word zaga, does by no means satisfy us, that the common understanding of that word, according to which it signifies the seat of the affections, is not the true one. It is so generally admitted, that a succession of thoughts or volitions, good or evil, must have a principle, or source from which they originate, that it is commonly assumed as a self-evident truth: And we do not perceive, that the author of these discourses denies this principle. He is not one of those who think that our thoughts have no cause of their existence in the soul itself. This he admits; but denies that there is any moral evil in this cause, however sinful its effects may be. We shall have occasion again to return to this point. On the present argument we would only observe further, that what has already been mentioned, respecting sins of omission, is itself a sufficient answer to all that is said on this part of the subject, and proves conclusively that all sin does not consist in acts, for the root of all sin is the omission of loving God.

The fourth and last argument of the preacher is, " An appeal (p. 12) to the absurdity of supposing that any thing else should constitute a ground of blame, in the subjects of moral government; and the reasonableness of taking this view."

"For," says he, "what other view can we take that leads not to absurdity? For, sin must lie, either in the consequences of wrong choices of the agent, or in the causes of them, or else in the wrong

choices themselves. But sin cannot lie

simply in the consequences of wrong choices, that they occasion evil to others. For although it may be true that sin does in most cases occasion evil to others, yet the sin itself is distinct from the evil flow. ing from it, nor does it essentially consist in its actually occasioning evil to others. For, ravenous beasts may occasion evil to others by their conduct, as well as men; and among men, it may be that, the worst sins in them may be prevented from actually bringing evil on others, and their best conduct, on the other hand, (as in the administration of salutary correction,) may occasion it in a high degree.

"Nor can it lie in the causes that influence an agent to sinful choices. I mean

any cause which precedes in the order of nature, and renders certain the sinful determinations and choices of the agent. For although a previous choice, which was wrong, may influence an agent in making a present wrong choice, yet to make a present sin consist in its being occasioned by a previous choice which was wrong, would equally require us to self, to lie, not in itself, but in some premake the sin of that previous choice itvious sinful choice of the agent which influenced him to it; and so on, till we come to the first choice or act of will in

the series, which could have no act of that on this position there could be no will preceding it to constitute it sin,-so such thing as sin, in the whole series of acts from first to last. Besides, many things influence an agent to a present determination of evil, aside from previous determinations: things which are wholly out of his own being, and pertain wholly to the agency of others: and to make his sin lie in such a cause of his determinations, and not in his determinations themselves, would be to make that pertain to his being which did not pertain to his being."

As to the consequences of wrong choices, we have nothing to do with them now. What we assert and what Professor F. denies, is, that the causes of sinful choices, which exist in the disposition, or temper of the soul itself, are sinful. We have not been able to see that he has made it appear, that any absurdity is consequent on this opinion. What is said about one choice being influenced by a previous one, is nothing to the purpose. The common belief of men is, that the cause of evil.choices is a moral corruption existing in the soul; and we do not see a single word in the amplification of this argument, which goes to show that there is any absurdity in such a supposition. Indeed, to our apprehension, the absurdity lies all on the other side. To maintain, that there is a cause existing in the soul from which all sinful volitions proceed, and yet, that this principle has no moral evil in it, bears very much the appearance of a palpable absurdity. It seems to us like saying, that there is something, or rather every thing, in an effect, which was not in its cause; which is the same as to say the

there is an effect without a cause. Or it is like the assertion that if a vessel contain poison, yet there is nothing evil in it, unless the contents be put in motion.

The point of difference between Professor F. and us, is not, whether the posterity of Adam have undergone a change in consequence of his fall. This, indeed, he seems reluctant to grant in the body of his discourses, but in the notes appended, he plainly recognises the fact, that there is an "effect on their constitution, which renders their sinning certain." There is then a corruption of the constitution of man. Somehow or other, his soul has suffered injury. This is admitted. The soul is so injured that the sinning of every man who comes into the world is certain; and it is also certain, that left to himself, he will do nothing else but sin. This depravity, Professor F. and those who agree with him, assert, is not of a moral nature-is not sinful. If it be not moral, then, to use the language of this school, it is physical. The true state of man by nature, therefore, according to this theory, is, that he inherits from Adam, a physical defect, which is the certain cause of his sinning, but which has in itself nothing of the nature of sin. The heart is diseased, but there is no evil in the disease, until it puts forth acts; and although the disease of the heart is the sole cause of the evil of the actions, yet the heart which produces these streams of moral evil, partakes not at all of that malignity which it communicates. While the thoughts and volitions which it sends forth are abominable and deserving of eternal death, the source itself is pure, and entirely free from fault. If men can please themselves with such philosophy and theology as this, they are welcome to all the honour and gratification which their peculiar notions may obtain for them. But what is not a little surprising, they establish that very physical depravity of which they are so much afraid. Adam has " entailed upon his posterity the

causes of sin, mortality, and condemnation."-(p. 43.)

