effort most painful to his heart-an appeal to the courage and patriotism of his people. The congress proposed by him, and accepted by both parties, assembled in the midst of military preparations, which the success of negociations would render uscless, were the Emperor's wishes realized, but would, in a contrary case, lead by new efforts to that pacific result which his majesty preferred obtaiuing wathont effusion of blood. (G.)

By obtaining, from the confidence placed in his Imperial Majesty, the consent of the allies for that prolongation of the armistice which France judged necessary for the ne ociations, the Emperor acquired, with the proof of their pacific views, that of the moderation of their principles and of their intentions. (H.)

"In them he acknowledged his own, and from that moment persuaded himself that it would be from their side he would meet with sincere dispositions to concur in the re-establishment of a solid and durable peace.

"France, far from manifesting analogous intentions, gave but general a surances, 100 frequently contradicted by public declarations, which gave no hope that she would make those sacrifices for peace that would he sufficient to bring it back to Emope. (I.)

"The proceedings of the congress could leave no doubt in this respect; the delay in the arriving of the French plenipotentiaries was the pretext winch the great end of its assembling ought to render nugatory. (J.)

"The insufficiency of their instructions upon objects of form, which caused an irreparable loss of time, when a few days only remained for the most important of negociations: (K.) All those circumstances united, but too clearly demonstrated that a peace, such as Austria and the alhed sovereigns desired, was foreign to the wishes of France (L.); and that having accepted, for form's sake, and in order not to be exposed to the reproach of the prolongation of the war, her proposition for a negociation, she wished to clude the effect of it, (M.) or perhaps take advantage of it to separate Austria from the powers which were already united with her by principle, even before treaties had consecrated their union for the cause of peace and the happiness of the world. (N.)

"Austria came out of this negociation, the results of which deceived her dearest wishes, with a consciousness of the good faith which she carried to it. More zealous than ever for the noble end which she proposed, she only takes arms for the purpose of attaining it, in concert with powers animated by similar sentiments. Always equally disposed to lend her hand to the re-establishment

that every thing which could restore peace

was then tried.

Note (F.) The cabinet of Vienna continues its errors. It made common cause with France in 1812, and it now says, that it was to prevent her from making war against Russia: it arms in 1813, in favour of Russia and Prussia, and this, it says, is to inspire them with the desire of peace. These powers, at first elevated by some success, which they owed to the chance of circumstances, were restored to more calm sentiments, by the striking reverses of the first month of the campaign. Enfeebled, vanquished, they were about to recover from their illusions: the Anstrian government declared that it wou'd arm in their behalf, and shewed them its arms ready to be taken up in their defence. By thus of fering them new chances in the continuation of the war, it pretends to inspire them with the desire of peace. What else could it have done if it had wished to encourage them to war?

It has offered to Russia to take upon itself the burden, and it has offered to Prussia to change the theatre, of the war. It has called upon its own territory the troops of its allies, and all the calamities which weighed upon that of Prussia. It has, in fine, offered to the cabinet of St. Petersburgh the spectacle most agreeable to an Emperor of Russia-that of Austria, her natural enemy, fighting against France, her actual enemy. If the cabinet of Vienna had asked advice of true wisdom, it would have known, that a conflagration is not to be extinguished by affording it new aliment; that it is not wise to endanger ourselves for a nation whose interests are contrary or foreign; in fine, that it is folly to expose to all the chances of war, a nation, which, after such longcontinued misfortune, might continue to enjoy the sweets of peace. But ambition is not a counsellor which wisdom acknow. ledges.

Note (G.)-The author of this declaration cannot get out of the vitious circle in which he is bewildered. Kussia and Prussia knew very well that the Austrian goverument was arming against France. From that moment they could not wish for peace. This result of the dispositions of the cabinet of Vieuna, was too evident not to be reckoned upon.

Note (H.)-The cabinet of Vienna had caused the whole mouth of June to be lost in the formalities which should have preceded the opening of the Congress. France did not solicit that the armistice should be prolonged, but she consented to it. What she wished, and what she asked was that the negociations should be continued during hostilities. But the cabinet of Vienna refused this. Austria would have been bound as mediatrix during the nego MONTHLY MAG. No. 247.

ciations, and she preferred a prolonga. tion of the armistice., which would give her time to finish her armaments; and of which the limited duration offered a fatal term for breaking off the negociations, and declaring herself.

Note (I)-How was the cabinet of Vienna assured that France would not bring to the peace those sacrifices which might restore it to Europe? Before the moment which it fixed for war, did it propose any ultimatum, and distinctly make known what it wished? It declared war, because it wished for war. It declared it without examining whether it could be avoided, and with a precipitation in which it is dif ficult to recognise the influence of the councils of wisdom,

Note (J.)-It was by the act of Austria and the Allies, that the arrival of plenipo tentiaries was retarded. Yet the difi

culties raised by design were not removed, when the Count de Narbonne was already at Prague. His powers, common to the two plenipotentiaries, authorized him to act jointly or separately. The Duke de Vicenza arrived later, because new diffi culties, by which the dignity of France was compromised, were raised by the enemy. But what signify these observations? What would a delay of a few days have been to a mediator, who did not wish for war?-and what a motive for war is a delay of a few days!

