What's Within?: Nativism Reconsidered

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Oxford University Press, 30 ene 2003 - 334 páginas
This powerfully iconoclastic book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: "native" to the mind rather than acquired. Fiona Cowie argues that this view is mistaken, demonstrating that nativism is an unstable amalgam of two quite different--and probably inconsistent--theses about the mind.

Unlike empiricists, who postulate domain-neutral learning strategies, nativists insist that some learning tasks require special kinds of skills, and that these skills are hard-wired into our brains at birth. This "faculties hypothesis" finds its modern expression in the views of Noam Chomsky. Cowie, marshaling recent empirical evidence from developmental psychology, psycholinguistics, computer science, and linguistics, provides a crisp and timely critique of Chomsky's nativism and defends in its place a moderately nativist approach to language acquisition.

Also in contrast to empiricists, who view the mind as simply another natural phenomenon susceptible of scientific explanation, nativists suspect that the mental is inelectably mysterious. Cowie addresses this second strand in nativist thought, taking on the view articulated by Jerry Fodor and other nativists that learning, particularly concept acquisition, is a fundamentally inexplicable process. Cowie challenges this explanatory pessimism, and argues convincingly that concept acquisition is psychologically explicable. What's Within? is a clear and provocative achievement in the study of the human mind.

 

Índice

11 What Is Nativism? Preliminary Spleen
3
12 The Oblique Approach
6
13 Two Problems
7
Foundations for Rationalism
8
The Genetic Question
16
More Spleen
25
What Nativism Is I The Hypothesis of Special Faculties
27
An Overview of the Dispute
28
65 Objections
139
LanguageLearning From Behaviorism to Nativism
151
The Case for Representationalism
159
A New Approach to the Psychology of Language
163
From Hypothesis Testing to Nativism
172
From Weak Nativism to Chomskyan Nativism
174
The Poverty of the Stimulus
176
81 The A Posteriori Argument from the Poverty of the Stimulus
178

2 The Argument from the Poverty of the Stimulus
31
23 A Trilemma
38
DomainSpecific Faculties
39
The Genetic Question Revisited
43
The Case for SpecialPurpose Faculties
47
What Nativism Is II The Mystery Hypothesis
49
31 The Impossibility Argument of Leibniz
50
32 The Impossibility Argument of Descartes
52
33 Everything s Innate Is Not an Acquisition Theory
56
34 Nonnaturalism
60
35 Nativism as Nonnaturalism
64
36 What Nativism Is
67
CONCEPT ACQUISITION Problem or Mystery?
69
The Case Against Empiricism
71
42 Alternative Accounts of Conceptual Structure
76
43 Radical Concept Nativism
80
44 Protoconcepts
83
45 BruteCausal Mechanisms
86
46 Concept Acquisition FodorStyle
89
The Constitution Hypothesis
91
51 The DoorknobDOORKNOB Problem
92
52 The Constitution Hypothesis
93
53 Ontology Acquisition and Innateness
99
54 The Standard Argument and the Dialectical Role of the Constitution Hypothesis
102
55 Is Fodor a Nativist?
105
56 How Low Can You Go?
110
Prospects for a Psychology of Concept Acquisition
112
61 The SterelnyLoar Objections
114
62 Ostension
121
63 Nonostensive Acquisition
126
64 Concept Acquisition Is Psychologically Mediated
131
The APS versus Putnamian Empiricism
179
The APS Versus Enlightened Empiricism
182
84 Childrens Errors and the Primary 0ata
184
85 The Predictions of Empiricism
188
86 Other Versions of the APS
196
The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition
204
91 The Logical Problem
207
92 Guaranteeing Learnability
211
93 The Case for OSand the Case Against i
213
94 Some Morals for Language Learners
217
95 Substitutes for Negative 0ata
222
96 The Dialectical Role of the Logical Problem
234
The Role of Universal Grammar in LanguageLearning
238
101 The Argument from the Poverty of the Stimulus Reiterated
239
True by Stipulation?
240
103 What Is Linguistics About?
242
An Inference to the Best Explanation?
248
105 Hypothesis Testing and ParameterSetting
250
106 Some Problems with Parameters
257
107 HypothesisTesting
264
108 The Iterated APS 0efused
270
109 Polemics and Concluding Truculence
272
Will the Evidence for Linguistic Nativism Please Stand Up?
276
112 The Distinctive ness Of Language
282
114 Pidgins and Creolization
302
115 Conclusory Moralizing
305
Conclusion
309
Bibliography
313
Index
331
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Sobre el autor (2003)

Fiona Cowie is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the California Institute of Technology. Born in Sydney, Australia, she received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton University in 1994.

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