ART. IX.-1. England and Russia face to face in Asia. Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission. By Lieutenant A. C. Yate. London, 1887. 2. Persia and the Persians. By S. G. W. Benjamin, lately Minister of the United States to Persia. London, 1887. 3. The Armed Strength of Russia. Prepared in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. By Captain J. M. Grierson, R.A. London (published under the superintendence of H.M.'s Stationery Office), 1886. THE HE critical position in Bulgaria still concentrates the political attention, not of England only, but of the whole of Europe, on the eternal Eastern Question. The decadence of the Ottoman Empire, and the necessity for providing for the future custody of the Bosphorus, give ever the same general cause for anxiety, though the particular phases of the question vary continually. Belief in the possibility of maintaining the integrity of the Sultan's dominions, and of securing British interests in the East by a close alliance with the Porte, was long an axiom with English statesmen, and England stood ready to draw the sword at any moment in defence of her joint interests with a valued ally. This unquestioning faith in the necessity and value of the Turkish alliance received a severe shock in the last Russo Turkish war. Mr. Gladstone's anti-Turkish agitation paved the way for a triumph of his party at the expense of England's faithful ally. Turkey was so crippled and thrown back by the disastrous struggle with Russia, that it is now self-evident that, without extraneous support, her position as an independent Power is endangered; and even if her independence be secured, there can be little hope of any rapid improvement in her disorganized internal condition. Lord Beaconsfield endeavoured by the Cyprus Convention to restore the feelings of community of interest between England and her old ally, and he bound England, conditionally, to the defence of the Turkish frontier in Asia. The condition was the reform of the Asiatic provincial administration, and the condition has not been fulfilled. The fulfilment has proved impossible, not so much from the disinclination of the Central Government, as from its utter weakness-the result of the blows inflicted in 1878. Meanwhile English statesmen and the English press have continually been taking Turkey to task for the neglect of essential reforms, and threatening to leave her to her fate. These threats and the difficulties of our position in Egypt, vis-à-vis the Khedive's suzerain, have resulted in the growing estrangement of the Porte; and the oft-repeated complaints of Turkish misrule, have encouraged in the mind of the British public a belief, that the condition of Turkey is hopeless, and her value as an ally nil. This belief has lately been declaring itself alike in the daily press, in influential weekly and monthly periodicals, and in other publications. The worthlessness of Constantinople as regards British interests is boldly asserted. England, it is said, should withdraw from Continental politics, and let the Eastern Question settle itself. The interests of other Powers, we are told, are more deeply involved than those of Great Britain, and the British nation is advised to let these Powers pull their own chestnuts out of the fire. If we undertake the exposition of the fallacies on which these ideas are based, we are met by still more sweeping assertions, and finally by the argument of fear. New phases in the Eastern Question have, we are assured, changed everything: and, it is added, that even if British interests are affected, we are powerless to protect them. Russia is determined to have her own way; and how is England to stop her? What can England alone do against Russia's enormous forces and reckless obstinacy? Where is a trustworthy ally to be found? We propose in this article to consider some of the really new phases in the Eastern Question, and how they affect English interests or the chances of English policy. Further, we propose to consider the question of the Russian bugbear, and we shall endeavour to point out the erroneous assumptions on which rest the superstitious fear, unfortunately manifested by some generally valued leaders of public opinion. Several distinct and important new phases have manifested themselves in the Eastern Question since the date of the Berlin Conference. The greatly increased proximity of the Russian outposts to the frontier of India, the change in the direction of Russian national ambition, making India the goal rather than Constantinople, the increased interest of Austria in the Balkan Peninsula, the growth of the new forces which are arising out of the ruins of the Ottoman dominion in Europe, the assertion of English supremacy in Egypt, and the collapse of Greek aspirations, all these are new and important factors in this complicated question. We have already said, that the main consideration in the Eastern Question is the custody of Constantinople, involving the command of the water-way between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. "The Russians shall not have Constantinople,' has long been the resounding key-note of England's policy in Eastern Eastern Europe. We are now told that the conditions under which this policy was formed are gone, whilst the policy still guides us. The conditions referred to, appear to be the desirability of maintaining the position of England as one of the Great Powers, and of preserving the balance of power in Europe. But in the first place, although the discussion of this proposition is not the object of the present article, we are by no means prepared to admit that it is correct; and secondly, even if it be true that the balance of power in Europe, and England's position with regard to it, are no longer matters of importance to British interests, this would not at all dispose of the question of England's interest in keeping Russia out of Constantinople. Checking the process of Russian aggrandizement which is being carried on at the expense of Turkey in particular, and of the balance of power in Europe generally, we may admit to be of secondary interest; but we are prepared to prove, that keeping the Russians out of Constantinople is a matter of primary importance for the maintenance of our supremacy in India, and for our commercial interests, especially for keeping open the markets in the East-in Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan-which Russia would close to us. Among the new phases of the Eastern Question we have classed as the most important to British interests, the extraordinarily increased proximity of the Russian outposts to the Indian frontier, and the change in public feeling in Russia, which now looks more covetously towards India than towards Constantinople. It is to be hoped that the days are gone