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steps together; one set find the bill, another decide on the fact, another the law; but that House, which administers no oath, which squares itself by no form, which makes no previous examination of the fact, jumps at once upon its dangerous and most alarming conclusion, and finds the accused guilty. And for what?-for their privilege. Then let gentlemen who said this was the privilege of the House, point out where it was so laid down. To his mind such a doctrine was untenable, and contrary to the law of the land, which declared that no man can be condemned without trial. Lord Coke laid it down explicitly that no man could be sent to prison without trial and judgment. The

withstanding this outrage which the House of Commons sustained by the attack upon its officer, it presumed not to touch any of the offending parties, except its own members, the lord mayor and alderman Oliver; passing over the printer, the journalist, and alderman Wilkes, who, at that time, was not a member of the House than which disaffirmance of its power a stronger proof cannot be conceived. It would also be recollected that when the libel in the North Briton, No. 45, and the gross publication," the Essay on Woman" published under the name of a bishop (Warburton) of course a member of the Upper House, came under their cognizance, they merely addressed to have the delinquent prosecuted by the Attorney-privilege talked of resembled the bye-laws General.. In adducing further authority on the point, sir Francis said, that he felt it too like trifling with the understanding of the House to expend their time. It was a doctrine clearly laid down by lord Coke, that no man could be fined or confined, but in a court of record; no court but that in which forty shillings damages might be given could be a court of record; the argument came into the form of syllogism, and the necessary conclusion was, that the power of fine and imprisonment was not in that House. But no right to fine was assumed. Why then was the greater power retained, when the smaller one was admitted to be illegal? Why was the maxim of law and reason violated?" Cui minus non convenit, cui majus non convenit.”

of a corporation, sufficient to bind themselves, but which could not overturn the law of the land, as laid down by the father of it. This was to shew the House to be as great as King, Lords and Commons. It was besides an encroachment on the prerogative of the crown, whose privileges it was to see that no unlawful restraint was laid on the liberty of the subject. He might be told this was a privilege of parliament. He answered, No; it was only a privilege assumed by one branch of the legislature; and he contended that the House was not entitled to take that arbitrary rule to themselves. If gentlemen should shew resolutions favourable to the exercise of this right as a privilege of the House, he could be at no loss to shew others of a contrary The warrant of committal too, he must principle. Sir F. Norton had said, that he contend, was illegal in all its parts, but would pay no more attention to a resolu eminently so in its conclusion. A legal tion of the House of Commons than to that warrant must conclude with the words, of a set of drunken porters at an alehouse. "till the party be delivered by due course The observation was coarse, but it was of law;" this warrant ends with the words just. If gentlemen, therefore, were of 4 during the pleasure of the House." He opinion, that a resolution of that House (sir Francis) highly valued the rights of was equal to that of all the branches of the that House; but from whatever part of constitution, they would agree in rejecting the constitution an exertion of arbitrary his proposition. But, if with him they power came, it was his duty, it was the thought that they could not overturn the solemn and sacred duty of every English-law of the land and the acts of parliament man, to avow himself hostile to it. There were, in a matter of this kind, two obvious questions to be considered with a view to justice. The first, " crime, or no crime?" The next was, if a crime, was the party accused guilty of it? The House, by such a proceeding as it had resorted to, invo.ved the assumption of the judicial, execu tive, and legislative powers; but this was in the very teeth of law. In the due administration of the law, it was wisely provided that the same men shall not take two

solemnly passed, by any assumed power exercised by that House alone, they would agree with him that John Gale Jones must be discharged. The hon. bart. concluded by moving that John Gale Jones be discharged.

Mr. C. W. Wynn said, that he felt himself embarrassed as to the course proper to be pursued, in consequence of the manner in which this subject had been submitted to the consideration of the House. If a motion had been brought forward for the

for that description of offence. But the principle contended for by the hon. bart., was sufficiently negatived by the two precedents to which he had referred. That

