"that there are certain fitneffes and unfitneffes of things arifing from hence, "which are of the fame nature with this diftinction; and that this difference, "and these fitneffes and unfitneffes are as easily difcerned by mankind, as the "differences between any natural and fenfible objects whatever."

One would be tempted to think, if all this is true, that this fame nature and fitnefs of things is Deity, and rather deserves the name of God, than he whom we call fo; fince it is prior to, and independent of his will; is the unerring rule of action to him, and the fupreme, univerfal, and most perfect rule to all reasonable beings whatfoever; and that itself is not directed and influenced by any rule or law from any other. Surely that must be God, which is poffeffed of fuch perfections, as neceffary exiftence, eternity, independence, fupreme power and authority over all reasonable beings. And if this is the cafe, we ought to worship and give homage to this Deity; this fhould we invoke, blefs and adore; and not him, who, under the Old-Teftament-difpenfation, went by the name of the God of Ifrael, or the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and who, in the New Testament, is ftiled the God and Father of our Lord Jefus Chrift. To this eternal and invariable rule fhould we yield a chearful and univerfal obedience, and not to the law and will of God; unlefs that fhall appear to be directed and conducted by this fupreme and moft perfect rule of action. But before we fall down, and proftrate ourselves to this new deity, and pay our devoirs to it, it will be proper, firft to examine the feveral magnificent things which are predicated of it; and begin with,

1. The original of it. The moral nature and fitnefs of things is represented as fomething to be confidered abftracted from God, and independent of his will, and fo confequently as neceffarily exifting; for whatever exifts independent of the divine will, neceffarily exifts, or exifts by neceffity of nature: and could this be made out, that the moral nature and fitnefs of things neceffarily exifts independent of the will of God, it must be allowed to be a deity indeed; for nothing exifts by neceffity of nature, independent of the will of God, but the being and perfections of God: either therefore this nature and fitness of things is fomething in God, or fomething without him; if it is famething in him, it must be a perfection of his nature, it must be himself; and therefore ought not to be confidered as abstracted from him, if it is fomething without him, apart from him, which exists independent of his will, that is, neceffarily; then there must be two neceffarily existing beings, that is, two Gods. It is faid, that "the difference between moral good and evil, virtue "and vice, as between darkness and light, and bitter and sweet, is a difference "not accidental to, but founded in the nature of the things themselves; not merely the refult of the determination and arbitrary will of another, but which "the

Y 2

■ Sermon, p. 5.

"the very ideas of the things themfelves do really and neceffarily include." Or,
as it is elfewhere expreffed, "the diftinction between moral good and evil doth
"fo arife out of the nature of the things themselves, as not to be originally and
་ properly the mere effect of the divine order and will, fo as that it never would
"have been, had not God willed and commanded it to be." But from whence
do things morally good proceed? Do they not come from God, from whom is
every good and perfect gift? As all natural and fupernatural good comes from
him, the fountain of all goodness; fo all moral good takes its rife from him,
and the moral perfections of his nature; which, and not the nature of things,
are the rule of his will, determinations and actions. Who puts this nature into
things, by which they are morally good, but the God of nature, of his own
will and pleasure; and, what fettles the difference between those things, and
what are morally evil, but the nature and will of God? Or the will of God,
which moves not in an arbitrary way, but agreeable to the moral perfections of
his nature. As for things morally evil, which lie in a defect of moral good,
are a privation of it, and an oppofition to it, though they are not of God, nor
does he put that evil nature into them that is in them, for he cannot be the au-
thor of any thing that is finful; yet these things become fo by being contrary
to his nature and will. The difference between moral good and evil lies in, and
the fitneffes and unfitneffes of these things are no other than, the agreement and
difagreement of them with the nature and will of God; and whatsoever ideas
we have of these things, and of their different natures, fitneffes and unfitneffes,
we have from God; who of his own will and pleasure has implanted them in
us, and in which we are greatly affifted in this prefent ftate of things by his re-.
vealed will; confifting of doctrines and inftructions, rules and precepts, found-
ed in, and agreeable to the perfections of his own nature. Befides, if the dif
ference between moral good and evil is founded in, and arifes from the nature
of the things themselves, and is not originally and properly the effect of the di-
vine order and will, then it cannot be faid to be, as it is ‘,