by, when any educated observer of passing events would dare to say that the rapid progress of Russia in Asia is not a menace to our Indian Empire. To those who would fain believe that this rapid advance is the result of accidental circumstances, we would, with full knowledge of the subject, reply, by challenging any high official, either Liberal, or Conservative, in either India, or England, to say that he had not had alsolute proofs before him that the Russian advance is the result of a well-matured design to dispute our Empire in the East. And although we thus appeal confidently to the judgment of English statesmen, based on irresistible evidence submitted to them in their official capacity, we are not confined to this class of proof alone. For those who really seek information, there is plenty of evidence to be acquired outside the Government offices. Let any constant reader of Russian journals say, whether that portion of the Russian Press which finds most favour with the public and with the Government is not constantly harping on the theme of India, and threatening to attack England England in the East. Let Englishmen who have been long resident in Russia, and, speaking Russian, have mixed intimately in Russian circles, say, whether the advance on India is not a frequent and engrossing subject of conversation. Why is Russia troubling herself to organize the forces of Persia, lending her officers, and making presents of artillery to the Shah? The services of Persia are certainly not required either in Europe or in Central Asia. They are required to secure the flank of the Russian advance on India. We have heard a Russian say, 'Ah! you English have always had the best of us till now, but it was your gold that beat us, and now we know where the gold comes from, we shall seize the mine. We will take India. Then we shall have the money and you will cease to exist.' When the popular and accomplished Russian painter Vereshtchagin, exhibited in St. Petersburg his wonderful gallery of Indian pictures, the largest and most conspicuous painting showed the procession of the great Durbar at Delhi, headed by the Prince of Wales. This picture drew down on Vereshtchagin the wrath of the patriotic press. The Russian painter was roundly accused of want of patriotism in making the representative of English rule the leading figure in his masterpiece. But it will be said, these are the exaggerated ideas of fanatics. We reply, that the Russian nation is becoming fanatical on the subject of India, and fanatics are people against whom every conceivable precaution must be taken. These views are perfectly confirmed by the conclusions of Mr. Benjamin, whose recently published work, entitled 'Persia and the Persians,' gives much valuable information about the country, where he resided some time as the representative of the United States. As a disinterested observer of the struggle between Russia and England, and as a favoured diplomatist at the Persian capital, he had special opportunities for noting the course of events. In his concluding chapter, on the political situation in Persia, Mr. Benjamin speaks pretty freely; and his remarks on the subject must, from his independent position, have such weight, that we cannot refrain from quoting him at some considerable length. He says: 'The definite purpose of Russia sooner or later to push her conquests southward until she reaches the Indian Ocean, either at Bombay or Bushire, cannot now be doubted. The secrecy of her tactics in those quarters shows the same far-sighted determination to accomplish a vast and deep-laid scheme, that she has displayed in Europe for a century. None but the most unsophisticated, or those gifted with phenomenal credulity, can for a moment accept any other solution of the conduct of Russia. 'I had I had precise information of her advance to Panj-dêh or the Ford of Five Bridges, and to other points farther south, before the facts were first rumoured in Europe, where they were persistently denied by the courts and press of both England and Russia, and then finally confirmed. To move thus in secret, to pave the way with promises and gold, to bluster and prevaricate when discovered, but in any case to move steadily ahead, and not to recede an inch until her battalions halt on the shores of the Southern Sea-this is the policy and the determination of Russia. Said a Russian gentleman to a member of the United States Legation: "Believe nothing you hear à propos of the imbroglio on the Eastern frontier. Even if you hear any one swear that we do not want Herat, do not believe him; not even if I swear, not even if the Tsar should swear, do not believe it. We want Herat and we shall have it!" 'Looked at in the abstract, Russia has quite as much right to advance on India as England had to take it. It is not Russia's advance, if she can do so, which is in question here, but her dark methods, her treachery, her dissimulation, and deceit. Furthermore, the world may also hesitate with reason to see her accumulate any more territory; she has already more than has been held by any power since the foundation of the globe. So far as India is concerned, she is certain to be under the sway either of England or Russia for ages to come; and wherein will she be benefited by a change of rulers, just as she is beginning to feel the advantages of the beneficent sway of England? It is nonsense to assume that any Asiatic people could be improved by exchanging the rod of England for that of Russia. Yet if Great Britain would maintain her hold in the East, she must be at once more wary and firm; success with Orientals is absolutely dependent on both. The emissaries of Russia are even now swarming in the north of India-not Russians, but Asiatics in Russian pay, who are familiarizing the people with grandiose ideas of the overpowering growth, the magnitude, the wealth, and the generosity of Russia. On the same subject Lieutenant Yate, whose service on the late Afghan Boundary Commission gave him special opportunities for noting the designs and methods of the Russians in Central Asia, says : 'I am personally quite convinced that the Russian Government will overstep the demarcated frontier at the first opportunity. Every care has been taken by the British Commission, by conceding to Russia the heads of water-supply, and indeed making any reasonable concessions, to avoid disputes hereafter. But to leave no loophole for a watchful foe ever on the qui vive to seize any opening, is obviously impossible. Disputes must arise, and the nature of their settlement will mainly depend on the policy of the British Government. If the weak spirit of concession that has been evinced for the past two years is adhered to, then of course Russia will have its own way, and little by little filch from the Amir the little territory that |