liberation of John Gale Jones, upon the
grounds of his contrition for the offence
which he had confessed at the bar, he
should not have objected to it; but the
proposal of that liberation was so inter-House, indeed, had been possessed of
woven by the hon. bart. with other topics,
to which he could by no means subscribe,
that he really was a loss how to proceed.
He could never be persuaded to go the
length of the hon. bart.'s doctrine, that
the committal by the order of that House
of any person who was not a member, was
contrary to the principles of Magna Charta.
This certainly was the first time when
such a question was mooted in parliament,
or any doubt professed as to the right of
the House to commit any person guilty of
treating it with contempt. But the hon.
bart. contended that such a right had not
the sanction of any ancient practice, and
that no instance of its exercise could be
found, previous to the existence of the
long parliament. Here, however, the
honourable baronet was under a mis-
take; for, so far back as the reign
of Henry the Sth, there were two cases
on record of the assertion of this right
the one arising out of the arrest of a
member, and the other out of an assault.
In the former, that of Ferrers, the House,
without any appeal to the courts of law,
interposed its own authority, and actually
committed the sheriff, with all those con-
cerned in the act of arrest; and in the
latter case, that of Monington, the parties
guilty of the assault were also committed
to prison. Many other instances of com-
mitments prior to the Long Parliament
might be cited with which he would not
now fatigue the House. With regard to
libels, no instance of a committal upon
such a charge, was, he admitted, to be
met with prior to the reign of Elizabeth;
but the fact was, that in the periods al-
luded to by the hon. bart., which imme-
diately succeeded the invention of print-
ing, there was no such thing as the liberty
of the press, which now existed so hap-
pily for the country; as he believed to
that valuable privilege our present pre-
eminence above all other nations was in
a great measure to be attributed. The
right of printing, and the liberty of publi-
cation, was so completely under the re-
strictions of the Star Chamber, and so lia-
ble to be limited by the king's proclama-
tion, that there was no probability of any
libel appearing against that House. In
fact, no such thing having occurred, no
precedent could be cited of any committal

many other privileges, beside that under
discussion, which it had itself thought
proper to abandon ;-for instance, the
lands of a member were formerly secure
against legal process, but in this case,
that House acted as he trusted it always
would-considerable inconvenience and
injustice being found to arise out of such
an arrangement, it was done away. But
the principle upon which the existing pri-
vileges of that House rested, still remained
untouched; indeed, the principle upon
which the protection of members from
arrest, lest by such arrest they should be
prevented from attending their duty in
that House, was clearly indisputable. And
it appeared to him equally clear, that li-
bels, or any other means of interfering
with the due performance of a member's
duty, should be equally provided against.
The same reasons which justified a court
of law, in punishing any contempt or in-
terruption of its proceedings, pleaded in
favour of the privilege exercised by that
House in the case which gave rise to this
discussion. Any offence to a court of law
was deemed not only personal to the
individual immediately presiding, but
to the whole tribunal of justice, or ac-
cording to the older language of the
law, to the king's person, which was con-
sidered as perpetually present there.
in this case the libel was not treated so
much as an offence to the member attacked,
as to the whole House collectively, which
therefore for the vindication of its dignity
felt it expedient to punish the offender.
A charge brought against any member,
for a motion which he had made in the
House, would naturally be considered a
contempt of the House itself, which had
entertained, and perhaps affirmed the mo-
tion. The individual who had been im-
prisoned, was justly considered out of the
question by the hon. baronet. He wished
indeed that he had waited till the discharge
of Mr. Jones from prison, and then the
question could be more delicately dis
cussed. As it was at present, however,
there was this inconsistency; the motion
had nothing whatever to do with the
speech, by which it had been prefaced.
He wished even now that the worthy ba-
ronet would propose a declaratory resolu-
tion, on which to found his present mo-

So

Hon; or, perhaps, indeed, then the motion now made need not follow, as the release of Jones must be the immediate consequence of the House agreeing in the resolution. He confessed that, even then, he for one would vote against the resolution, as tending to deprive the House of a privilege, which it had enjoyed for above 300 years-that of guarding its dignity against libels.

Lord A. Hamilton highly panegyrized the character of the worthy baronet, who brought forward this question, to no part of whose conduct in that House, or elsewhere, was it possible to attribute any personal or selfish motive. But while he bore full testimony to the hon. bart.'s rectitude, he could not concur in the opinion he had advanced, that that House did not possess a privilege, which he found to have been so long exercised, and to have been uniformly recognized by all the courts of law. The court of King's Bench was known to have interfered with a sacred privilege which materially interested that House, namely, the right of election; and to act in contradiction to the decision of a committee of that House, upon questions connected with such right; and was it to be supposed that the same court would hesitate to interfere with the exercise of the privilege under discussion, if such interference were conformable to law. Under these impressions, and from these considerations, he felt himself bound to vote against the worthy baronet's mo

tion.

