was natural, since she was then the only "rebel privateer" known to be in existence, and they would have said so in good faith, but of course with no notion that the whole cost of their cruise was to be eventually claimed from Great Britain. If such a claim were admissible, a similar claim would be equally admissible on account of every United States ship of war of sufficient force then in commission, since, if the Shenandoah had fallen in the way of any such ship, it would have been the duty of that ship, as it was that of the Iroquois, to capture her; but this is not, cannot be, "pursuit." It is therefore obvious, from this further investigation, that the Admiralty Committee were fully justified, on every ground, in considering as inadmissible the claim made on her account. The claim made in the United States Case for the pursuit of the Shenandoah, the asseveration in their Counter Case that "Her Majesty's Government is mistaken in its belief that no endeavor to intercept or capture the Shenandoah appeared to have been made by the Government of the United States," and the large sum involved in this claim, amounting, without interest, to no less than $329,865.08, will, it is hoped, afford good and substantial grounds for thinking that the labor and research expended in the investigation of this particular case have not been fruitless. INADEQUACY AND WANT OF CONCERT OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE ABROAD, ETC. The United States ministers abroad were constantly calling the attention of their Government to the inadequacy of their naval forces to arrest the career of the Confederate cruisers. Messrs. Adams, Dayton, Pike, Perry, Webb, Harvey, one and all at different times dwell on this theme; but when the letters on the subject (and many of the consuls made similar representations) were referred to Mr. Welles, he may be said to have acted always as if he regarded this question as wholly subordinate to that of the blockades; hence it is seen that the most suitable vessels were taken from the pursuit to re-enforce the blockading squadrons, without regard to the injury which the depredations of the Confederate cruisers were inflicting on the United States commerce. Sometimes he explained that it was want of men which prevented him from sending a greater force in pursuit; but with the number of seamen at his disposal, 28,000 in 1862 and 36,000 in 1863, exclusive of officers, this excuse would seem to be of little avail when the facts are sifted. However, besides this notorious inadequacy of force to compass the ends which it is submitted the United States Government ought to have had in view, and to have considered a necessary, if not the first, duty, there were other causes in operation which are disclosed sufficiently in the correspondence laid before Congress and the House of Representatives, and which tended to impair the efficiency of the small force detailed for this special service; they were— (4.) The absence of any communication to many of the different legations of the movements of the several men-of-war in European waters, of which there are many complaints. (B.) The fact that there was no naval head or senior officer in European waters; each ship appeared to act independently and for itself; there was a consequent absence of all concerted action. For instances, see Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862-63, part ii, pp. 902, 980, 1278; 1864-65, part iii, p. 323; part iv, pp. 275, 302, 319, 325; 1865-66, part iii, p. 102. 2 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864-'65, part iii, p. 42. From these causes combined, which may be abundantly proved from the United States documents, and which were— (a.) Insufficiency of force; (b.) Ignorance of movements of the ships on the part of United States Ministers; (c.) Independence of action on the part of each ship; it may fairly be inferred that the United States Government did not "actively and diligently exert their naval power" to arrest the course of the Alabama or the other Confederate cruisers. ERRORS IN THE SYNOPSIS OF ORDERS. Frequent reference is made in the Report of the Admiralty Committee and its Appendices, as well as in this paper, to errors in the synopsis of orders; a few fresh illustrations may not be inapt: (a.) The Chippewa is stated to have been watching the Sumter at Algeciras to the 30th May, 1863. Now not only, as is well known, had the Sumter left Gibraltar as an unarmed ship on the previous Sth of February,' but the Chippewa was herself with some of Admiral Wilkes's ships in the West Indies, at Cape Haytien, on the 21st May, 1863, and at Nassau," from St. Thomas," on the 26th May.2 She had been at Cadiz on the 12th February, and again in March, and she was at Madeira in April; hence the synopsis must be in error in stating that she was watching the Sumter at Algeciras to the 30th May, 1863. (b.) The Kearsarge. In the admiralty report it has been noticed with reference to this ship's orders of 30th September, 1862, "to capture the Rappahannock or other rebel privateers in European waters," that the synopsis must be in error. Mr. Welles, in his report of the 1st December, 1862, stated, at "last advices (she) was also in pursuit of the 290," (page 23.) In the United States Case she is stated to have been at Gibraltar with the Tuscarora, watching the Sumter, and it is implied that this was continued till that vessel's sale. The Kearsarge was, in fact, about the time to which Mr. Welles must have referred to, viz, on the 30th September and on 3d November, watching the Sumter at Gibraltar, and on the 4th November she was at Cadiz; she was certainly not in pursuit of the Alabama, which vessel was then in the West Indies. (c.) Ino.