cotton manufacturers depended primarily upon superiority of methods. Soon after the invention of improved spinning machines, the question of protecting them from foreigners by legislation similar to the laws protecting the hosiery, silk, and woollen manufacturers was raised in parliament, and the result was the law of 1774 (14 George III, c. 71), forbidding the export of tools or utensils used in manufacturing cotton or cotton and linen mixed. This law was used as a weapon against the rebellious American colonies, although the next year, 1775, witnessed a slight relaxation of the laws against the export of machines to the North American colonies (15 George II, c. 5).

The laws outlined above forbade the export of machines, but this was inadequate, because the machines might be reproduced abroad by means of models, sketches, or specifications. In 1781 this defect in previous laws was remedied by a new law (21 George III, c. 37) forbidding the export not only of the machines themselves but of models or plans or similar information concerning machines used in the manufacture of the principal textiles.

By 1782, another branch of textile manufacturing, in addition to spinning and weaving, had developed mechanical methods vastly superior to earlier processes. This was the printing of cloth, particularly of cottons and linens, by means of cylinders in place of blocks. In consequence, a law (22 George III, c. 60) was enacted to prohibit the export of machines used in printing, and also to forbid the emigration of artisans.

Legal protection was thus afforded textile manufacturers against the use of their machines by foreigners, but in the meantime there had also been developed in the metal industries a large number of devices and processes second only in importance to those in the textile industries. The manufacturers insisted,

particularly in connection with the Irish Resolutions of 1785, 69 that the laws be made to include the improvements in these industries. In 1785 a law (25 George III, c. 67) was enacted to prevent the export of machines and of models or plans of machines used in the iron and steel industry, and also to prohibit the emigration of artisans. In the year following, a law (26 George III, c. 89) supplanted the act of 1785 by a detailed list of tools and utensils. This law was temporary, but was renewed from time to time till 1795, when it was made permanent (35) George III, c. 38).

In 1825 a parliamentary committee favored the repeal of these laws, partly because of laissez-faire views, and partly on the ground that the existing state of the laws was so chaotic as to render enforcement difficult. In some instances licenses were granted for the export of machines legally prohibited, but according to a committee reporting in 1841, in the processes connected with spinning and weaving the policy of monopoly was maintained, licenses for the export of spinning and weaving machines never having been granted. Means were frequently found to evade the laws, but their enactment and the persistent adherence to the policy of monopoly afford significant evidence of public recognition of the productive and competitive power of the great inventions. 70

This new power was thus recognized, guarded, and fostercl in various ways by the people of the time. The fact that the transition was so rapid, and the fact that it was so largely con

"British Merchant for 1787, pp. 57-63; Minutes of the Evidence taken before a Committee of the House of Lords (on Irish Resolutions, 1785), pp. 148, 248-258.

TO

Report from the Select Committee on the Laws Relating to the Export of Tools and Machinery, 1825, pp. 2-9, 47-51; First Report and Second Report from the Select Committee appointed to Inquire into the Operation of the Existing Laws Affecting the Exportation of Machinery, 1841, particularly Second Report, p. iv.

fined to Britain, gave to the British industries affected an incalculable advantage. In a word, the singular productive and competitive power of the machine afforded an unparalleled economic basis for the rapid development of manufacturing enterprises, and out of these there arose a new industrial groupthe great manufacturers.

CHAPTER III

THE GENERAL CHAMBER OF MANUFACTURERS OF GREAT BRITAIN

It has now been seen that the inventions were in the first place essentially the result of a prevailing spirit of mechanical progress, consciously recognized and fostered by writers, by the government, and by the concerted efforts of various non-profitmaking organizations. It has been shown, further, that the productive and competitive value of the new devices was widely recognized in the writings of the time, in the ready acceptance of machine-made commodities by consumers, and in attempts on the part of the government as well as of manufacturers to maintain for Britain a monopoly of their use.

The extensive manifestations of public spirit attending the transition favored a public-spirited control and utilization of the inventions. But other influences tended in the opposite direction-that is, in the direction of an organization of the new system of manufacturing on the basis of private initiative and private profit-making unrestrained by public control and conscious efforts to make the inventions minister to public welfare. Among these latter forces may be mentioned the prevailing dissatisfaction with the old system of public control of industry; the acuteness of party conflicts, which focused attention on political issues and maneuvers; the discrediting of the government during the crucial period of industrial transition by the failure of George III and his ministers in foreign and colonial policy and domestic reform; and the acceptance by Pitt and his followers of laissez-faire doctrines. During the earlier stages of the organization of mechanical production, the forces of individualism and

private gain therefore prevailed with slight restraint. The latent disadvantages of such an organization to the laborers and the public developed somewhat later under the influence of the pol icy of reaction and repression connected with the French wars into a system of industrial control essentially anti-social. But the disadvantages were at first not fully apparent, and the organization of the system assumed a form that was largely spontaneous, undirected, and unrestrained, and in consequence the benefits derived therefrom by the workers and the larger public were secondary and merely incidental to the benefits secured by the manufacturers who fashioned the system.

The individual members of the new group have in most instances remained obscure. Josiah Wedgwood of the Staffordshire potteries, and Matthew Boulton, the Birmingham ironmaster, are probably the best known members of the group. Richard Arkwright, whose name is most commonly associated with the origin of the factory system, had little to do with the organized activities of the group. By virtue of his control of patents, a fight was waged against him, which tended to unify the group but to isolate from it the man who, more perhaps than any other, was its creator. Even Arkwright's career is little known and has been the subject of numerous controversies rather than of well-informed discussion. Jedediah Strutt, the Derbyshire hosiery manufacturer and partner of Arkwright, is more frequently mentioned because of his inventions and his association with Arkwright than because of his work as a manufacturer. Robert Owen, whose career as a manufacturer began at Manchester, has left a remarkable and enduring record of his life in his autobiography, but his fame is based mainly upon activities and views beyond the scope of the present study. Thomas Walker, a prominent cotton manufacturer and exporter at Manchester, who represented Manchester in seeking the repeal of the cotton tax in 1785, and who was otherwise active in the new