The Federalist: A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, Interpreting the Constitution of the United States as Agreed Upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787

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Colonial Press, 1901 - 488 páginas
 

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Índice

I
1
II
5
III
10
IV
14
V
18
VI
22
VII
27
IX
33
LIV
252
LV
257
LVI
264
LVIII
271
LIX
276
LXI
281
LXII
284
LXIII
289

X
38
XIII
44
XIV
52
XV
58
XVI
64
XVII
66
XVIII
72
XIX
80
XX
85
XXIII
89
XXV
95
XXVI
101
XXVII
105
XXVIII
110
XXIX
119
XXX
124
XXXI
129
XXXII
134
XXXIII
140
XXXIV
144
XXXV
148
XXXVI
153
XXXVII
157
XXXVIII
165
XXXIX
171
XL
177
XLI
183
XLII
189
XLIII
196
XLIV
205
XLV
211
XLVI
219
XLIX
228
LII
235
LIII
244
LXIV
294
LXV
299
LXVII
305
LXVIII
310
LXIX
314
LXX
320
LXXII
325
LXXIII
330
LXXIV
336
LXXV
340
LXXVI
346
LXXVIII
354
LXXIX
360
LXXX
365
LXXXI
371
LXXXII
375
LXXXIV
379
LXXXV
386
LXXXVI
394
LXXXVIII
398
LXXXIX
403
XC
409
XCII
412
XCV
417
XCVI
422
XCVII
425
XCVIII
427
XCIX
435
C
438
CI
444
CII
454
CIII
458
CIV
472
CV
482
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Página 46 - A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.
Página 135 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Página 268 - In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them : to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Página 247 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Página 435 - NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.
Página 47 - When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.
Página 48 - The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
Página 286 - In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Página 246 - Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.
Página 372 - to nominate, and " by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to appoint " ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the " supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose " appointments are not in the constitution otherwise provided for, " and which shall be established by law.

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