Every regimental hospital was complete in stores and hospital bedding; besides which, there were 3,000 sets of hospital bedding for the general hospital, and great quantities in the quarter-master-general's store, from whence supplies might be drawn when necessary.-There was a full establishment of medical officers attendant upon the army; and hospitals Established in England for the reception of 5,500 sick and wounded men orders were also given for sending home the sick and wounded as expeditiously as it was possible to do so. The distance being so short, and the communication so easy, it was of course concluded, that any additional supplies might be forwarded before they could possibly be required.

If the original plan had been carried into execution, the sickness of the army would not have been nearly so great. The country near Antwerp, which in that case would have become the principal theatre of our operations, is extremely healthy. The only part of our force then which would have been exposed to the effects of the unhealthy season of Zealand, was that part destined to occupy Walcheren.

As soon as the necessity was known in this country, the utmost exertion was made by the government, and the Commander in Chief at home, to supply the wants of the army in every way. The first letter upon this subject was received by the secretary of state for the war department upon the second of September; and upon the fifth it was reported to him, that all the medical men required in that letter, as well as the medicines, and stores, and medical comforts, were ready and ordered off.

The noble lord who began this debate has deprecated the delays which, he says, arose from too scrupulous an attention to the forms of office under circumstances of Auch urgency; but the noble lord does not recollect that these offices are all within a short distance of each other, and that the necessary forms therefore might be gone through in a few hours. I perfectly agree in opinion that forms of office may be much too dilatory and multiplied. But certain forms are indispensable to avoid confusion, which must always be

In point of fact, no inconvenience was ever experienced from want of medicines or medical comforts; no actual want ever existed. This you have from sir Eyre Coote in evidence; and he states that his urgent representations to the government on these subjects arose from an anxious desire to obviate that inconvenience. A convincing proof too that our supplies of bark were never exhausted is, that no application was at any time made to the navy for any part of their supply, which was ample. There does appear indeed to have been a delay in forwarding one package of 1,000lbs. of bark from this country. Whence that delay arose is not made out; but one thing is very certain, that there was never any want of bark in our hospitals. The most ample supplies of bedding were sent out as expeditiously as possible, in addition to the great provision originally made; and it stands in evidence before the House, that at no time the sick with the army exceeded the number of hospital beds.

The sickness was much beyond what could have been calculated upon by those most experienced in the effects of that climate. This appears upon the quartermaster general's journal. From a sickness so rapidly increasing, and so unexpectedly extensive, confusion must have been occasioned at first. Immediately entering upon active operations without previous possession of the country, you cannot at once have all your hospitals perfectly arranged; nay, even when they are so, and you have a great many more men wounded in a battle than you had reason to expect, much temporary inconvenience occurs. There is some analogy between this circumstance and the sudden manner in which the sickness attacked our troops in Zealand. I can readily conceive, therefore, that though our supplies of bedding with the army were fully sufficient, it might have been some time before the hospitals could be properly furnished.

Medical men were certainly at times much wanted. The original number sent out, however, was a full proportion of such a force, and very large augmentations of that number were subsequently made; in short, as many were sent out as could possibly be procured-that likewise stands in evidence before the House. But the

dearth of medical assistance upon such calamitous occasions is by no means a new case. It frequently happens in the West Indies, when the epidemics incident to that climate rage with violence.

The surgeon-general of the forces, and the inspector-general of hospitals with lord Chatham's army, have stated in evidence, that if the necessary precautions had been taken, the effects might have been considerably palliated though the disorder itself could not have been prevented; and that if they had been consulted in time they should have suggested those precautions. Now really it has never been usual for the government of a country to impart to the medical department the destination of an expedition, excepting in cases of extreme necessity. If an expedition were going to a great distance, then such necessity might perhaps arise. But in the present instance that was not the case, and such communications, unless absolutely called for, are certainly acts of imprudence. I am far from meaning to dispute that our present surgeon general, Mr. Keate, is a man of strict integrity and well deserving of confidence, but unnecessary disclosures are always to be avoided.

In point of fact, ample supplies of all medicines, stores, &c. either accompanied the army, or were sent out in time; and with regard to precautions, as the sickness did not begin till about four weeks after our first landing, there was full time to have taken them, had they been suggested. How came the medical department, the moment the destination of the troops was notorious, not to suggest those precautions? Was it their business to wait till regularly consulted upon the subject? Certainly not. It lay entirely within their province; and whilst these palliations must have occurred forcibly to them, the government at home and the Commander in Chief abroad could not be aware of them. Any thing necessary for this purpose could very soon have been sent to so short a distance; even 40,000 flannel waistcoats, had they been wanted, might have been made up in London upon an emergency in a week, and they would have arrived at Walcheren in a fortnight from the day they were ordered. That the necessary precautions, therefore, alluded to by the surgeon-general; Mr. Keate, and the inspector-general, Mr. Webb, were not taken, neither the government nor the commander in chief of the Expedition are in the least to blame.

