But yet still there remains some great difficulties upon my mind, which arise from other arguments which I have heard and read on this subject. Shall I propose them now, my friends? Or shall we appoint to meet again more early next Wednesday in the afternoon, and finish our conferences on this subject?

PITH. Indeed, Sir, I fear we have too much work upon our hands to be all finished this evening. And since you are so obliging, Logisto, to invite us to such a peaceful and pleasant retreat, and since I persuade myself Sophronius will be so good as to afford us a few hours more of his company, for my part, I know not how I can better employ my time than in endeavouring, in such society, to search after and communicate truth. It is indeed the appointed business and station of my life to be a teacher to others, yet I take pleasure gentlemen, to come hither and learn.

SOPH. But why will ye not please, my friends, to favour me with a visit, and let your last conference do my parlour the honour of finishing this friendly controversy? I will not pretend to such an elegant and spacious garden as Logisto has, nor to so neat and private a retreat for conversation, as this wherein we are now entertained: But you shall be attended with the best accommodations which my dwelling will afford ; and if you will give yourselves the trouble to ascend to my study, we shall there be sufficiently retired from all other

company.

LOG. I doubt not, Sophronius, of the sincerity of your request, nor the conveniency of your library, for such a friendly conference: but since you have favoured us thus far with your happy assistance in a debate which Pithander and myself had appointed here in this garden, I cannot with any satisfaction permit the scene to be altered. Perhaps it may seem a degree of incivility to desire a visit from you so often without a return; yet I promise you, Sir, I will write myself down indebted to you for every such favour, and when we begin any new subject of debate, Sophronious shall appoint the place.

SOPH. Then since it is the pleasure of Logisto to have it so, without any more ceremony, we will attend him here next Wednesday.

PITH. I agree, Sir, to your proposal. I can never be in an ill situation at either of your houses, amidst the honour of such company.

LOG. Gentlemen, I own the obligation, and am veur very humble servant,

THE THIRD CONFERENCE.

IN the days that passed after the last meeting, Logisto had been reviewing several books which have been written in vindication of the sufficiency of human reason to conduct men to happiness in a way of religion; and as he had renewed his own difficulties, so he had furnished his memory with some of their strongest arguments: but he found none so hard to answer, as that great and important one, which is derived from the wisdom, the equity, and the goodness of God; upon which account he resolved to reserve this to the last. When his company were come, he led them down to the usual place of learned conversation, and began the conference thus:

LOG. The only thing that remains before us, gentlemen, is, that I should propose some arguments, drawn from the reason of things, and from the nature of God, and man, why it appears necessary that the principle of human reason should be sufficient, in all mankind, to guide and conduct them to the belief and practice of such a religion, wherein they may obtain the favour of God, and happiness in a future state.

PITH. I wait with some impatience, Sir, to hear these ar guments of yours, which you have so often intimated: And yet it may not be improper, before you produce them, to consider, what is the particular proposition your arguments can possibly prove, or what it is you can expect from them. Will you please to remember, Sir, it has been plainly proved and determined already, and agreed in our past debate, as a certain matter of fact, that there are several large countries of heathenism wherein the inhabitants have not reason sufficient to guide them into true religion, considering their vast prejudices and aversions to God and goodness; much less is it sufficient to enable them to practise it; that is, according to the distinction of our worthy friend Sophronins, that though there may be in them a remote, natural, and speculative sufficiency for this purpose, yet their reasoning powers are so poor and low, so unpractised, and so much perverted by a thousand errors, evil customs, vicious propensities, and wilful ignorance, that they are not practically and experi mentally sufficient for this great design. This has been abundantly confirmed by the melancholy, and yet entertaining accounts Sophronius hath given us of African and American heathens. Now I humbly hope, Sir, you will not suppose that any of your arguments can destroy plain matter of fact, nor prove that to be sufficient, which has before been plainly declared and proved, and agreed to be insufficient.

LOG. I must acknowledge, Pithander, I know not how to appose what you say. It seems to be plainly proved, that reason

in these savages is not a sufficient guide. All that I can pretend therefore, is, only to shew, that if human reason is not in fact sufficient, even practically sufficient for this purpose: yet, at least, it ought to be practically sufficient; and perhaps my arguments will prove it.

PITH. Pray, Sir, be so good as to inform me, what you mean by saying, it ought to be sufficient? Will any of your arguments teach the all-wise God what he ought to have done, and in what other and better condition he ought to have placed mankind, than he has seen fit to place them in? Will your arguments give wisdom to your Maker, or instruct him in rules of justice? Or can any of your reasonings inform him, what superior talents, and happier circumstances, he ought to have bestowed upon his creatures? Have you courage enough to reprove or arraign the conduct of the supreme Governor of the world towards his African or American subjects! Is it right, Logisto, to talk at this rate? Or is it safe to venture on such an unequal contest? What else can you mean, Sir, by affirming, that reason ought to be sufficient, but this, viz. that God ought to have given men better faculties, or he ought to have bestowed upon them clearer light, and better helps, or ought to have brought them into the world with greater advantages than his wisdom has thought fit to do: And what is this, but telling the all-wise God, he has acted weakly, or charging the God of justice that he has dealt unjustly, or accusing the Father of Mercies that he has acted cruelly toward his creatures?

