The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge

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Oxford University Press, 1984 - 287 páginas
This book argues against the view that mathematical knowledge is a priori, contending that mathematics is an empirical science and develops historically, just as natural sciences do. Kitcher presents a complete, systematic, and richly detailed account of the nature of mathematical knowledge and its historical development, focusing on such neglected issues as how and why mathematical language changes, why certain questions assume overriding importance, and how standards of proof are modified.
 

Índice

Introduction
3
1 Epistemological Preliminaries
13
2 The Apriorist Program
36
3 Mathematical Intuition
49
4 Conceptualism
65
5 Toward a Defensible Empiricism
88
6 Mathematical Reality
101
7 Mathematical Change and Scientific Change
149
8 Mathematical Changes
178
9 Patterns of Mathematical Change
193
A Case Study
229
Bibliography
272
Index
281
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Sobre el autor (1984)

Philip Kitcher is at University of California, San Diego.

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