2. Strictly and properly eternal; for these things must exift, and this nature must be in them, from whence this difference arifes, ere there can be this difference; wherefore if the things themselves are not strictly and properly eternal, then the nature of them is not ftrictly and properly eternal; and confequently the difference which is founded in, and arifes from that nature, is not strictly and properly eternal. Moreover, nothing is strictly and properly eternal but God. If the nature and fitnefs of things is eternal; if there are eternal, everlafting, and unchangeable fitneffes of things, thofe fitneffes must be God. Should it be said, as it is, that "fuppofing the eternal and immutable existence of "God

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God, the ideas of these things (good and evil, virtue and vice) must have "been the fame in his all-perfect mind from eternity, as they now are; and have "appeared to his understanding with the fame oppofition and contrariety of "nature to each other, as they do now-and of confequence, the diftinction "between moral good and evil is as eternal as the knowledge of God himself, "that is, ftrictly and abfolutely eternal ;-and that before ever any created being received its existence, God had within himself the ideas of all possible futurities; of the nature of all beings that should afterwards have life; of their "feveral relations to himself, and one another; and faw what fitneffes, obliga"tions and duties, would, and must result from, and belong to creatures thus "formed and conftituted'; - which fitneffes or unfitneffes were eternally prefent to the all-comprehenfive mind of God, and as clearly difcerned by him, as the "natural differences of the things themselves, from whence they flow." It will be allowed, that there is in God an eternal knowledge of all things poffible and future; he knows all things poffible in the perfection of his almighty power, who could, if he would, bring them into being; but then this knowledge of his does not arife from, and depend upon the nature of the things themselves, which may be, or may not be; but it arifes from his own all-fufficiency. Poffible futurities, or posible fhall-be's, I do not understand. What foever is poffible may be, and it may not be; but what is future fhall be, and fo not barely poffible, but certain. A poffible futurity seems to be a contradiction. God knows whatever is poffible for himself to do; that is, he knows what his power can do; and alfo what his will determined to do, or fhall be done: the former is called poffible, the latter future. God's knowledge reaches to both, but then every thing that is poffible is not future. All that God knows might be accomplished by his power, he has not determined that it fhall be; and whatsoever he has determined shall be, is future, and ceases to be barely poffible. God fees and knows all things future, in his own will, purposes and decrees; for as it is the power of God that gives poffibility to things poffible; it is the will of God that gives futurity to things that fhall be. So God faw, knew, and had within himfelf the ideas of the nature of all beings that should afterwards have life; their feveral relations to himself, and one another; and all fitneffes, obligations, and duties belonging to them; because he had determined within himself to bring. fuch creatures into being, beftow fuch natures upon them, put them into fuch a relation to himself, and others; and make such and fuch duties fitting for them, and obligatory upon them. In this fenfe it will be readily granted, that the ideas of all things that come to país in time, were in his all-perfect mind from eternity, as they now are; because he determined within himself they fhould.

come to pass in the manner they now do. The fitneffes and unfitneffes of things were eternally present to his all-comprehenfive mind, because he willed they fhould be, either by his efficacious or permiffive will. But then the eternity of these things in this fenfe, or the eternal difference of good and evil, as founded upon the eternal knowledge of God, arifing from, and depending upon his own will, strongly militates against what is further said of this nature and fitness of things, or of the difference between moral good and evil, as that it is ",