LOG. I confess, good Sir, that you confound me a little with these enquiries. I have no such hardiness of soul, as to dare to reprove my Maker, whom I adore with the most profound veneration; and I do acknowledge, that whatsoever he does, must be right and just. And yet there are arguments which seem to prove, that man, who as you agree, is to be tried and judged in the other world, for his behaviour in this, should, some way or other, have sufficient powers given him to know and fulfil his duty: Otherwise, men would be excusable in their greatest superstitions and immoralities, as being destitute, by the necessity of their circumstances, of a sufficient guide in matters of religion and virtue: And this is the first argument which I desire leave to offer upon this head, as a difficulty which I cannot solve.

PITI. Perhaps, Sir, it is an effectual relief to this difficulty, if we suppose mankind to be furnished with such reasoning powers as are, in the nature of things, and in a remote sense, sufficient to guide and conduct men in their religious affairs: For the neglect of using and improving these rational powers, is greatly criminal: And it is this universal neglect of using them well, that renders them practically insufficient. If they employ

not their reason in their most important concerns, you will grant it is their own fault; and this renders them condemnable for the neglect or abuse of it, and for the errors and vices proceeding from such an unreasonable conduct of life. This is confessed by the writers of your own side of the question. Besides, the rea soning faculty, and the remains of conscience, which are found even in the most savage tribes of mankind, may be called practically sufficient, though not to conduct to happiness completely, yet, to have taught them much more of the first principles of virtue and religion, than most of them either know or practise; and thus to have withheld them from their grossest immoralities and superstitions.

Yet further, reason may teach them the duties of an innocent man, but not to recover a sinner to God's favour. The obligations which their reason and conscience might lay on them to practise duty may be clear and strong as far as they go; and yet these may not be sufficient to bring sinners to the favour of God and eternal happiness. Devils are under clear and strong obligation to love God, and to repent, and obey him, through the dictates of a rational nature; but this rational nature is not sufficient to bring them to happiness and the favour of God. It is granted, the heathens have great hindrances; but great as they are, they are not so insurmountable, but that most or all of them might have arrived at much superior degrees of knowledge and practice in religion, than what any of them have actually arrived at, if they had not been so shamefully and criminally negligent, so exceeding fond of error and sin, and so lazy in their search after truth and duty. Therefore they are by no means excusable, as you express it, in their greatest immoralities.

Give me leave, Sir, to represent this matter by a plain similitude. Suppose Anergus a slave, to have a remote natural capacity sufficient to trace out all the demonstrations in Euclid : Then you consequently must suppose him also to have a proximate and practical sufficiency to trace out some of the first and plainest of them: Criton, his master commands him to demonstrate all the propositions there, or to practise all the problems: but he will not so much as set about the first and plainest of them: Is not Anergus greatly criminal? If he would have traced out the first, he might perhaps find a growing capacity, and a proximate and practical sufficiency to demonstrate the next and the next in succession, till he came to the last. Is he not chargeable then with the guilt of not demonstrating and practising the whole series, even though he never actually had a practical and proximate sufficience of reason or ability to grasp the deepest and most complicated theorems, or to perform the hardest problems, because he was lazy and thoughtless, and

would not apply himself to the easiest? You know, Sir, how to apply this to the case in hand.

LOG. Then you do not assert, that their reason is practically insufficient to have taught them the chief part of their duty, or to have enabled them to perform it, if they had been well inclined to it, and sincerely diligent in their attempts to their utmost ?

PITH. No, Sir, I assert no such thing: For it is their great and universal sloth and negligence, and disinclination both to learn and perform their duty, that is one of the chief things that renders their reasoning powers thus insufficient in a practical sense: It is owing to their powerful prejudices, their evil moral habits, and their strong aversion to God and virtue, that they do not exercise their reasoning powers to the utmost of their capacity: And it is by this means they continue in darkness, guilt, and death: Whereas if they had a real inclination, and sincere desire, to search out and perform their duty to God and man, if they obeyed every secret dictate of conscience, every hint of truth that arose within them, and used their natural light, both as to belief and practice, to the utmost of their power, God would never be wanting to any of his creatures; I am persuaded, he would have graciously accepted the utmost that their reasoning powers could perform: or, if it were necessary, he would have given such well-disposed persons, greater light and greater strength, to learn and fulfil the necessary parts of religion; for to him that hath, shall be given; that is, greater helps shall be given to him that improves what lesser talents God has entrusted him with. But the case of these brutal creatures seems to be represented in the latter end of that text; Luke viii. 18. From him that hath not, shall be taken away that which he hath, or seemeth to have; that is, those who improve not the feeble light that is given them, even those feeble glimmerings of light shall be taken from them, and by the righteous judgment of God they shall be left in deep and utter darkness: And thus they are greatly culpable, though their reasoning powers are practically insuffieieut.

LOG. Very well, my friend; I can hear this with more patience, since you impute the crime to men's own abuse of their rational powers, and not to God their Creator. I proceed therefore to a second argument, and forgive me if I express it in pretty strong terms: Does not the great and blessed God equally behold all the dwellers on the earth, free from partiality and prejudice? And can he be supposed to make some people his favourites, without any consideration of their merits, and merely because they believe certain propositions, and practise certain duties, which he has revealed, and which are taught and known generally in that country where they happen to be born;