alteration of the terms of service. The system might for that reason produce more men, but fewer soldiers. British soldiers should be military men, sui generis. They were often engaged against twice their number of enemies, and under disadvantages of situation, and circumstances of debarkation and embarkation; they must therefore be real soldiers, and British troops had always proved themselves to be of that description. If our brave but unfortunate countrymen in Egypt, where the efforts of every individual was necessary to repel the superiority of numbers that assailed them, had not been troops of that character, it would have been impossible to save the remains of that army. He did not concur in the objection to the ballot, because it would interfere with the system of the right honourable gentleman. This measure was to furnish 28,000 men to the army, and he could not see any reasonable objection to it on the ground of its interfering with a part of the supply under the present system. They could not apply the conscription which had enabled France to overrun the continent to this country. But the ballot was applicable, both because it was necessary, and conformable to the practice of the constitution, but he could not assent to its application as proposed by his noble friend. By the papers upon the table, it appeared that the regular force at present in Great Britain and Ireland, was 25,000 less than when he went out of office, a period when so much was said about the necessity of augmenting that description of the national force. Upon this subject the House, he thought, ought to have some explanation. Though no person ought lightly to make a charge upon ministers for their distribution of the public force, yet when he considered how that force had been last year distributed, or rather scattered, he could not avoid saying, that the matter ought to be explained. A considerable force had been sent to South America, and though he should not say any thing of the merits of the first expedition to that country, because an hon. officer, a friend of his, had been tried for having undertaken it, he was ready to admit, that it was advisable to support the force that achieved the origi nal conquest. But he wished to know from the right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Windham) why, after the battle of Jena, so large a force as five thousand men had been sent out under general Craufurd to America. These troops, from the manner in which the expedition had been VOL. I.-1807. conducted, 3E conducted, had been nine months at sea. The troops which had been employed in foreign service, were the best of the British army. There was an army likewise in the Mediterranean, from which the expedition to Egypt had been detached. That expedition he felt it difficult to appreciate, nor should it have his approbation, unless it could be proved to him, that under all the circumstances of the case the project was well concerted, and the force .dispatched fully adequate to its object. From the circumstances he had stated, it appeared that a recruiting for the army was necessary. The regular force in Great Britain and Ireland at present, was 15,000 less than even last year. It would be obvious how necessary it was in the present situation of the world, to concentrate the British army in these islands with all possible expedition. As that was impracticable with respect to the distant troops, he agreed to the use of the ballot to raise a considerable force; but he thought the ballot should be employed to raise an army of reserve, which would be disposable for the protection of Ireland, rather than to recruit the militia. The army of re serve act, and the other defensive measures which he had formerly brought forward, were only so many great steps to wards making the country a military nation. He had long been a militia officer, but should not suffer his natural partia lity for one branch of the military establishment, to prevent him from stating his opinion on it freely as a part of the whole. The militia had done much service, but was not now adequate to the object of its establishment, for it was not numerous enough. The number of the militia had been calculated upon the exigency of the wars in which this coun try had been heretofore engaged, and was consequently ins adequate to the present crisis. A much smaller establishment was sufficient, when the most formidable expedition that could be equipped against any country, in 1744, which was composed of 30,000 troops, under marshal Saxe, assembled at Boulogne, than under all the circumstances of the present war. Besides, the war had continued now fourteen years with little intermission, and the officers of the militia, who had submitted to considerable privations and inconvenience, in order to make themselves soldiers, would not be disposed to continue during a war, of which he saw no end. He preferred, therefore, employing the ballot to raise an army of reserve, because if they were to increase the militia, where could officers be found, such such as militia officers ought to be? His noble friend had stated, that the number proposed to be taken from the militia, would be sufficient to fill up the 56 second battalions: supposing each battalion to be completed to 750 men, 36 battalions would exhaust the whole number, there would remain then 20 battalions to be completed. According to his opinion, it would be wiser to add those 20 battalions to the nine garrison battalions, which were the remains of the army of reserve, and to complete the whole to 1000 each, making altogether 29,000 men, to serve on the same terms as the army of reserve. This was the time for such an operation, and the whole might be filled up in three months. By adopting his suggestion, there would be an immediate accession of 46,000 men to the disposable force of the country; and when he considered the danger, and the point in which that danger was most likely to take place, he was more strongly impressed with the necessity of the disposa ble force of the country. As to the objection of his noble friend, that the ballot for the reserve would be productive of expence, by raising the price of substitutes, he was sure his noble friend must have been misinformed upon that head, because undoubtedly