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T. uv. purpose; that their Liberty confided rather in having i.t. ap.i. tste confuiar Authority annual, than that any diminution was made of the Regal Power.
If we descend from the Romans to our own times, we find, that amongst the Republics now in Europe, Venice and Holland are by far the most considerable: The first of these has had its Dukes for about a thousand Years; and much longer is it since it was erected a popular State, by those, who, upon the Invasion of the HuttSt deserted their Countrey and their Emperor, and betook themselves to those Islands, and dcR^'ub, almost inaccessible Mar flies, where Venice now stands } vtntt. but then it must be remembred, that for some hundreds of Years, their Dukes had a Sovereign Authority, so that their Wealth and Conquests are not owing to any Excellency there is in their present Constitution. And as to the United Provinces of Holland-* they, for about an hundred years past since the time of their revolt from the Spanijh Monarchy, have almost perpetually been harrals'd by war j and for their continuance hitherto as a State, more indebted to the English Monarchy, especially in the Reign of Q^Elizabeth) than to any peculiar advantage of their Polity.
But, to forbear all farther comparisons of differently constituted Common-wealths s it may appear from the reason of the thing it self, that Monarchy, in its own nature, is the best form since it best answers the End of all Government, viz. the happiness of the Community.
Now this principally consists in the safety which every individual Member of it doth or may enjoy, and in the quiet possession of what he can justly call his own: And these blessings, so far as Human power
can can extend, aresecur'dbythe Magistrate's protection of his people from injuries from abroad) and by discouraging all fraud and violence, injustice and oppression at home. For the effecting of which, Monarchy oa's.rha'nirefrly' the advantage of a popular State.
"I."' First, as to the more expeditious dispatch of "affairs; When Men of equal dignity, and equal power, and, which is natural to suppose, of different judgments meet to consult about matters of concern ;t6 the public, and there is none Superior to them, as in the cafe of a Common-wealth, that can with Authority interpose, cither to hasten or determine them 5 the delays that are occasion'd hereby, do often prove of dangerous Consequence to the State for many fair opportunities of action have flipt, and are irrecoverably lost, whereby the Public suffers not a little as to its Safety and Welfare.
2. Secondly, Where the Sovereign Power and Authority is lodg'd in one hand •, it tends much to the preventing of Faction. It is true indeed, there is no Constitution so perfect, no Nation under Heaven so happy, as to be ablealway to exclude this Enemy of the Public peace: However it is equally true, that as Factions portend more mischief, when they happen amongst those, who equally share the Supreme Power, as in a Common-wealth so are they there more frequent. The very Nature of the Constitution it' self difposeth it thereto j emulationsand animosities must needs arise from a.di versify of judgment as to the management of State-business} and since most are apt to entertain a favourable opinion of their own abilities, they will think themselves 0ighted, when their counsel is rejected, whereupon faction will ensue to the disturbance of the peace,
and and hazarding the welfare of the Nation. And the prevailing party will hardly berestrein'd from oppressing the other, whereby the right course of distributive Justice must unavoidably be perverted.
3. Thirdly, Government by one is more advantageous to a State, than when many rule: because the Interests of King and People are so nearly related, that they mutually support and uphold each other. In a Common-Wealth it can scarce be, but that a Separate Interest, distinct from that of the Public, (hall be carried on by those who divide the Supreme power; and proportionably as this is advanc'd, the public interest must be deprefs'd. Ambition, to which, He who hath set bounds to the Sea, hath set none to this, is not very apt to let a man rest content with an Equality, when he conceives it in his power to mount above it; but will instigate and spur him up to endeavour aster a Superiority; for the compassing whereof he will be put upon such methods, as either are themselves injurious to the Common-weal, or productive of an end that is so: Whereas under Monarchy, whatever ambitious struggles there are between Subject and Subject, these rarely, or never tend to the endangering the whole. The Sovereign power being committed to one, prevents all contest on that side, and for a Subject to dispute the matter of Supremacy with his Prince would be most unnatural and monstrous.
In short, under a Monarchy well-constituted, the Safety and Interest of King and People are so twisted and complicated, that the one cannot be Great and Happy, while the other is oppress'd and miserable j What promotes the peoples good, and causeththem to encrease and flourish, tends at the fame time to
advance advance the Honour and Dignity of the Prince, /of'w.n. the multitude of people is the Kings Honour, but in i8~ the -want of people is the destruction of the Trince.
XX. Secondly, The Good and Welfare of the Subject is best provided for under Monarchy, when the Prince is ot High Birth and Noble Extraction.
I. First, because this qualification doth naturally dispose Men to a certain Greatness and Generosity of Mind, which will hardly suffer them to stoop to any little Arts and Projects of encreasing Wealth and Power, by burdening others, or to handle in an harsh and arbitrary way the Lives and Fortunes of those that they are under them.
Magnanimity, or a Generous Temper isa fit Foun- o p,,yx\idation, whereon to superstruct several excellent and useful Vertues, particularly Benevolence, Clemency, H^sm Munificence and the like} it teacheth to despise danger, and will difficultly be brought to submit to f^aghN'' a mean and base action upon any Solicitation. Be- Lib.4. fides, where one has all along been accustom'd to an0?-1)High Station, as those of Noble Parentage have, the Mind meets with nothing to surprize or disturb it on this hand, or to hinder the right discharge of the Offices of Government; whereas on the other hand, should one of mean and low rank on a sudden be exalted to the Top of Regal Power, and set upon the highest Pinnacle of State, it is great odds, but that by this strange height his Head turns round, and he becomes Vertiginous •, by this, to him immoderate, Dose of Honour and Dignity, his Mind becomes intoxicated j? so that he neither knows himself, nor those about him; and altho' by degrees the Seisure mould wear of, and the Fit abate; yet it usually leaves behind such a lasting Tincture of in
supportable pride and haughtiness, of vanity-and. untractablenels, as would render him sometimes uneasy to himself, and at all times so to others.
it Secondly, a Prince of High Birth is bell qualified for Rule and Authority ( becaule such are educated and train'd up from their Infancy in the, Art of governing. The Vulgar have been apt to imagine that a Prince's life, ot all other, is the most unactive and slothful, wholly spent in Rase and Luxury, in Softness and Delights-, and because, by their eminent and moll iliullnous Station, they are advane'd far above the want of any of the Conveniencies and Accommodations of Life, they conclude them to be totally exempt from all trouble and distraction, from all manner of care and concern, even to that degree, as to have no occasion for thought and reflection any farther, than as it serves to make them conscious of their happy Condition. But they who discern things in a better light are fully periwaded that the Station of Princes is not more High, than their Office is difficult to discharge aright. The Affairs of a Kingdom are matters of great moment, of mighty weight and importance-, and therefore require great skill and dexterity to manage them. The Matters they consult about are often of a perplext and intricate nature, the Enterprises they undertake are sometimes arduous and extremly difficult i so that Prudence and Experience seem absolutely, requisite to produce a right understanding of, and to enable for the more ready dispatch of StateBufiness. And it may as well be imagin'd, that a poor unexperiene'd Peasant just taken from rustick Employments is capable of guid;ng a Ship a long Voyage, as that one unacquainted with Political Wisdom, and untaught the Art of Governing is