I must not omit to observe, that it was expected by the government that the chief part of the army would have returned, after completing the service upon which it was sent, by the end of August, or beginning of September at latest.

Captain Puget, naval commissioner of Flushing, states, that he saw several of the sick in the hospitals there lying in their great coats on the floor, not having beds to lie upon and that according to the reports of some officers many of them were without medicines for four days. He also describes the hospitals themselves to have been very bad.-Now, no hospitals were chosen till regularly inspected by medical officers; the roofs of some of them had been damaged by the bombardment, but it appears that they were repaired as soon as possible.-At times the hospitals were certainly much crowded, which is accounted for in evidence by the rapid influx of the sick. The large naval storehouse at Flushing, where capt. Puget saw some of the men whom he took to be sick, was not an hospital but a barrack, which at that time was of course unknown to him.-Colonel Offney, who was acting as quarter-master general in Flushing, and who often went into the hospitals there, states in evidence, that he never saw any sick who were not furnished at least with straw and blankets; that these were only the slightest cases; and that they were all provided with beds as soon as it was possible to get them from the stores.

With respect to some of the troops being without medicines for four days, it is clearly proved, that this was owing to the regimental surgeon of colonel Cochrane's battalion not making timely application for the necessary supply.

It is stated, that some ships which brought home the sick were too much crowded, and without medical attendance, or any proper assistance. If this was so it certainly was a very unpardonable neglect; but none of these circumstances necessarily imply an inculpation of the government, or the commander in chief of the Expedition. They can only be answerable for general arrangements and general directions; and if defects in the details are discovered, the blame must fall upon those who were specifically charged with their execution.

I cannot quit this subject without again most sincerely lamenting that such a calamity should have befallen us; but it is impossible, I think, after this investiga

vernor, general Fox, immdiately repair to his post; and were not reinforcements sent out without a moment's delay, lest the Spaniards should take advantage of the reduced state of our garrison? Let me ask, too, has it ever been established as a principle, that we should not conquer and retain important posts, because their climate is occasionally unwholesome? Until that principle is established, as one by which the government is to be regulated, let it not be argued that there is a difference between not abandoning possessions which you have long retained, and seizing upon others with a view to retention, and forming upon this argument an accusation against ministers for attempting to retain Walcheren. In the year 1794 we had troops stationed a considerable time in the province of Zealand.-In the reign of Queen Elizabeth, this country retained the island of Walcheren, during a period of 30 years. The climate then was of course the same as now. And it has frequently been in the contemplation of different governments of this country, to acquire permanent possession of that island: the plan has been from time to time laid aside, not on account of the climate, but purely from military reasons: now, on this occasion those reasons were in our fa

your.

Had we not abandoned Walcheren, it might have been very easily defended; we should have strengthened and perfected the works of Flushing, and made proper casemates for the troops; we should have erected two strong forts of regular construction and profile, to protect the anchorage: these forts would have been connected with Flushing by a line also of regular construction and profile; the whole covered by a very deep and broad wet ditch. Such arrangements, combined with the means of inundation in your power, and considering that you are masters of the sea, would have rendered that situation impregnable. You would have had some strong forts, likewise of regular construction and profile, with casemates for the troops, and bomb-proof magazines, so placed as to prevent the enemy front collecting vessels in the interior of the Slough Passage, the extremities of which would be watched by your naval means; and the Slough is seldom or ever frozen in such a manner as to be available for military purposes. The enemy's attack of Walcheren, therefore, would have been nearly, if not quite, reduced to an in

vasion of that island upon the northern or north-western side; against which our naval station in the Roompot would have been a great protection: where, with Flushing harbour for the ships to come into occasionally, we could, I conclude, always have kept a fleet.

The best barracks would have been constructed for the troops; we should also have had floating barracks, in which a considerable part of the garrison might always have been kept during the unhealthy season; and it is well known, that no man afloat was attacked by the fever. We should likewise have had floating bos. pitals: and whenever the sick amounted to any considerable number, they would have been immediately sent to England. And the whole garrison might have been frequently relieved from this country.