But after all, this is the labouring point in the new system; and the Professor seems exceedingly unwilling to come to an explanation of what constitutes this necessity of sinning, in all Adam's posterity: and upon a second reading of what he says, we are doubtful whether or not he makes this inherited cause of sinning, to be internal or external. "Do you ask," says he, "how Adam could occasion a moral certainty, applying to every instance of his posterity? I may reply, that if I cannot tell how, it may yet be true; for there are many instances of moral certainty which I know to be in fact founded on their proper causes, but cannot exactly state how they are." We are the more disposed to doubt, whether we have understood the writer correctly on this point, because in a pamphlet, on human depravity, published in the city of New York, and believed to be from the same school, the writer explicitly denies that the soul of man has suffered any injury by the fall; and asserts that the certainty of sinning (which he also admits) is owing entirely to the state of temptation to which man is exposed. Now, this is honestly speaking out. When a man avows such opinions as these, we know where to place him. He may still profess to be orthodox, and may associate with the orthodox; but if this is not barefaced Pelagianism, then Pelagius was no Pelagian. But Professor F. is extremely cautious here. He endeavours to keep this point out of view, by raising a mist about it. He asks a question, and then flies off with a vague, unsatisfactory reply. Now to us it seems to be a cardinal point, to know where this cause lies. If it be internal, then an internal remedy is needed; if it exist in outward circumstances, then it will be sufficient to seek to have these changed. This is certainly a point which ought not to be left in the dark. Men, it seems, are under a moral certainty

of sinning, and doing nothing else but sin, as long as they are left to themselves; but why so? Where is the cause? Is there any defect in our nature, which lays us under this sad necessity? We really need information here. But the Professor will give us no satisfaction. He says, "there are many instances of moral certainty which I know to be in fact founded on their proper causes, but cannot exactly state what they are."

If ingenious men did not involve themselves in a mist of metaphysics, they never could persuade themselves, that such a theory as we are now considering, would have any tendency to remove the objections which are made to the scriptural doctrine of original sin. The doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin is first rejected as unreasonable and unrighteous-And what then? Why men, in consequence of being the children of Adam, are born in a state of inherent depravity; and for this depravity, which is visited on them for no other reason but because their first father was depraved, they are doomed to everlasting misery. It requires little discernment to see that this scheme removes no difficulty; or if it seem to remove one, it substitutes another far more formidable. Hence this scheme of inherent depravity is rejected by some, and a new theory is invented. Men, it is said, do not inherit from Adam sin of any kind, either imputed or inherent: but only "the causes" of sin, mortality, and condemnation. Thus all the difficulties about original sin, it is supposed, are removed at once-There is in fact no such thing. Very good: but how is it then, that all men sin as soon as they are capable of moral action? The explanation is, that they have entailed on them from Adam, "the causes of sin, mortality, and condemnation." And will the cavilling rationalist be satisfied with this? No; he will say immediately-" It is a pitiful evasion. You tell me I am not a sinner by inheritance

from Adam, but assure me that the causes of sin are entailed upon mecauses, so certain in their operation, that not one of all the millions of Adam's race ever escaped the pollution." And truly, as far as the righteousness of God is concerned, it is not of the least consequence, whether this powerful cause be external or internal. In the upshot, it all amounts to the same thing. Man is under a moral necessity of becoming a sinner; and for this sin, the causes of which are entailed upon him, he must die. What is there in the imputation of the first man's sin, more unreasonable or unrighteous than this?

We will now consider this doctrine in its bearings on other doctrines connected with it; and we will make our remarks short, leaving it to the reader to fill up the outline.

1. According to this theory, which makes all sin to consist in wrong choices, and all holiness in right choices, it was impossible that man should have been created in the moral image of God, or in a state of holiness; for man must have had an existence before he could choose, and choosing was his own act, therefore he could not have been created in a holy state, but must have formed the holiness of his own character, by right choices. The causes of holiness, however, might have been created in him, or with him.

2. This theory is a complete denial of the doctrine of original sin, in all its parts, both imputed and inherent. We can scarcely acquit the reverend Professor of some want of candour, in what he writes about original sin, in one of his inferences, (see p. 27) where he says-" The subject may assist us in making a right explanation of original sin,"and that "nothing can in truth be called original sin, but his first moral choice or preference being evil." But Professor F. knows as well as any one, that there never existed a heretick who denied original sin, according to this definition. For as

all men sin, there must be a first sin. Pelagius, if this be a correct definition, held the doctrine of original sin, as fully as Augustine; and much more correctly, if we receive this theory. But let men deal fairly with their readers-If they reject an old doctrine, let them not retain the name, as a blind to impose on the ignorant and unwary.

There is; indeed, one scheme on which original sin may consist with this new theory, and that is the opinion, that man is a moral agent in the womb, and puts forth wrong choices in the first moment of his conception: but Professor F. has excluded himself from the benefit of this theory, by his definition of sin, that it is "the violation of a known law;" for it will scarcely be contended that the newly formed homunculus has the knowledge of law; it might as well be supposed that he was a great philosopher, and understood all the laws of nature.