The Attorney General contended, that the two cases quoted by the hon. baronet since the Revolution, and particularly that with regard to Knollys, who claimed to be earl of Banbury, had no analogy to the question at issue, for in neither of these cases could any contempt of the authority of either House of parliament be fairly made out. Indeed, the words of chief justice Holt before the House of Lords fully justified this assertion in the case of Knollys; but if that House did not possess the right of committing any person for a contempt or breach of its privileges, the way was clear for trying the legality of its exercise, by moving for a habeas corpus on the part of any person so committed. The court of King's Bench, upon such a motion, would first be called upon to decide as to the right, and he should have no doubt as to its decision, because he had no doubt as to the right. That court must, in fact, feel that it was no

more warranted to interfere with the right of that House to cominit for contempt, than with the right of the court of Common Pleas, or of any other court. In fact, the question to which this discussion referred had been brought into a court of law, in the case of Crosby, the lord mayor of London, for obstructing a messenger of that House in the execution of its order. There, although the lord mayor was a member of the House, he was committed -not, however, as a member, but for the obstruction alluded to as a municipal officer, and on an application for a writ of habeas corpus the court of Common Pleas decided, that it could not interfere with the exercise of a right which belonged to that House. The hon. bart. had thought proper to quote the observations of sir F. Norton, comparing "the Resolutions of that House to the resolutions of a set of drunken porters at an alehouse," and likeened its privileges to the bye-laws of a corporation. Now he wished to know where the hon. bart. could find an instance where any corporation possessed the right by a bye-law, to arrest one of its officers at a distance, as that House had done, with regard to the lord mayor in the instance alluded to. But, returning to the decision of the court of common pleas, the learned gentleman read an extract from the words of lord chief justice De Grey, upon pronouncing that decision, which included a quotation from Coke's Institutes, stating, that the right in question was legal, because it was necessarythat the privilege of that House to commit persons in certain cases, was a part of the law of the land—that in such cases, its adjudication was conviction, and its sentence execution-and that no court was entitled to interfere with the execution of another. As to the words of the warrant of committal " during the pleasure of the House" so particularly dwelt upon by the hon. bart., these words were also the subject of considerable discussion in the case of Crosby, but the result was, that they were found to have been those usual in all similar cases, and so had been decided to be correct. There were many other cases, which he could cite to shew the indisputable right of that and of the other House of parliament to commit for any contempt or breach of their privileges; But he thought it hardly necessary to mention any more, as the sentiment of the House appeared almost unanimous against the hon. bart.'s motion. He would

not, therefore, trespass upon the attention of the House further than by alluding to the case of Flower, who was committed by the House of Lords for contempt. The opinions of lord Kenyon and Mr. justice Grose, delivered upon the application in that case for a writ of habeas corpus to the court of King's Bench appeared to him quite conclusive, as to the right of committal in cases of this nature.

Mr. Cre.vey declared his inability to concur in the sentiments of his hon. friend who originated this discussion; for in his opinion, the right of committal in such cases as had been referred to, justly and necessarily belonged to that House. Indeed, it was highly essential to the performance of its duty. He quoted the case of lord Strafford, when by gross misrepresentations and the most libellous publications, such a degree of outcry and odium was excited against the minority, (among whom was Selden), who opposed the infamous bill against that nobleman, in order to shew, that such a power was necessary to maintain the authority and independence of that House. Recollecting the treatment of that minority, and comparing it with the conduct for which they were so abused, he should always feel himself bound to resist those who should by libels or other means attempt to excite popular vengeance against any individual or any number of individuals for their conduct in that House. Therefore, although he felt disposed to vote for the liberation of John Gale Jones, he could not agree to the proposition as founded on the general doctrines laid down by his hon. friend.

Lord Folkestone vindicated the statement of his hon. friend from the disingenuous manner in which the learned gent. (the Attorney General) had applied some of the cases and authorities of which his hon. friend had in his very able Argument, happened to make use. It must be in the recollection of the House, that when his hon. friend alluded to the comparison between the resolutions of that House and of a set of drunken porters in an alehouse, he only quoted the words of a grave and well known authority. Therefore, his hon. friend had not been fairly interpreted by the learned gentleman. Indeed the interpretation had been equally unfair with regard to his hon. friend's allusion to the bye laws of a corporation as compared with the privileges of that House. But the eloquent and forcible address of his

hon. friend was not to be easily answered, and therefore it was not fairly met by the hon. and learned gent. His hon. friend's position was simply this, that that House did not possess a legitimate right to commit in a case of this nature-[Here there was some cry of question! question!] The noble lord observed, that it might perhaps not be pleasing to some gentlemen to enter into any argument upon this case; but he could not help thinking it rather ungracious in any gentleman to display that feeling, when it was considered that the discussion related to the imprisonment of an English subject for an indefinite period and for an undefined of fence. Upon such a subject he thought it his duty, before he should make up his mind, carefully to examine the Journals. He had done so, and entirely concurred with his hon. friend (Mr. Creevey) in the expression of regret, that the motion was so framed that he could not support it to the whole extent. Indeed, he found no precedents for the exercise of this right of committal on the part of the House at a very early period; the practice was not of long duration; but so far from the fact being as stated by a learned gent. (Mr. Wynne), that there were no libellous publications punished by that House, previous to the Long Parliament, that he found the case of Hall, who was committed for a libel, 1580. This Hall, was, indeed, a member, and expelled the House, because he would not retract his book, and the book itself burned, by order of the House.

