5. Let us next examine, whether this distinction of moral good and evil, as founded in the nature of things, together with the original and unalterable fitneffes arifing from it, is the fupreme, original, univerfal, and moft perfect rule of action to all reafonable beings whatsoever, as is afferted. If this be true, all laws of God and men are to be difregarded; and indeed, they are all plainly fuperfeded by it; for if this is the fupreme, original, and univerfal rule to all reasonable beings, then all inferior, fubordinate, and particular laws, as all the after-laws of God and men must be thought to be, merit no regard; at least are no further to be regarded than as they may be thought to agree with, and are reducible to this grand one; and if it is the most perfect rule, then certainly there is no need of another. Yea, it is affirmed, that "it is impoffible that "there can be any rule of action more excellent in itself, or more worthy the "regard of reasonable beings." What need then have we of the law of God? This may lead us to question, whether indeed there is any law binding upon us; at least it tends to weaken our obligation to duty, as arifing from the will of God. Indeed we are told, that "the will of God is a real and immutable obligation upon us, to which we should always pay the highest deference and "fubmiffion." What, the highest deference and fubmiffion? No furely, that muft be paid to the most perfect rule, that rule which regulates and determines the will of God itfelf. And truly, this real and immutable obligation of the will of God upon us, is immediately brought under the general notion of the original fitneffes of things, and is not allowed to be an obligation of a diftinct nature and kind from them. So that as all morality is founded in the nature and fitness of things, our obligation to it arifes from the fame, and our obedience and difobedience to be confidered as an agreement or difagreement with that scheme of things. Sin was therefore wrongly defined by our forefathers', who, in andwer to that question, "What is fin?" fay, "Sin is any want of conformity "unto, or tranfgreffion of any law of God given as a rule to the reasonable "creature." They should have faid, Sin is any want of conformity unto, or tranfgreffion of the nature and fitnefs of things, which is the unerring rule of God himself, and the most perfect one to all reasonable creatures. How the apostle John himself will come off, I fee not, who says, that fin is the tranfgreffion of the law, unlefs, by fome dextrous management, inftead of the law, fhould be put the nature and fitnefs of things. But furely, to derive moral obligation from the will of God, must be of more ufe and service to engage perfons in the practice of moral virtue, than to derive it from the nature and fitness of things, of which men themselves must be judges. A rule of fitness may be a guide in fome cafes; but the law of a fuperior, who has a right and power of enforcing it by sanctions, properly obliges. In the other cafe, there is nothing to hope for in confequence of agreement with it, and nothing to fear by ftraying from it; fo that this immutable, and eternal obligation of moral virtue, will be found to be very little, if any at all, as derived from the nature and fitness of things; at moft cannot rife higher than mens perception of the nature and fitness of things; for the nature and fitnefs of things can be no further a guide unto men, or obliging upon them, than as known by them; and if God had not made fome notification of his will, with refpect to moral good and evil, by giving us laws as the rule of moral conduct, our perception of these things would, in many cafes, have been very deficient in the prefent ftate of things; and confequently moral fitnefs, as perceivable by us, would have been a defective rule, and not that univerfal and most perfect rule of action it is affirmed to be. But we are told ', 6. That "this difference between moral good and evil, and the fitneffes and "unfitneffes which they neceffarily infer, is as eafily and certainly to be dif "cerned by mankind, as the differences between any natural or fenfible object "whatever." The natural and fenfible objects particularly referred to, are light and darkness, bitter and sweet; which fuppofe natural and fenfible capacities. and powers, fuited to the difcernment of fuch natural and fenfible objects; otherwise they cannot be easily and certainly difcerned: A man blind from his birth, will not be able to distinguish between light and darkness; and one whose natural taste is vitiated, will not easily and certainly difcern between fweet and bitter. So likewise there must be moral capacities and powers in men, fuited to the difcernment of moral good and evil; if these should be wanting, or impaired and corrupted, the difference between moral good and evil will not be so easily and certainly difcerned. Now the moral capacity of man is greatly impaired and corrupted in the