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3. Prior to the will of God, and independent of it. By the will of God is meant either his will of purpofe, and is what the fcripture calls, The counsel of his will '; or will of precept, which is that system of moral laws, God has given to rational creatures as the rule of their actions. The Gentleman I am attending to, uses the phrase fometimes in one fenfe, and fometimes in another; and fometimes takes in both in one and the fame paragraph; and plainly fuggefts, that this difference is prior to the will of God, and independent of it, taken in either sense; his words are thefe *; "this difference did originally and eter"nally fubfift in the mind of God, as certainly as the difference between light " and darkness; and was in idea ever present with him, before ever it became "the law of his creatures, and appeared to them as the matter of his command "and will; and is itself that neceffary and invariable rule, by which God him"felf regulates and determines his own will and conduct to his creatures; and which, therefore, as a rule of action to himself, must be supposed to be inde"pendent of, and prior to, not the existence of God, which is abfolutely eter"nal, but to the will of the eternal God, and to be, indeed, the great reason "and measure of all his actions towards his creatures." Now, though it should be admitted, that things are fit and proper, juft and good, antecedent to the revealed will of God, or his will of command; and that God wills these things, that is, commands them, because they are fit and proper, juft and good; and not that they are so because he commands them; though one fhould think, whatever God commands must be fit and proper, just and good, for that very reafon, whether we can difcern any other reason or no, because he commands it; fince he can command nothing contrary to his nature, and the moral perfections of it; yet, nevertheless, these must be subsequent to the fecret will of God, or the counsel of his will, as that is within himself determining, fettling, conftituting, or permitting the order and fituation of things, their natures, beings, and relations to himself and others; from whence the fitneffes and unfitneffes of things, and the difference of moral good and evil are faid to arife. Whatever may be faid for the independency of these things on the will of God, they can never be prior to it: For if the production of creatures into being is owing to the will of i Ephes. i. 11. * Sermon, p. 10, 11.

h Sermon, p 11.

of God, and follows upon it; if the several relations they stand in to one another are folely of his appointment and forming, then furely what is fit, or not fit to be done, in such a situation, must be fixed by, and be the refult of his own will, as determining them according to the moral perfections of his nature; which determinations of his fecret will being revealed, become the law of his creatures; and being fo, this law is the fureft rule of judgment to them, with respect to the difference of moral good and evil; what lays the ftrongest obligation upon them to do the one and avoid the other; and fo must be the best rule of action to them. Mr Chandler himself owns', that "God might have "formed other creatures than what he hath; or produced some, or all of those "which now exift, in a different manner from what he actually hath done; he might, for instance, have stocked our earth with inhabitants at once, and "formed them in the fame manner as he did our first parents. And of confequence, as the prefent frame of things is owing to the wisdom, the good plea"fure and will of God, fo the fitneffes of things which now actually take place, "and that particular system of mor al virtue which mankind are obliged to re

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gard, and conform themselves to, muft, as far as it is a conftitution of thingsactually existing, be refolved into the fame good pleasure and will of God." Now, as the formation of creatures, and their production in this or the other manner, entirely depends on the will of God, and according to the variations. of them the fitneffes of things must have altered; there would not have been the fame fitneffes and unfitneffes, obligations and duties; fo it wholly depended on the will of God whether he would create any or no; and if he had never formed any creature, in any manner whatever, as he might not have done, if he would, where had been this eternal nature and fitnefs of things? As therefore the formation of creatures follows upon, and is owing to the will of God, the nature and fitness of things, with refpect to these creatures, cannot be prior, but must be subsequent to the will of God. Yea, this fame Gentleman says ", that "the will of God is not any thing diftinct from the everlasting fitnesses of things, but included in them, and indeed a neceffary and effential branch "of them." If therefore the will of God is not diftinct from them, is included in them, and a neceffary and effential branch of them; then the nature and fitnefs of things is not without the will of God, is not prior to it, and independent of it. And though this fame writer boldly afferts in one place", that the certain and immutable difference of things is entirely independent of the will of God; yet in other places he feems to ftagger a little, and fays, that this dif tinction is not originally and properly the mere effect of the divine order and will, and is not merely the refult of the determination and arbitrary will of another;

n Ibid. p. 9.

m Ibid. p. 22.

1 Sermon, p. 15.

Ibid. p. 10, 5:

as