to them, to act justly by others, and not with reference to the advancement of their own claims they have told me, that they wished, on all such subjects, that what we deemed right we should do, and that on justice, not on contrivance, still less on the sacrifice of other men's claims or interests, they relied for the final success of their own cause. These are feelings that become them as Englishmen, and it is but bare justice to record them.

It remains for me to say one word on another subject; namely, the part of the Bill relating to a declaration to be signed by those who take office. My Lords, it is unnecessary for me to tell you, that that provision formed no part of the original Bill, and it would be disingenuous in me not to acknowledge, that it is one which I should never have suggested either as necessary or useful, and that if the Bill were without it, it would equally have my warm and zealous support; but yet I can, with perfect honesty and sincerity, recommend the adoption of this part of the measure; for though, in my judgment, unnecessary, it allays, I am told, the fears of some, and gratifies the feelings of others. If the enactment of such a declaration reconciles one conscientious mind to the measure, I not only recommend, but cordially and earnestly urge its adoption, as giving to the great work in which we are engaged, not the character of victory, but that more desirable one of peace, union, and conciliation. It is in that spirit I acquiesce. I recommend and support it. One reserve, however, I must make to protect myself on any future occasion from the charge of disingenuousness or inconsistency. My acquiescence in the declaration, as here applied, does not preclude me from objecting to it strongly, if it be attempted to transfer it elsewhere. I see no objection to it as it stands-1 can hardly conceive that any man called upon by this Bill to sign it, can object to it: at least, I am sure that were I to be appointed to office-not a very likely event, I acknowledge—I should have no scruple whatever in signing it; but should any security-grinder, as they have been termed, at any subsequent period endeavour to transfer it, mutatis mutandis, from office to seats in Parliament, I must frankly avow that I should earnestly and strenuously resist it. Indeed, I hardly think I could, in my character of member of this House, sign it, or any promissory engagement, myself. I have not, God knows, nor am I likely to have, any intention, wish or design, of subverting, weaken

ing, or disturbing the Church established by law; but as a legislator I could not declare, that in no possible emergency I would consent to laws that might have that effect. Such scruple does not arise from any hostility to the Church. It applies to a promise of this nature with respect to any human institution. I should feel equally unwilling to declare as much, in the character of legislator, in favour of the trial by jury, the privileges of Parliament, the prerogatives of the Crown, the liberty of the press, or the rights of the people. The supreme power of Parliament must, in my judgment, be always left at full liberty to legislate for the good of the country, as emergencies arise, and the exigencies of the state and the community may require. No shackles, uo promises, no pledge, ought to bind a legislature, which, unless it is free and unfettered, cannot, in the vicissitude of human affairs, be sufficient to provide for the security and welfare of the community.

My Lords, I have done. I fear I have been dreadfully prolix, but your Lordships must attribute that fault to its real cause my earnest desire that the merits of this great question should be fully understood by the House and the Country; that the vote of this evening should be, and should be felt to be by the public and posterity, the result of calm and peaceable deliberation, not the termination of an angry contest; that it should be, not the triumph of one class of men over the prejudices of another, but the just and wise decision of the House for the interests and happiness of all. That so it may prove is my earnest prayer and confident hope.

REMARKS ON THE CATHOLIC QUESTION.

June 30, 1828.

It would be a real and mighty benefit to do away for ever with civil distinctions on account of religious creeds.

MENDELSSHON.

Ar what seems an advanced period of time, and in a country professing to be enlightened, moral, and religious, we are called to discuss a case which, stripped of artificial circumstances, is a case of simple and equal justice; making its confident appeal to the judgment and the feelings of mankind.

It is material that the question at issue be correctly understood. For what do the Catholics petition? What is

asked for from the State? I answer, political eligibility: and who can be ignorant or doubtful of the import of these terms? The object solicited is this, that Catholics, as Catholics, as a body so denominated, and, of course, giving the name to each individual of the body, may not, on the mere ground of their being Catholics, be declared ineligible to certain offices of power, honour, and profit; may not be debarred from all hope of serving their country in these functions. The privileges of the British Constitution they cordially value in these privileges they wish to participate; surely, it is a strong presumption in behalf of the petitioners, that they form the estimate and cherish the desire.

Let not political eligibility be confounded with political power. Here we have a difference as well as a distinction. Yet no mistake is more common than to speak of the two things as the same; and the error has an unpropitious influence on the public mind. A class of men, and therefore all the individuals composing it, may be eligible to political offices; while, in point of fact, few, if any, of them are invested with such offices. To give the eligibility, is, in this country, the province of the Legislature, consisting of King, Lords, and Commons: to confer office on individuals, is the prerogative of the Executive Government, the well-established privilege of the Crown. I have yet to learn that it is a crime in any man, or set of men, to aim at political power. In a free state, this power cannot but be the object of honourable ambition. Still, nothing is, in truth, solicited, excepting the capacity of holding power: 'Do not mark us as an excluded caste-do not impress on us the seal of degradation;" this is what the Catholics, together with some other Dissidents,* entreat and urge.

