Marriage, by its definition, is an union of the most intimate nature; but not indissoluble or indivisible,* as some contend, on the ground of its being subjoined, Matt. xix. 5. they two shall be one flesh.? These words, properly considered, do not imply that marriage is absolutely indissoluble, but only that it ought not to be lightly dissolved. For it is upon the institution itself, and the due observance of all its parts, that what follows respecting the indissolubility of marriage depends, whether the words be considered in the light of a command, or of a natural consequence. Hence it is said, for this cause shall a man leave father and mother . . . and they two shall be one flesh;' that is to say, if, according to the nature of the institution, as laid down in the preceding verses, Gen. ii. 18, 20. the wife be an help meet for the husband; or in other words, if good will, love, help, comfort, fidelity, remain unshaken on both sides,† which, according to universal acknowledgement, is the essential form of marriage. But if the essential form

*This is in direct opposition to the sentiments attributed to Adam in his original innocency.

The same comment upon the passage in Genesis occurs elsewhere, and is remarked by Newton as a beautiful climax.

For this cause he shall forego

Father and mother, and to his wife adhere;

And they shall be one flesh, one heart, one soul.

VIII. 497.

And again, Eve, replying to Adam, who had said, 'we are one flesh.

Adam, from whose dear side I boast me sprung,

And gladly of our union hear thee speak,

One heart, one soul in both. IX. 965.

be dissolved, it follows that the marriage itself is virtually dissolved.

Great stress, however, is laid upon an expression in the next verse; what God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.' What it is that God has joined together, the institution of marriage itself declares. God has joined only what admits of union, what is suitable, what is good, what is honourable ;* he has not made provision for unnatural and monstrous associations, pregnant only with dishonour, with misery, with hatred, and with calamity. It is not God who forms such unions, but violence, or rashness, or error, or the influence of some evil genius.† Why then should it be unlawful to deliver ourselves from so

*Lastly, Christ himself tells who should not be put asunder, namely, those whom God hath joined. A plain solution of this great controversy, if men would but use their eyes; for when is it that God may be said to join? . . . . only then when the minds are fitly disposed and enabled to maintain a cheerful conversation, to the solace and love of each other, according as God intended and promised in the very first foundation of matrimony; "I will make him a help meet for him :" for surely what God intended and promised, that only can be thought to be his joining, and not the contrary.' Doctrine, &c. II. 39. 'But here the Christian prudence lies, to consider what God hath joined: shall we say that God hath joined error, fraud, unfitness, wrath, contentiom, perpetual loneliness, perpetual discord; whatever lust, or wine, or witchery, threat or enticement, avarice or ambition hath joined together, faithful and unfaithful, christian with anti-christian, hate with hate, or hate with love, shall we say this is God's joining?' Tetrachordon, Prose Works, II. 178.

It is error or some evil angel which either blindly or maliciously hath drawn together, in two persons ill embarked in wedlock, the sleeping discords and enmities of nature.' Doctrine, &c. Prose Works, I. 370. The rest whom either disproportion or deadness of spirit, or something distasteful and averse in the immutable bent of nature renders conjugal, error may have joined, but God never joined against the meaning of his own ordinance.' Ibid. II. 40. Charity and wisdom disjoins that which not God, but error and disaster joined.' Tetrachordon, II. 203.

Further, our doctrine God has joined togeth

pressing an intestine evil ?* does not separate those whom er in the spirit of his sacred institution, but only those whom God has himself separated by the authority of his equally sacred law; an authority which ought to have the same force with us now, as with his people of old. As to Christian perfection, the promotion of which is urged by some as an argument for the indissolubility of marriage, that perfection is not to be forced upon us by compulsion and penal laws, but must be produced, if at all, by exhortation and Christian admonition. Then only can man be properly said to dissolve a marriage lawfully contracted, when, adding to the divine ordinance what the ordinance itself does not contain, he separates, under pretence of religion, whomsoever it suits his purpose.

