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and therefore have all the reason in the world co expect that he will decide against em, and finally award the victory to their enemies Tis true, God is not obliged in justice,, always to determine the Victory to tne Just cause: for there may be just reasons, and many times there are, moving him to the quite contrary. Sometimes it may be more for the publick good, of which he is the great conservator, that this particular righteous cause should miscarry,, than that it sliould prosper and succeed 5 in which case it's but reasonable that he should rather permit a particular mischief, than hinder a publick convenience. Sometimes a good cause maybe more effectually advane'd by a present overthrow, than by a victory 5. and when this happens, it's a good reason why God sliould at present pronounce the sen* tenceof victory on the contrary side. Sometimes it may be necessary to deny success to those who have the righteous cause on their fide, in order to the crowning it with some greater blessing 5 and to take away a lese good, to make room for a greater, is such an exchange, as is far from Robbery. And lastly, Sometimes for the sins of those
on it not only fit, but necessary for God to make 'cm examples to the world, of his righteous severity. And what greater severity can he express, than to abandon a good cause, and rather permit it to fall to the ground, than fee it upheld and supported by impious and prophane hands? But though there are these, and sundry other just reasons why God sliould not always award success and victory to the right side $ yet doubtless he ordinarily doth so: for all war is either between one Prince and Nation and another, or else between Princes and rebellious Subjects. Now as for the first, it is in most cafes impossible for us certainly to determine which of the two parties hath the rightful cause 5 because we do not understand the pretensions on both sides, nor are we capable of judging of those nice reasons, and intricate circumstances upon which their opposite claims depend; and therefore though we through our pity and ignorance together, do commonly pronounce the vanquished cause the best, and upon that account do foolishly murmur at the decisions of Providence, as if they were unjust and
uncircumstances of things, doth many times most certainly know the contrary, and so determines the cafe contrary to our blind pity and ignorance, according to his own infallible judgment: and had we but the understanding of God, I make no doubt but we should find many of those prosperous causes which we condemn for unjust, to be most just and righteous, and be fully satik fied, that the awards of Providence in the cafe are much more equal than we imagine. But then, as for the other fort of war, viz* That between Princes and their rebellious Subjects, it's evident that Providence doth much more constantly decide the success to the just and jighteous cause, and give judgment on the side of the injured Prince, against the Rebellious and usurping Subject. For if you consult History, you will nnd> that though for just and righteous ends, <2od hath sometimes permitted Rebellions to succeed; yet where he hath prospered one, he hath usually cursed and blasted twenty. And indeed, since War, as was before observed, is an appeal to God, the great Arbitrator of all events 5 there are
pecupeculiar reasons why he should more constantly declare himself for the right side in a Rebellious war, than in any Other; ...
First, Because Rebellion is an apppeal to him, in a cause that is plainly and apparently unjust. .
Secondly, Because 'tis an appeal to him, in a cause that very nearly touches and affects his own Authority.
Thirdly, Because 'tis an appeal to him, in a cause that is of all others most destructive of humane Society.
I, First, Because Rebellion is an appeal to God in a Cause that is plainly and apparently unjust. For in those wars that are between Princes and Princes, the right~or wrong of the case is many times not easily decidable: the Meunis and Tuums of Princes and Nations, being very often so blended and confounded by Conquests, Leagues, and Intermarriages, and revolutions of Empire 5 that 'tis not only difficult, but sometimes impossible to determine on which side the Right lies: and the' the contending Princes may in most cases, perhaps, be able to inform
themthemselves, whether the Cause they contend for be right or wrong 5 yet the people can be no competent Judges of it, but are ob- liged to acquiesce in their Princes judgment, and to follow 'em with an implicit faith: so that if they are in the wrong, *tis through invincible ignorance, which renders their cafe extreamly pitiable and excusable before the just and righteous Tribunal of God. And therefore though He most perfectly understands on which side the Right lies, be the cafe never so perplexed or intricate, yet his compassion to their mistaken innocence, may in concurrence with other reasons, especially when their enemies sins do outvy the justice of their cause, sometimes prevail with him to give judgment of Victory on their side. But as for Rebellion, the injustice of it is far more visible and apparent, every man knows, or might easily know, if he were not extreamly wanting to himself, that his King is the Vicegerent of his God 5 and that being so, he is indifpensibly obliged by all the ties of Reason and Religion to submit to his Will,and reverence his Person, and bow to his Authority; and that he cannot lift up his hand against him, . C with