prefent state of things; men deftitute of the light of grace, are darkness itself"; the understanding of men, even in things moral, is greatly darkened by fin, and they are alienated from the life of God; averfe to living foberly, righteously and godly, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their hearts". The moral light of nature is very dim, and has fhone out very faintly even in those who have made the greatest advances in moral science, deftitute of a divine revelation, and without the affiftance of God's grace. The moral taste of man is vitiated; he favours the things of the Alesh; relishes fin, which he rolls in his mouth, and hides under his tongue, as a fweet morfel; fo that through the blindness of his heart, and the viciofity of his tafte, he is far from a clear difcerning of the difference of moral good and evil, ⚫ Ephes. iv. 18. • Sermon, p. zz. - Ephes, v. 8. evil, of the fitneffes and unfitneffes of things; of the amiableness of virtue, and the ugliness of vice. But, man is reprefented in a quite different light, as far from having his moral powers and capacity in the leaft impaired or corrupted by fin. It is faid, that "nature itself hath feemed to have been friendly to "mankind in this refpect, which hath implanted a kind of constitutional abbor"rence of vice in their minds, an instinctive prejudice against it, and fear to com"mit it." Who is defigned by nature, whether God, or the nature and fitness of things, I fhall not ftay to inquire; but go on to obferve, that unless this is to be understood of man, as he was created by God, as he was in his state of innocence before his fall, the contrary to it is true; for though the God of nature has not implanted it, yet there is in the minds of men, in confequence of the corruption of human nature by fin, to use this author's phrases, a kind of conftitutional abhorrence of good, and an inftinctive prejudice against it; or rather a natural and habitual abhorrence of good and prejudice to it. Man is shapen in iniquity, and conceived in fin; he is a tranfgreffor from the womb; the carnal mind is enmity against God, and all that is good; and is not fubject to the law of God, nor can it be; there is none that doeth good, no not one; nor is there any fear of God before their eyes. In how many instances has it appeared, that the imagination of the thought of man's heart is evil, and that continually? Such who are renewed by the grace of God, and are enabled to live fober and religious lives, yet were fometimes foolish, difobedient, deceived; ferving divers lufts and pleasures; living in malice and envy, hateful, and bating one another". Before their converfion, they walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of difobedience; among whom they all had their conversation in times paft, in the lufts. of their fleb, fulfilling the defires of the flesh, and of the mind; and were by nature children of wrath, even as others. Their converfion from darkness to light, from the power of Satan to God, from fin to holiness, from ungodliness to godlinefs, does not arife from any internal principle in themselves, from any natural will or power in them; nor is it brought about by the force of moral fuafion, but is effected by the exceeding greatnefs of God's power, and the energy of his grace; which only gives them the maftery of their corruptions, puts down the old man with bis deeds, dethrones fin, fo as that it shall not have dominion over them. These fame perfons, after converfion, find in them a proneness to fin, and are, as Ifrael of old was, bent to backfliding, and are only preferved from a total one by the power of divine grace. The whole of this Sermon, p. 26. » Titus iii. 3. • Ifai. xlviii. 8. ▸ Pfalm li. 5. t Gen. vi. 5. y Hof. xi. 7, this is fo clear a point, that he must be a ftranger to himfelf, to human nature, and to divine revelation, who will attempt a confutation of it. We are indeed told, that "vice is really a kind of art that requires fome length of time to "become dextrous, and grow any confiderable proficients in." Ethic, or morality, is indeed by fome defined, "an art of living well and happily." But that vice or immorality fhould be an art, or a kind of art, to be learned, as arts ufually are, by a collection of rules, a train of reafoning, with application of thought, and in length of time, I am inclined to believe, was never heard of before it looks as if it required fagacity and good fenfe, fome confiderable abilities of mind, penetration of thought, diligence and industry, as well as time, to be wicked, at least to be dextrous proficients in fin; whereas persons may be fottish and foolish to every thing elfe, and yet wife enough to do evil. It is easy to fee with what view fuch expreffions are used; that they are calculated to encourage and support the old Pelagian notion, "that fin is only by "imitation." After all, fuppofing that the moral powers and capacities of men are not so corrupted and impaired, as