The effects of the climate might thus have been in a great measure obviated; and when the fortifications which I have described were completed, the amount of force stationary on the island of Walcheren need not have been considerable, because if the enemy effected a landing in superior numbers, you could at once retire to your works and bid him defiance; his communication would probably soon be cut off by our naval means, and our troops could be reinforced from England to any extent. The enemy therefore would certainly not succeed in taking Flushing, or in annoying the anchorage in its neighbourhood, and most probably would lose every man he had landed upon Walche

ren.

It appears then evident, that if the ministers had determined upon evacuating Walcheren, in consequence of sir Eyre Coote's letter of the 17th of September, received here about the 21st, the removal of the sick, the demolition of the enemy's naval establishments there (a point of very essential importance), and the final evacuation could not have taken place, till long after the period of the usual and almost invariable termination of the sickness; and really, under that impression, they would have been unjustifiable as a government, if they had not endeavoured to retain a possession of such extreme importance as long as it was practicable to do so; more especially as they were fully entitled to expect, that the sickness would cease in about three weeks from the receipt of that letter which it is contended ought to have governed their determination.

I do not hesitate to say, that the permanent attainment of such an object as Flushing, would amply have compensated the efforts of a whole campaign however long and arduous. At the same time, when, contrary to all reasonable expeoration, the government found so extensive and calamitous a sickness continuing beyond the period of its customary duration, I am ready to admit, that they are not to blame for viewing it as an imperious and paramount necessity, and for sacrificing to that consideration a political object so closely interwoven with the vital interests of the state. I contend, however, that it was not only very natural for them to be slow in coming to such a decision, but if they had done so till driven to it by the irresistible necessity which forced upon them such a disastrous alternative, they might justly have been accused of lightly sacrificing the best interests of their country; and they would not only have deserved all the censure now attempted to be passed upon them, but impeachment would not have been more than adequate to the offence.

The expence of the Expedition to the Scheldt has also been much dwelt upon. The least calculation made by the public upon that point has amounted to five or six millions; whereas it appears, by papers on the table, that the extraordinary expence, deducting of course what the naval means employed and the troops would have cost if they had remained at home, and considering that most of the transports could not at any rate have been paid off, according to their old agreements, till later in the year, did not amount to more than one million.

The failure has been talked of as complete, which is entirely erroneous. An extent of sickness totally unexpected, and which those most experienced in that climate could not possibly calculate upon, alone occasioned the abandonment of a conquest, the permanent possession of which would have been cheaply purchased at the whole cost which the most exaggerated statements have represented as that of the Expedition to the Scheldt; and the having destroyed the naval establishments at Flushing, so as to make that port of little or no use to the enemy for

* Vide Evidence of lieut. gen. Don and lieut. col. Pilkington, who was the engineer employed in the demolition of the basin, &c. See vel. 15, Appendix.

nearly two years, is a service undoubtedly of great importance.

I do not dwell much upon the diversion in favour of Austria, because, though the only one we could make, it was not of considerable magnitude. However, Austria herself thought it essential, as appears in the correspondence of that government; and the presence of so large an army in an enemy's territory, carrying on an attack against one of his principal naval and commercial establishments, must always occasion great embarrassment.

I think there can now be no doubt respecting the general policy by which his Majesty's government was actuated, in determining to direct the efforts of this country to the Scheldt; the expediency of that measure too is completely established, not upon any loose reasoning, but upon fair inference from the evidence and papers now upon the table of the House. It is very clearly proved too, that the utmost attention was paid to the wants of the army by the government, and the commander in chief of the Expedition. That the sickness was an inevitable calamity with which they cannot be charged; and that the attempt to retain as long as possible the island of Walcheren, was not only justifiable, but an indispensable obligation. I trust therefore that the Resolu tions of censure proposed by the noble lord will not for a moment be entertained. They are wholly unmerited, and if they were to pass, would tend to shackle the exertions of every government in a manner the most prejudicial to the interests of the country. But that cannot be, until all regard for those interests, and all liberality and justice shall have fled from the British House of Commons.

I have now only to observe, that I heartily concur in the motion approving the conduct of the army and navy. To the Resolutions of fact I shall propose the pre vious question, because they are unnecessary; and to the Resolutions of censure a decided negative; and I shall beg leave to conclude with moving Resolutions of an opposite tendency.

Mr. Herbert (of Kerry) expressed his anxiety to decide upon this question solely upon its own merits, unprejudiced by party views. In every view he could give the question, it was impossible for him not to have wished that our assistance was not fully applied to Spain. The reason stated with respect to the want of bullion, he could scarcely believe, when