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cannot avoid observing their sensible qualities, nay, their very substances, to be in a continual fux: and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same change. Nor have'we of active power (which is the more proper signification of the word power) fexrer instances : since whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it. But yet, if we will consider it attentively, bodies, by our senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reftection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to action, and there being but two sorts of action, whereof we have any idea, viz. thinking and motion; let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all, it is only from reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion, than an action in it. For when the ball obeys the motion of a billiard-stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion : also when by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and loses in itself so much as the other received : which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power of moving in body, whilst we observe it only to transfer, but not produce any motion. For it is but a very obscure idea of power, which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the passion. For so is motion in a body impelled by another; the continuation of the alteration made in it from rest to motion being little more an action, than the continuation of the alteration of 175 figure by the same blow is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, whicit
were before at rest. So that it seems to me, we have lites from the observation of the operation of bodies by our
senses but a very imperfect obscure idea of active able te?
power, since they afford us not any idea in themselves ter of the power to begin any action, either motion or ord for thought. But if, from the impulse bodies are observed ? Obce to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a ble to me clear idea of power, it serves as well to my purpose, thing we sensation being one of those ways whereby the mind attere comes by its ideas : only I thought it worth while to 1 clear to consider here by the way, whether the mind doth not ve from receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection ralma on its own operations, than it doth from any external rosinsensation. winking . 5. This at least I think evident, that the clear we find in ourselves a power to begin or derstanding, ze A7 forbear, continue or end several actions of two powers. it all is our minds, and motions of our bodies, 9. 1x barely by a thought or preference of the mind order100g sing, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doallt er ing such or such a particular action. This power tion which the inind has thus to order the consideration of action e' any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer Iliards the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and 35101: vice versa, in any particular instance: is that which we motion " call the will. The actual exercise of that power, by ution i directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that Lo mude which we call volition or willing. The forbearance of Ery Oik" that action, consequent to such order or command of
where the mind, is call voluntary. And whatsoevor action re any * is perforined without such a thought of the mind, is we called involuntary. The power of perception is that uit dhe * which we call the understanding. Perception, which
inabo we make the act of the understanding, is of three sorts; the er l. The perception of ideas in our mind. 2. The persitlerception of the signification of signs. 3. The percep. Griestion of the connexion or repugnancy, agreement or des of disagreement, that there is between any of our ideas, Hection All these are attributed to the understanding, or percep
pictive power, though it be the two latter only that use what allows us to say we understand.
Faculty. . $. 6. These powers of the mind, viz. of
perceiving, and of preferring, are usually 'called by another name: and the ordinary way of speaking, is, that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind ; a word proper enough, if it be used as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real beings in the soul that performed those actions of understanding and volition. For when we say the will is the commanding and superior faculty of the soul: that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties; that it follows the dictates of the understanding, &c. though these, and the like expressions, by those that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things, than the sound of words, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense : yet I suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of faculties has inisled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did cominand, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings : which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating to them. Whence the. $. 7. Every one, I think, finds in himidea of li. self a power to begin or forbear, continue berty and or put an end to several actions in himseli. necessity. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity. Liberty,
$. 8. All the actions that we have any what.
idea of, reducing themselves, as lias been
said, to these two, viz. thinking and motion; so far as a man has power to think, or not to think ; to move, or not to move, according to the preférence or direction of his own mind; so far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance areas not equally in a man's power; wherever doing or 101 a doing, will not equally follow upon the preference or his mind directing it: there be is not free, though per
haps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of
5. 9. A tennis ball, whether in motion
ular Supposes the
uriderstand. rest, is not by any one taken to be a free' ing and will. agent If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any volition, or preference of motion to rest, or vice versa ; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both
motion and rest come under our idea of necessary, and mut are so called. Likewise a man falling into the water
(a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, DELETE is not a free agent. For though he has volition, though
he prefers bis not falling to falling ; yet the forbearance dist of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cescrt sation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and in so therefore therein he is not free. So a man striking himtente self, or his friend, by a convulsive motion of his arm, men! which it is not in his power, by volition or the direc
tion of his mind, to stop, or forbear, 110-body thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting
by necessity and constraint. as J. 10. Again, suppose a man be carried,
Belongs not Er whilst fast asleep, into a room, where is a to volition.
person he longs to see and speak with; is to die and be there locked fast in, beyond is power to get Por out; he awakes, and is glad to find bimself in so dehaaran sirable company, which he stays willingly in, i. e. pre
fers his stay to going away; I ask, Is not this stay. vo.. referente luntary? I think no-body will doubt it; and yet being i Vol. 1.
locked fait in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to
thought or volition to stop; and therefore in respect to these motions, where rest depends not on his choice, nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it should prefer it, he is not a free agent. Convulsive motions agitate his legs, so that though he wills it ever so much, he cannot by any power of his mind stop their motion (as in that odd disease called chorea sancti Viti) but he is perpetually dancing: he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much neceffity of moving, as a stone that falls, or a tennisball struck with a racket. On the other side, a palsy or the stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind, if it would thereby transfer bis body to another place. In all these there is want of freedom ; though the sitting still even of a paralytick, whilst he prefers it to a removal, is truly voluntary. Voluntary then is not opposed to necessary, but to involuntary. For a man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the state he is in, to its absence or change, though necessity has made it in itself unalterable.
. $. 12. As it is in the motions of the body; Liberty,
so it is in the thoughts of our minds : where what.
any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in