For it

ought to be remembered that God in his just, and pure, and holy law, has not only permitted divorce on a variety of grounds, but has even ratified it in some cases, and enjoined it in others, under the severest penalties, Exod, xxi. 4, 10, 11. Deut. xxi. 14. xxiv. 1. Ezra x. 3. Ezra x. 3. Nehem. xxiii. 23, 30.

But this, it is objected, was 'because of the hardness of their hearts,' Matt. xix. 8. I reply, that these words of Christ, though a very appropriate answer to the Pharisees who tempted him, were never meant as a general explanation of the question of divorce. His intention was, as usual, to repress the

* Once join'd, the contrary she proves, a thorn
Intestine, far within defensive arms

A cleaving mischief. Samson Agonistes, 1036.

The occasion which induced our Saviour to speak of divorce, was either to convince the extravagance of the Pharisees in that point, or to give a sharp and vehement answer to a tempting question.' Doctrine, &c. Prose Works, Il. 2.

arrogance of the Pharisees, and elude their snares; for his answer was only addressed to those who taught from Deut. xxiv. 1. that it was lawful to put away a wife for any cause whatever, provided a bill of divorcement were given. This is evident from the former part of the same chapter, v. 3. 'is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?' not for the sole reason allowed by Moses, namely, if 'some uncleanness were found in her,' which might convert love into hatred; but because it had become a common practice to give bills of divorce, under the pretence of uncleanness, without just cause; an abuse which, since the law was unable to restrain it, he thought it advisable to tolerate, notwithstanding the hardness of heart which it implied,* rather than to prevent the dissolution of unfortunate marriages, considering that the balance of earthly happiness or misery rested principally on this institution.†

*Now that many licentious and hard-hearted men took hold of this law to cloke their bad purposes, is nothing strange to believe, and these were they, not for whom Moses made the law, (God forbid) but whose hardness of heart taking ill advantage by this law he held it better to suffer as by accident, where it could not be detected, rather than good men should lose their just and lawful privilege of remedy; Christ therefore having to answer these tempting Pharisees, according as his custom was, not meaning to inform their proud ignorance what Moses did in the true intent of the law, which they had ill-cited, suppressing the true cause for which Moses gave it, and extending it to every slight matter, tells them their own, what Moses was forced to suffer by their abuse of his law.' Doctrine, &c. Prose Works, II. 21. See also p. 42. 'Moses had granted—contentious cause whatsoever.' Again; 'This was that hardness of heart, and abuse of a good law, which Moses was content to suffer, rather than good men should not have it at all to use needfully.' Ibid. p. 50. Why did God permit this to his people the Jews, but that the right and good which came directly thereby, was more in his esteem than the wrong and evil which came by accident?' Colasterion. Prose Works, II. 251.

Quandoquidem in iis tantum vitæ momentum vel beatæ vel misera

For, if we examine the several causes of divorce enumerated in the law, we shall find that wherever divorce was permitted, it was not in compliance with the hardness of the human heart, but on grounds of the highest equity and justice. The first passage is Exod. xxi. 1-4. these are the judgements which thou shalt set before them: if thou buy an Hebrew servant....in the seventh year he shall go out free for nothing....if he were married, then his wife shall go out with him if his master have given him a wife, and she have borne him sons or daughters, the wife and her children shall be her master's, and he shall go out by himself.' Nothing could be more just than this law, which, so far from conceding anything to the hardness of their hearts, rather restrained it; inasmuch as, while it provided against the possibility of any Hebrew, at whatever price he might have been purchased, remaining more than seven years in bondage, it at the same time established the claim of the master as prior to that of the husband. Again, v. 10, 11. if he take him another wife, her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage shall he not diminish: and if he do not these three unto her, then shall she go out free without money.' This law is remarkable for it consummate humanity and equity; for while it does not permit the husband to put away his wife through the mere hardness of his heart, it allows the wife to leave her husband on the most reasonable of all grounds, that of inhumanity and unkindness. Again,

positum esse judicavit; an expression which will be best illustrated by the author himself: