part of the definition altogether, changing operans into præveniens, and cum into dum ?

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Thus a well known extract from the writings of St. Austin was selected, because, with the addition of the sentence, quæ Deo grata sunt et accepta," it directly militated against the Scholastical position of Congruous Merit; a position, which it was the principal object of the Article to oppose: but, as certain expressions, in which it was couched, might at least seem, upon a collateral and inferior point, to convey a meaning, which it was not wished to inculcate, those were either omitted, or corrected so as to prevent all ambiguity.

I have remarked, that the Latin copy of our Articles ought to be consulted in cases of doubt and controversy. In Latin they were originally composed; nor were they ever subscribed in English, until the Convocation of the year 1571. Previously therefore to that year, the English editions materially varied; while the Latin (the errors of the press alone excepted) remained the same, unless where alterations were introduced by authority.

But it should be added, that in the English copy, constantly used since the period referred to, the expression is at least inaccurate. It is there said, “with" out the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that "we may have a good will, and working with us, when "we have that good will." Certainly the words, when we have that good will, are not a correct translation of dum volumus. Nor is the precise grammatical sense of them very clear. The verb have, used actively, and not as an auxiliary, sometimes appears to mean rather the act of acquisition, than that of complete possession; as Matthew xix. 16. "Good Master, what good thing "shall I do, that I may have eternal life?" and in other similar passages of the Bible. Indeed to this exact sense perhaps it is appropriated in the first part of the clause

before us, in which it is said, "preventing us, that we "may have" (that is, obtain) " a good will." If therefore in the latter part of the clause it be applied in the same way, the construction may be, cooperating with us, "when" (or at the period in which)" we have" (or are having, obtain, or are obtaining) "that good will." Thus is the same verb used in the same incomplete present tense, when our Saviour addresses the disciples on their way to Emmaus: "What manner of communica"tions are these, that ye have" (or are having) "one ❝ to another, as ye walk, and are sad ?" Luke xxiv. 17. Had the phraseology been, "preventing us, that we 66 may will what is good, and working with us, when "we will that good," little or no obscurity would have occurred. It must however be confessed, that at first view the words, "when we have," seem to admit a very different interpretation, and to signify, not when we are obtaining, but after that we have obtained; yet as this interpretation is irreconcileable with the evident meaning of the Latin, surely we ought not to explain a translation in a sense directly repugnant to the original; or, if it must be so explained, at least should consider it rather as an error of the translator, than the sentiment of the compiler.

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By way of contrast with the doctrine of our Church in this part of the Article, I shall subjoin that of Calvin upon the same question. "Sinistre," he remarks, 66 non minus quam infeliciter tritam illam distinctio"nem usurpant operantis gratiæ et cooperantis. Hac "quidem usus est Augustinus, sed commoda defini❝tione leniens, Deum cooperando perficere, quod ope"rando incipit; ac eandem esse gratiam, sed sortiri "nomen pro diverso modo effectus. Unde sequitur

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eum non partiri inter Deum et nos, ac si ex proprio "utriusque motu esset mutua concurrentia; sed gratiæ "multiplicationem notare..... Ad id, quod dicere so

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"lent, postquam primæ gratiæ locum dedimus, jam co"natus nostros subsequenti gratiæ cooperari, respondeo. "Si intelligant nos, ex quo semel domini virtute in jus"titiæ obsequium edomiti sumus, ultro pergere, et propensos esse ad sequendam gratiæ actionem, nihil re"clamo. Est enim certissimum, ubi gratia Dei reg"nat, talem esse obsequendi promptitudinem. Unde "id tamen nisi quod Spiritus Dei ubique sibi consen"tiens, quam principio generavit obedientiæ affectio"nem, ad perseverandi constantiam fovet et confirmat? "At si hominem a seipso sumère volunt, unde gratiæ "Dei collaboret, pestilentissime hallucinantur." Institut. lib. ii. cap. 3. sect. 11. Here he plainly admits no cooperation, except that of grace cooperating with itself; "Spiritus Dei ubique sibi consentiens." And hence was he always careful to distinguish his own tenet from that of the Schools, which he thus censures: "Id dum vult expedire magister Sententiarum dupli"cem gratiam necessariam esse nobis docet, quo redda"mur ad bonum opus idonei. Alteram vocat operan"tem, quà fit ut efficaciter velimus bonum: cooperan"tem alteram, quæ bonam voluntatem sequitur adju"vando. In qua partitione hoc mihi displicet, quod, "dum gratiæ Dei tribuit efficacem boni appetitum, in"nuit hominem jam suapte natura bonum quodammodo, "licet inefficaciter appetere; sicut Bernardus bonam