they are by fome thought to be; yet notwithstanding the difference of moral good and evil, with all their fitneffes and unfitneffes, may not be fo eafily and certainly difcerned, as the difference between light and darkness, which is done at once, with a glance of the bodily eye; or as the diftinction between fweet and bitter, which is difcerned immediately; for moral science, like other fciences, is not to be learned at once, but by degrees; it takes in a very large compafs, it confifts of various rules, precepts, and instructions, concerning different virtues, which must be confidered and examined with their contrary vices, ere the true diftinction between them can be clearly feen. In order to have a clear and certain difcernment of the difference of moral good and evil, with all their fitneffes and unfitneffes, we ought to have a knowledge of the feveral beings, God, and the creatures we ftand related to, and of the feveral relations we ftand in to them; all which require time, application of thought, and a train of reafoning; but if the difcernment of these things is as eafy and certain, as that of light and darkness, bitter and fweet, what need of all that care and pains in the moral education of children? why fo much folicitude to inftil the notions of virtue into them, and give them an abhorrence of vice? Since, as they grow up, the perception of the moral nature, fitness and unfitness of these things, will be as eafy and as certain as their fight and tafte of natural and fenfible objects. What need alfo either of the laws of God or of men? And indeed, it is faid, that "as they (men) need no command, or "law, to enable them to difcern the natural difference in these things (moral ર good z Sermon, p. 26. ■ Vid. Mori Enchirid. Ethic. 1. 1. c. 1. p. 1. Sermon, p. 25, 26. "good and evil) they as little need them to help them to pass a true judgment "concerning them, or to teach them which, upon the whole, is fitteft for "them to chufe and refufe." Moreover, what need is there of moral preaching, or the continuance of a moral miniftry? Why fo much needless time and pains spent, in opening, inculcating, and enforcing moral duties, and expofing contrary vices? Since without all this men cannot fail of obferving the difference of, and of giving the preference to the one above the other? One should think, that gentlemen who have been concerned in fupporting readers of morality, fhould, upon fuch a principle as this, put their hands in their pockets, and at once pay off and discharge these moral preachers, as ufelefs men. Such moral guides may easily be fpared; fince it is affirmed, that as nature and experience are infallible rules of judgment in natural things; they are equally fure guides in "things of a moral nature." But to proceed, That the difference of moral good and evil, with the fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, has not in fact been fo eafily difcerned as is contended for, will appear from the different fentiments men have entertained of these things, in different ages and difpenfations. The moral philofophers among the heathens, as no one of them ever drew up a compleat fyftem of morality, nor is such an one to be collected out of all their writings put together; nor was Mr Woolafton's celebrated performance, called, The Religion of Nature delineated, drawn up without the affistance of divine revelation; and, perhaps, is not without its defects. So what one of thefe philofophers inculcated, another neglected, and what one denied, another affirmed. Some of them taught, that there was no fin in incest and fodomy; and thought it was lawful for buyers and fellers to circumvent each other. Plato, a philosopher that made a confiderable figure in moral science, commended community of wives, and brought it into his commonwealth. The Stoics, a grave and stiff fett of moralists, were of opinion, not only that it became a wife man, but in fome cafes it was his duty, to destroy himself; and, perhaps, many of those unhappy creatures who have been guilty of this fin, have not fo clearly seen the evil of it; but have been ready to think, that they have a greater power over their own lives, than over others; and though they may not take away another man's life, may take away their own. The apostle Paul condemns fornication, filthiness, or obscene language, foolish talking or jefting, as very unbecoming, inconvenient, not fit to be practised; yea, as criminal, and highly difpleafing to God. Whereas for nication was thought lawful by many; and Cicero asks, "When was not this "done? Sermon, p. 25. in vita ejus. Ephes. v. 3, 4. d Vid. Grotium in Ephes. v. 6. Chryfippus allowed of inceft. Laertius Lipf. Manuduct. ad Stoic. Philof. Differt. 22. p. 365. : Verum fiquis eft, qui etiam meretriciis amoribus interdi&tum juventuti putet, eft ille quidem valde feverus-quando enim hoc non factum eft? quando reprehenfum? quando non permiffum? Ciceron. orat. 34. pro M. Calio, p. 940. Ed. Gothofred. |