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The question to be determined, is not a question of theological doctrine or of ecclesiastical discipline. Not of theological doctrine: for who will pretend that political eligibility is, at this day, refused to Catholics as the consequence of their belief in transubstantiation, in the sacrifice of the mass, and numerous other tenets? Not of ecclesiastical discipline : for who can with seriousness allege that spiritual obedience to the Bishop of Rome is the

* A few weeks since, I must have said, " sidents."

many other Dis

ground of ineligibility? Were the reverse of this statement true, were it a fact that political eligibility is withholden from Catholics because their creed, their ritual, and their spiritual allegiance, are not those of Protestants, the Intolerance would then be confessed: the Persecution would be gross and palpable. Now on what more specious plea is the refusal placed? Why, says Bishop Marsh, "they are excluded, not because they believe in the doctrine of Transubstantiation, but because they who believe in this doctrine, believe also that a foreign Potentate hath or ought to have jurisdiction in the dominions of His Majesty King George." The prelate is as incorrect in his allegation as he is unsuccessful in his reasoning. Let him not take refuge in the generality of his language. The Roman Catholics do not believe that a foreign Potentate hath or ought to have jurisdiction in these realms: they have repeatedly and solemnly disclaimed the opinion and spurned at the imputation; that they have done this, the Bishop of Peterborough knows full well. † Nor is an affinity between a belief in Transubstantiation and a belief in the civil Supremacy of the Pope more essential than affinity between a belief in the truth of the Newtonian Philosophy and attachment to speculative Republicanism.

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We have Dr. Marsh's admission that the Catholics are not excluded on account of their religious opinions. Why, then," it may be asked, "should recourse be had to a religious test?" They are the Bishop's own words: and they mean,." Why, if you exclude not a man because he believes in Transubstantiation, why frame a test which, in effect, makes his avowal of a disbelief in Transubstan、 tiation his passport to eligibility of office?" The answer given by our author, is, "A religious test, being founded on articles of faith, is less easily evaded than a political test. It is adopted, therefore, as an additional security, though the real object is to guard, not against the religious doctrine itself, but against practical principles connected with that doctrine."

* Charge, &c., 1827, p. 9.

Even the words quoted by him from the Confession prescribed by the Council of Trent, refer merely to the spiritual character of the Roman Pontiff, p. 8.

A Catholic who should receive the Lord's Supper according to rites of the Church of England, would, by that act, virtually renounce his faith in the doctrine of Transubstantiation.

Now all this is neither more nor less than the addition of insult to injury. The prelate assumes, for he cannot prove, that an inseparable connexion subsists between certain theological and certain political opinions: and, that he may exclude individuals professing those political opinions, he would employ a religious test. If he charge political disaffection upon the Catholics, let him substantiate his charge: so much being done, let the test be political. This is common sense and common equity: but why, in the name of both, must the test be religious, or theological? In other words, where is the justice of visiting a man's religious sincerity with civil disabilities? If the repeated asseverations of the Catholic body will not satisfy you, respect, however, their conscientious adherence to their communion, and their veneration for an oath. Were they dishonest and hypocritical, and inclined to evade their civil obligations, we should hear of no scruples on their part, and perhaps of no alarms on yours.*

A grievous wrong is done to them by Dr. Marsh, when he speaks of a religious test as being less easily evaded than a political test. Have the Catholics a stronger disposition to evade a test, be it of what nature it may, than he himself, or any of their Protestant reighbours? He acknowledges that they are not excluded for their religious tenets; and yet the barrier prescribed is a religious act! What, if I believe in Transubstantiation? Am 1, on that ground, a disloyal subject? Do I refuse civil allegiance to my natural and lawful sovereign? Am I less exemplary than the members of other communions in paying unto Cæsar the dues of Cæsar?

Thus, the Bishop of Peterborough is either sophistical or grossly intolerant and persecuting: either he confounds together things which are mutually and perfectly distinct, or he, in reality, would exclude Catholics on the score of their religious creed. Where political disaffection is with justice suspected, a political test may be proposed; though even this measure is rarely expedient. But a religious test can be applicable only to religious discipline and opinions: and these, ex confesso, are beside the question.

I have dwelt the longer on this part of the case, because I feel persuaded that the majority of my countrymen do not mark the difference between the theological faith and

* See Mr. Pitt's Letter to George III.