the ballot for the reserve in the former instance, had not the effect of raising the bounties for substitutes for the militia. As to the remission of the penalties be had disapproved of that measure, but he could not agree with his noble friend, that it would be an obstruction to the effect of a bill for raising a similar force now, because it would equally apply to the militia acts, which had not been impeded by it. He had never thought the defence act which he had brought forward perfect, but he had always considered it as a step taken upon the country towards its military organization. When he brought it forward, he had looked to it more as a stimulus to the volunteer force to keep it up to that amount, which would be adequate to the necessity of the times, than for any immedia e effect from its own operation. He did not think that the militia should be reduced below 30,000, and therefore he wished that after it should be reduced to that number, the militia should be left in that state, and another force arising out of the general training act should be ingrafted upon it. As to the observations of his noble friend with respect to the employment of the constable under the training act, he should only say that as all these measures were new, it had not been thought advisable to subject the persons persons to be trained to the mutiny act, but rather to try how much the country would bear, and to leave the discipline to be maintained by the constable, who, in former times, was a person of even considerable military command. But he saw no reason why the persons, who should be called out as he proposed, should not be subject to the new mutiny act in the same manner as the militia in time of peace. i hey might be taken out for a fortnight in spring, and a fortnight in autumn each year, and disciplined by the militia regiments, which should be marched into their counties for that purpose. A levy of 200,000 or 100,000 armed and clothed, and thus engrafted upon the militia, though not to be regularly embodied till the occa sion should arrive that called for their service, would compose a most formidable défensive force. This idea was not new; for a similar course had been adopted in 1796, with respect to the supplemental militia. He had thought it right to state thus freely his sentiments upon this question, and was confident the country was ripe for some such measure as that he had proposed, if the Parliament should set the example, and that in consequence, by Christmas next, the country would be in a situation to defy all danger. In stating his sentiments on the subject, he had discharged his duty. He saw that the military system of the country was far from being perfect; he was afraid they talked too much on these subjects, whilst so little had been done. He had hoped that they had done with discussions of this description; but as the subject had been again broached, he trusted the House would take effectual measures for procuring a great army, which, added to our naval pre-eminence, would enable us to bid defiance to the tyrant, who had trampled upon the independence of so many of the continental states. Mr. Bathurst coincided in most of the sentiments expressed by his right honourable friend, though he could not help being surprised at his having introduced into his discussion topics that had no immediate connection with the question then under consideration. He contended that the measure of his right honourable friend (Mr. Windham) was adequate to the purposes for which it was intended, though it might not be sufficient to afford an immediate supply, such as the crisis demanded. His noble friend needed not to apologise for having made his proposition to Parliament: the apology should, according to his impression, 397 impression, be for not having made it before. If the country was to be saved, it was by becoming an armed nation that its salvation was to be effected. He agreed with his right honourable friend that the question now was, whether the ballot was to be employed for recruiting the mili tia, or raising an army of reserve; but he had some doubts of the propriety of allowing the militia to volunteer into the line, especially as the principal object of the measures was the internal defence. He was afraid, however, that his noble friend had his attention too much bent upon foreign and continental expeditions. The House should keep in view that it was desirable to have a force disposeable for Great Britain and Ireland. His right honourable friend had stated that the militia was in a declining state, but he had omitted to state, that this measure would destroy the spirit of those who commanded and kept up that force. His noble friend had said that it was not his intention to interfere with the existing establishments, but by this arrangement he would most materially injure a most important branch of the national force. Whenever the militia had been before drafted into the line, it was in the contemplation of foreign expeditions, but the present measure was brought forward with a view to home defence. After this measure should be carried into effect, no militia officer could look upon himself as belonging to a military establishment, if the House should sanction the impression, that it was unfit for the defence of the country. By adopting the proposition of his noble friend, they would run the risk of breaking in upon a most impor ant establishment. He could not agree in the recommendation of his right honourable friend, to have the militia regiments marched into their respective counties for the purpose of drilling the mass, because if marched from the military posts they occupied on the coasts, they would be rendered inefficient for immediate defence. The noble lord had stated as a ground of his measure, that about 6000 of the militia would be withdrawn from the service, in consequence of the expiration of their terms; but if these men were to withdraw from the militia, how could his noble friend expect to get them to enter for the general service? It was his opinion, that the militia ought rather to be increased than diminished. When the noble lord stated, that if the circumstances of the country were the same now, as when the reserve act had been brought forward, he should have preferred |