As to the power now claimed, the House appeared to have derived it from precedents in the time of the civil wars; but yet even then the instances of its being exercised were uncertain, and differing from each other in the various modes of offence, of proceedings thereon, and of punishments. They ought therefore to be very cautiously taken for precedents. The House ought also to recollect, that though at the time alluded to, their predecessors had assumed almost the whole executive power of the government: they however proceeded with more deliberation even then, than they did now, for they were wont to refer the consideration of the offences to a committee of privileges, and have a formal opinion thereon before, they committed the person, and when they did commit any one, it was only to be proceeded against in due course of law. It should be recol

lected too, that at the close of the last century, it was decreed, that all alleged libels against that House should be referred to the examination of a committee of privileges, before any decision was pronounced upon them by the House. This solemn course was, however, of late years dispensed with, and the House determined for itself with a promptitude that was too liable to error, and too likely to be influenced by passion. The revival of the former, and the better course of proceeding, seemed therefore desirable. As to the reference of libels on the House to the attorney general for prosecution, he did not mean to question its propriety; but would maintain that the House was competent, by its own authority, to punish any contempt or interruption of its proceedings. He denied, however, that the publication of a libel was to be regarded as a contempt. For, if a libel and a contempt of court were held to be tantamount, how came Hart and White to be brought to trial, for a libel upon the court of King's Bench. If a libel were tantamount to a contempt of court, the court could unquestionably have committed these men at once, without a trial. The noble lord concluded, with expressing his disposition to vote for the liberation of Mr. Jones, although he could not go the whole length of his hon. friend's proposition.

The Solicitor General observed that the question was now reduced to a much smaller point than it was at first presented, since the supporters of the motion had explicitly abandoned the principle originally maintained, that the House had no right to commit any person but their own members, in any case whatever. This was the principle for which the hon. baronet had contended, and for the support of which, every argument used by him was directed. The noble lord, who spoke on his side, had, nevertheless, declared himself of a directly contrary opinion, and acknowledged that the exercise of the right was consonant with the law of parliament and the law of the land. The question then was, whether this was a case of contempt or not? That is to say, whether this person, convicted on his own confession by the unanimous vote of the House, of a gross breach of privilege, (which contained in itself a gross and scandalous contempt,) and punished for his offence in the way that appeared most fitting to the House, was guilty or not? As far as the present practice could be traced, it was found to be

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legal and constitutional, and he could therefore see no objection to its exercise. It was open to Jones to apply by the other mode, that of petition, and he (the Solicitor general) might agree to his discharge in this way, the next moment after dispos ing of the question as it now stood; but he would not, and he trusted the House would not, relax now, after hearing the kind of arguments adduced by the hon. baronet. If they did, what would be the consequence? It would be said, that they yielded, because they doubted their own right that when it came to be questioned, they were glad to compromise the matter by liberating the individual. grounds, he must give his vote against the motion, and he called on the House to pause before they adopted a course which would subject them to much misrepresentation.

Mr. Sheridan had heard a great deal during the whole night, of cases in the earlier periods of our history, in the reigns of the Tudors and the Plantagenets: and of the Henries, and the Edwards; before the Reformation, and previous and subsequent to the Revolution-now he wished to draw the attention of the House to one simple and obvious case-the case of Mr. John Gale Jones. It had been said by the hon. and learned gent. who had just sat down, that it would be wrong to think of releasing Mr. Jones, on account of the principles contained in the speech of the honourable baronet, lest the act of liberation might seem a consequence of the doctrine, or a concession to its validity. Now he should certainly vote for the release of Mr. Jones, but he should not do it by any means on the principles contained in the honourable baronet's speech; and he did not see indeed what the abstract arguments of that speech had to do with the actual liberation of Mr. Jones. Why should he be sacrificed to a theory with which he had no concern? Why should he fall an unwilling martyr to doctrines, which he never propagated, nor perhaps ever entertained? Did he ever say, with the hon. bart. that the House had no jurisdiction over any persons except its own members? To this indeed, and to this in its full extent, went the arguments of the hon. baronet. It was in vain to deny it. What! said he, condemn a man without a trial, examination, or the intervention of a jury-imprison a British subject without the verdict of his peers! This was indeed, the whole tenor of his speech, but

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