Imágenes de página
PDF
ePub

should not think of denying the one to contain moral excellence, for the sake of humbling the creature; neither is there any ground for doing so with respect to the other.

But there are other ends to be answered by maintaining the holy nature of faith; and such as Mr. M. himself will not deny to be of importance. -First, It is of importance that faith be considered as a duty for if this be denied, Christ is denied the honour due to his name. But it is impossible to maintain that faith is a duty, if it contain no holy exercise of the heart. This, I presume, has already been made to appear. God requires nothing of intelligent creatures but what is holy.-Secondly, It is of importance that the faith which we inculcate be genuine, or such as will carry us to heaven. But if it have no holiness in its nature, it is dead, and must be unproductive. Mr. M. considers true faith as the root of holiness: but if it be so, it must be holy itself; for the nature of the fruit corresponds with that of the root. If the difference between a living and dead faith do not consist in this, that the one is of a holy nature, and the other not so, I should be glad to be informed wherein it does consist; and whether the nature of the one be the same as that of the other, the difference between them arising merely from circumstances?-Thirdly, It is of importance that unbelief be allowed to be a sin, as it is that which, by Mr. M.'s acknowledgment, "impeaches the moral character of God." But if there be no holiness in faith, there can be no

sin in its opposite. It is true, Mr. M. denies the principle of this argument, and speaks of " innumerable instances" of things which have no virtue, and yet the opposite of them is sin. This, I am persuaded, is not true. Whatever is the proper opposite of sin, is holiness. The instances which are given do not prove the contrary; as abstinence from various crimes, eating when we are hungry, and believing a human testimony. There may indeed be no holiness in these things, as they are performed by apostate creatures: but if they were performed as God requires them to be, (and which they should be, in order to their being the proper opposites to the sins referred to) they would be holy exercises. God requires us to abstain from all sin, from a regard to his name; to eat and drink, and do whatever we do, even the giving credit to the testimony of a friend, "when we have reason to do so," to his glory. These things thus performed would be exercises of holiness.

I am aware that those who have opposed the doctrine of total depravity have argued, that as .being without natural affection, is sin, so the being possessed of it must be virtue. To this it has been justly answered, that though a being without natural affection argues the highest degree of depravity, as nothing else could overcome the common principles of human nature; yet it does not follow that mere natural affection is virtuous: for, if So, virtue would be found in animals. This answer is just, and sufficient to repel the objection on the subject

of human depravity: but it will not apply to the case in hand. The question there relates to a matter of fact, or what men actually are; but here to a matter of right, or what they ought to be. Whatever is capable of being done by a moral agent, with an eye to the glory of God, ought to be so done; and if it be, it is holy; if not, whatever may be thought of it by men, it is sinful. Natural affection itself, if subordinated to him, would be sanctified, or rendered holy; and the same might be said of every natural inclination or action of life. It is thus that God would be served, even in our civil concerns; and holiness to the Lord written, as it were, upon the bells of the horses.

I have known several persons in England who have agreed with Mr. M. as to faith belonging merely to the intellectual faculty, and the moral state of the heart having no influence upon it; but then they either denied, or have been very reluc tant to own it to be duty. The mind, say they, is passive in the belief of a proposition: we cannot believe as we will; but according to evidence. It may be our duty to examine that evidence; but as to faith, being altogether involuntary, it cannot be a duty.' And if it be a mere passive reception of the truth, on which the state of the will has no influence. I do not perceive how this consequence can be denied. But then the same might be said of unbelief: If evidence do not appear to us, how can we believe? It may be our sin not to examine: but as to our not believing, being altogether in

voluntary, it cannot be a sin.' By this mode of reasoning, the sin of unbelief is explained away, and unbelievers commonly avail themselves of it for that purpose. As both these consequences (I mean the denying of faith being a duty, and unbelief a sin) are allowed by Mr. M. to be utterly repugnant to the scriptures, it becomes him, if he will defend the premises, to shew that they have no necessary connexion.

The above reasoning might hold good, for aught I know, in things which do not interest the heart: but to maintain it in things which do, especially in things of a moral and practical nature, is either to deny the existence of prejudice, or of its having any influence in hindering belief.

The author of Glad Tidings to perishing sinners, though he pleads for faith as including our receiving Christ, and coming to him; yet is decidedly averse from all holy disposition of the heart preceding it, not only as affording a warrant, but as any way necessary to the thing itself. And as he unites with Mr. Mc. Lean in considering the sinner as an enemy of God at the time of his being justified, he must, to be consistent, consider faith as having no holiness in its nature. His method of reasoning on the priority of repentance to believing, would seem to denote the same thing. He allows speculative repentance, or a change of mind which has "no holiness" in it, to be necessary to believing; giving this as the reason: "While a sinner is either stu

[ocr errors]

pidly inattentive to his immortal interests, or ex66 pecting justification by his own obedience, he will "not come to Christ." It should seem then, that aversion of heart to the gospel plan, or a desire to be justified by one's own obedience, is no objection to coming to Christ; and that a sinner will come to him notwithstanding this, provided he be right in speculation, and his conscience sufficiently alarmed. If so, there certainly can be nothing spiritual or holy in the act of coming. The respect which I feel both towards Mr. Booth, and Mr. Mc. Lean, is not a little but there needs no apology for opposing these sentiments. Truth ought to be dearer to us than the greatest or best of men.

[ocr errors]

Mr. M. writes as if he were at a loss to know my meaning. “By a corresponding temper of heart, "he says, cannot be meant some good disposition previous to faith; for as the question relates to "faith itself, that would be foreign to the point." I have no scruple in saying, however, that I consider it as previous to faith; and as to what is suggested of its irrelevancy, the same might be said of unbelief. Were I to say that unbelief includes the exercise of an evil temper of heart, and that herein consists the sin of it, I should say no more than is plainly intimated by the sacred writers, who describe unbelievers as stumbling at the word, BEING DISOBEDIENT.* Yet Mr. M. might answer, By an evil temper of heart you cannot mean any thing

* 1 Pet. ii. 8.

« AnteriorContinuar »