It was matter of surprise, therefore, to find the learned Professor, in one of his notes, (p. 45) hesitating, whether this might not be the true doctrine; at least refusing to express any opinion, and very formally recounting the reasons, pro and con. Unhappily, for him, however, he had prejudged the cause already. Whoever can adopt this theory, he cannot, while he maintains the fundamental proposition of his whole system. The conclusion is evident, therefore, that this theory subverts the doctrine of original sin, in toto.

3. If furnishes no reason why infants are subject to suffering and death. They are treated as sinners, while they are perfectly innocent. Let the advocates of this opinion exercise all their ingenuity to invent some more plausible reason for this procedure of the Divine government, than did Pelagius. If they can satisfactorily remove this difficulty from their system, we shall be disposed to think more favourably of it. But we are persuaded that this single fact will forever be fatal to every system, which denies that

infants have sin imputed to them. And the Professor has not even noticed this difficulty; perhaps he judged it best to keep it out of view.

4. But if infants have no sin they have no need of redemption. Christ died only for sinners, therefore those infants that die before they become moral agents, have no part in the death of Christ; but are saved, if saved it all, without a Mediator; which is in direct contradiction to the scriptures, and the perpetual belief of the universal church.

5. On this principle, infants which die before they commit sin, have no need of regeneration by the Holy Spirit. They are not polluted with sin, and why should they be regenerated?

6. According to this theory, there is no meaning in baptism as applied to infants. This sacrament, undoubtedly is an emblem of the cleansing of the sin-polluted soul, by the washing of regeneration. Pelagius was not more gravelled by any objection made to his doctrine, than by this.

7. It is difficult to say what regeneration is, in adult sinners, according to this theory. Undoubtedly, it must remove the cause of evil volitions, or wrong choices; but what that cause is does not appear. If it is a defect in the soul itself, then it must be a new creation of the soul, as to its physical powers; but surely this is a strange notion of regeneration. But if the cause of the wrong choice is without us, then there is no need of any operation on the soul, but merely a change of external circumstances. The writer on human depravity, mentioned above, makes the supernatural agency of the Spirit necessary, to give force to motives and render them effectual; but why any supernatural agency should be deemed necessary upon his theory, we cannot understand. When the soul is in itself perfectly free from depravity, except what exists in its acts, there seems to be no manner of necessity for any Divine power to be exerted. All that is necessary is to present sufficient motives to the un

derstanding, and this can be effected by external instruction, by means of the word, without any supernatural agency.

8. If this doctrine be true, then there is no more sin in the worst man living, when not engaged in moral action, than in the best. Judas Iscariot when asleep, had no more depravity in his beart, than the beloved John; or even than there was in the spotless human soul of Jesus itself!

9. According to this doctrine, it does not appear how there can be any such things as moral habits.

10. Two principles are assumed in these discourses which have no foundation in truth; the first is, that to suppose the soul itself to be stained with inherent depravity, is to make depravity a physical thing. But the truth is, moral principles can exist in the soul, when not exercised, just as well as intellectual faculties. True, if by physical, be understood that which is natural, then native depravity is physical; but if by it be meant something which is opposed to what is moral, then the assumption is false.

The other principle assumed without foundation in these discourses, is, that if one choice be wrong, all that follow it will be so, according to an ultimate law of our constitution. The author's words are"Now, as it is an ultimate fact, that an original choice or preference of a wrong end or forbidden object does, itself, occasion the certainty of a continued train of evil choices by the agent, the total depravity of the agent, the original choice or first inclination of the will to evil, sustains towards the acts of the agent, as does no other, the relation of a primary influential cause of their being evil." (p. 29.) This is a new philosophy of the human mind; that if a moral agent make one wrong choice, it is a matter of constitutional necessity, that all consecutive acts should be evil also. It seems to have been invented for the occasion, to assist in harmonizing the new sys

tem; for thus, without any inherent principle of evil, total depravity can be accounted for. But this new dogma is contrary to all experience, and therefore ought to be rejected. as false.

Finally, we close our examination of these discourses, by expressing our regret, that Professor Fitch has published on this subject so hastily. We are informed that he is yet a young man, and, we think therefore that it would have been wise in him, to have revolved this theory in his mind, and to have discussed it with his friends, for half a score of years to come; for it is no very easy matter for a professor of theology to retract an opinion which he has once published to the world. Honour, interest, consistency, all are pledged, to go on defending what has once been uttered, ex cathedra. Few men have the magnanimity, or shall we call it humility, of an Augustine, a Luther, or a Baxter, to retract and refute their own errors.

We must also express our surprise and grief, that on the very spot, where we had supposed the sound theology of President Edwards had taken deeper root than any where else in the world, there should be promulgated, by men called orthodox, a system subversive of the radical principles of that great and good man!