Note (K.)-The plenipotentiaries had for their instructions, to adhere to all the forms of negociation consecrated by cns

tom.

The mediator proposed unusual forms, and such as tended to prevent all approach of the plenipotentiaries on either side, all accommodation, and all negocia tion. He introduced a discussion which Do negociator, with a sincere desire of peace, would ever have started. There re mained, said he, but a few days for the most important of negociations. Why did there remain only a few days? What had the armistice in common with the negociation? Was it not possible to negociate fighting? What signifies a few days more or less, when a treaty of peace is in question? If the cabinet of Vienna did not wish to negociate, but to dictate, as conditions are dictated to a besieged place, a few days might indeed suffice; but then, why did it not propose a capitulation? There only remained a few days for the most important of negociations. What ne gociation then is that which can be concluded in a few days? Time may be neces sary, when satisfactory explanation is wished, but it is useless to a mediator who has taken his determination before-hand. However, when it is against France, some days more or less may be allowed to think of it.

Note (L.) We must here do justice to

the

the penetration of the cabinet of Vienna. No doubt a peace, such as the allied sovereigns desired, was foreign to the wishes of France; in like manner as such a peace as France could approve, must have been contrary to the wishes of the allies. Every power that enters into negociation, wishes for all that it can obtain; but when there is a mediator, he interposes between these contrary wishes. But such was not the part which the Austrian cabinet had assigned itself. It never was a mediator; it was an enemy from the time when, according to its own confession, it wished no other peace than that which was wished by one only of the parties. But what was the peace which the cabinet of Vieuna wished? If it really wished peace, a peace of any kind, why did it not explain itself? Why? because it had adopted all the pretensions of Russia, of Prussia, and of England, and because it had, besides, pretensions of its own, on which it did not wish to give way, because it had resolved on

war.

Note (M.)-France proposed the meeting of a cougress, because she sincerely wished peace--because she flattered her self that her plenipotentiaries, when in the presence of those of Russia and Prus sia, would come to an understanding-because a engress, even under the media

tion of Austria, would be a meaus to escape the dangers of the insinuations which the cabinet of Vienna circulated. France accepted the mediation of Austrin, because, supposing in the cabinet of Vienna the anibitious views of which we had no doubt, it was to be believed that it wonld find itself cramped by its part of mediator, and would not dere in a public negociation, undertaken for its sole interest, to reject our moderate views, and the sacrifices which we were disposed to make for peace; be cause, in fine, if it had been otherwise, and the mediator and our enemies had been agreed on their reciprocal pretensions, the cabinet of Vienna would propose an ultimaalum which would excite the indignation of France and her allies.

Nate (N.)--Austria then was already united in principles with the enemies of France. Who required from her this confession? The cabinet of Vienna feared lest France should prevail in a negociation to separate Austria from her powerful enemies. No doubt, if Austria had united with them to prevent their making peace, and with the firm resolution of making war against us, she must have feared a negociation, in which our moderation might have offered them more advantageous chances in peace than in war. But why then did the cabinet of Vienna offer its mediation, and cause Europe to resound with its wishes for peace?

Note (0.)--Austria wishes to establish an order of things, which, by a wise distri bution of forces, places the guarantee of peace under the ægis of an association of independent states. She will not make peace till an equal distribution of forces shall guarantee the independence of each state. To obtain this, she ought immediately to aggrandize, at her own expense, Bavaria and Saxony; for the great powers must descend, in order that the weaker powers may become their equals. When it shall have given that example, it will have a right to demand that it shall be imitated. Thus the cabinet of Vienna wishes to fight to render all powers a republic of sovereigns, the elements of which shall be perfectly equal; and is it to such reveries that the repose of the world is to be sacrificed? Can publie reason and the opinion of Europe he more openly sported with? In drawing up manifestoes, as well as in the regulation of its conduct, the cabinet of Vienna has not listened to the councils of wisdom.

On the 7th of Oct. at one o'clock, her Majesty the Empress Queen and Regent set out from the palace of the Thuilleries to repair to the Senate. On the arrival of her majesty all the Senators were standing, and uncovered. Her majesty ascended the throne placed to the left of that of the emperor; and the ministers and great officers were seated in chairs to the right and left.

Her Majesty then delivered the following address:—

"SENATORS,

The principal powers of Europe, indig nant at the pretensions of England, had last year muited their armies to ours, to obtain the peace of the world, and the re-establish ment of the rights of all nations.

By the first chances of the war the slumbering passions were awakened; England and Russia drew in Prussia and Austria to join in their cause.

Our enemies wished to destroy our allies, to punish them for their fidelity. They wish, in iuc,to carry the war into the bosom of our beautiful country, to revenge the triumphs which led our victorious eagles into the midst of their States.

I know better than any one what our people will have to dread, if they ever suffer themselves to be conquered.

Before I ascended the throne to which I have been called by the choice of my august spouse, and the will of my father, I had the highest opinion of the con. age and ener gy of this great people. This opinion has been every day increased by all that I have seen pass under my eyes.

Acquainted for four years past with the most intimate thoughts of my spouse, I