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quidem voluntatem opus Dei esse asserens, homini "tamen hoc concedit, ut motu proprio bonam ejusmodi "voluntatem appetat. Sed istud ab Augustini mente "procul abest, a quo tamen sumpsisse partitionem videri "vult Lombardus. In secundo membro ambiguitas me "offendit, quæ perversam genuit interpretationem. "Ideo enim putarunt nos secundæ Dei gratiæ cooperari, "quod nostri juris sit primam gratiam vel respuendo irri"tam facere, vel obedienter sequendo confirmare..... Hæc "duo notare obiter libuit, ut videas jam lector, quan

"tum a sanioribus Scholasticis dissentiam. Longiore « enim intervallo a recentioribus sophistis differo, quanto "scilicet a vetustate longius abscesserunt." Ibid. lib. ii. cap. 2. sect. 6. Nor while he warmly contended for the truth of his opinion, did he wish to conceal its novelty: "Ac voluntatem movet, non qualiter multis secu"lis traditum est et creditum, ut nostræ postea sit elec ❝tionis motioni aut obtemperare aut refragari, sed illam "efficaciter afficiendo. Illud ergo toties a Chrysos"tomo repetitum repudiari necesse est, Quem trahit ' volentem trahit;' quo insinuat Dominum porrecta "tantum manu expectare, an suo auxilio juvari nobis "adlubescat." Ibid. lib. ii. cap. 3. sect. 10. Indeed, he frankly confesses, that, in support of his position upon free will in general, he cannot appeal to the authority of the Fathers, that of St. Austin alone excepted, whom, of course, he explains in his own way. He states them to have been ambiguous: he might have allowed, that they were completely hostile to his system: "Quod si nos patrum auctoritas movet, illi quidem " assidue in ore habent vocabulum" (viz. liberum arbitrium). Ibid. lib. ii. cap. 2. sect. 8. "Magnum mihi

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præjudicium attulisse forsan videar, qui Scriptores " omnes ecclesiasticos, excepto Augustino, ita ambigue "aut varie in hac re locutos esse confessus sum, ut "certum quippiam ex eorum scriptis haberi nequeat. "Hoc enim perinde nonnulli interpretabuntur, quasi a "suffragii jure depellere ideo ipsos voluerim, quia mihi "sint omnes adversarii. Ego vero nihil aliud spectavi, "quam quod volui simpliciter ac bona fide consultum "piis ingeniis quæ si eorum sententiam hac in parte "expectent, semper incerta fluctuabunt; adeo nunc ho"minem liberi arbitrii viribus spoliatum ad solam gra"tiam confugere docent; nunc propriis ipsum armis aut "instruunt, aut videntur instruere." Ibid. sect. 9.

Page 111, note (12).

O God, who declarest thy almighty power most chiefly in shewing mercy and pity, mercifully grant unto us such a measure of thy grace, that we, running the way of thy commandments, may obtain thy gracious promises, and be made partakers of thy heavenly treaCollect 11th Sunday after Trinity.

sures.

Page 113, note (13).

Concil. Trident. Decret. de Justificatione, Sessio sexta, Canon 7.

It may perhaps be proper to observe, that in the passage which follows, it is by no means intended obliquely to charge upon the Calvinistical doctrine of Inspiration, as appropriated to the elect, when correctly understood, the absurdities and impieties, which enthusiasm has sometimes deduced from it. Calvin himself was both a wise and a good man; inferior to none of his contemporaries in general ability, and superior to almost all in the art, as well as elegance, of composition, in the perspicuity and arrangement of his ideas, the structure of his periods, and the Latinity of his diction. Although attached to a theory, which he found it difficult in the extreme to free from the suspicion of blasphemy against God, as the author of sin, he certainly was no blasphemer; but, on the contrary, adopted that very theory, from an anxiety, not to commit, but (as he conceived) to avoid blasphemy, that of ascribing to human, what he deemed alone imputable to divine, agency. With respect to the application of it, at a later period, to enthusiastical purposes, no one would have more severely reprehended such an application, than he himself; nor ought we perhaps to attribute the principles, which modern enthusiasts have extracted from it, to Calvin, more than we do those, which modern republicans have affected to derive from a political revolution