-There is a claim on behalf of this sailing-ship for fifteen months for convoying the Aquila with the monitor Camanche on board. Now the Camanche, on the 1st February, 1863, was building at Jersey City, and on the 14th March of the following year, was at San Fran cisco, California. It seems more probable that there is a further errror in the synopsis than that this service should have taken fifteen months to perform. (d.) Juniata. From the synopsis of orders, the dates given, and the amount of the claim on her behalf, it would be inferred that this ship commenced her service with Admiral Wilkes's squadron on the 4th December, 1862; whereas she did not leave the United States for nearly five months after that date. A correspondent of the New York Herald, writing on the 22d January, 1863, says that the Juniata, 1 Appendix to British Case, vol. ii, p. 57. 2United States Navy Report, December, 1863, p. 557; Appendix to British Case, vol. V, p. 225. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, p. 229. 4 United States Navy Registers for 1863 and 1864. which had been under sailing orders since November, was still at Philadelphia, being detained by a defect in her machinery, (New York Herald, January 26, 1863.) She went to Fortress Monroe on the 17th March, and sailed for the Havana on the 25th April, 1863, (see New York Herald of that date.) The United States Navy Register for 1863, shows that on the 1st February, 1863, she was in Hampton Roads, and not with the West India squadron. (e.) The Connecticut.-To cruise between Bermuda and Nassau to watch for the Sumter from 3d August, 1863, to 7th September, 1863. This claim is made for a period when the Sumter, as admitted in the United States Case, p. 88, had changed her character, and become the Gibraltar. She sailed from Liverpool on the 3d July, 1863, as a merchant-vessel without armament, with a cargo of warlike stores for Charleston, and the Connecticut was doubtless employed to look out for her; but as she was then simply a blockade-runner, or a merchantship, with contraband of war on board, or both, it is clear that under no circumstances could this claim be admissible under the treaty. (f.) Ticonderoga.-In a note in the appendix to the report of the admiralty committee, 2 attention is called to the fact that between May, 1863, and June, 1864, although her cost is claimed, no service is given in the synopsis of orders for the period. This was not an omission to specify the service, but an error in the dates and charges; as within. the period, for which it would otherwise be inferred she was in pursuit of Confederate cruisers, she was actually under repairs (had "work done") at the navy-yards of Brooklyn; Charlestown, Massachusetts; Philadelphia, and Norfolk, respectively; and she is shown in the Navy Register for 1864 as being on the 12th of March of that year "ready for sea at Philadelphia. " Again, it is obvious that she could not have been employed in the Gulf of Saint Lawrence protecting the fisheries during the winter. 3 (g.) Niagara. The claims on account of this ship and the Sacramento have been already dealt with in the admiralty report and its postscript on the grounds 1. That they are generally inadmissible. 2. That they extend far beyond the existence, as confederate cruisers, of the vessels on account of which the claims are made. 3. That they extend to periods long after the cessation of hostilities. But in addition to these fatal errors or objections to the claims, the following are also obvious errors: 4. Mr. Adams stated that the Niagara had left France for the United States on the 8th August, 1865; the claim, however, embraces a period forty-four days beyond that date, although a vessel of her speed could hardly have occupied that time in making the passageacross the Atlantic: 5. The Niagara accompanied the Russian squadron, which convoyed the remains of the Czarovitch from Lisbon to the North Sea, and for which act of courtesy the Russian government expressed itself deeply sensible and grateful to that of the United States; but, through a manifest error in the synopsis and in the claims, the cost of the ship for this period is claimed against the British Government. 5 (h.) Nereus.-The claims for this ship on convoy service embrace a 1 1 Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, p. 203. 3 United States Navy Report, December, 1864, pp. 1,005 et seq. Ibid., part iii, p. 127. period during which she was employed with the fleet at the attacks on and final capture of Fort Fisher between 24th December, 1864, and 15th January, 1865. She may have been employed on this service for a much longer period, and she, as well as her consorts in convoying duty, may have been often similarly withdrawn during the periods embraced in the claims, as it is only incidentally that errors of this character can, in the absence of complete information as to the orders and the movements of the United States cruisers, be discovered. It is thus shown that there is a sufficiently large number of patent errors in the synopsis of orders to warrant its authority on matters of fact being questioned, when other data, generally derived from United States official documents, point to different conclusions. They are ad duced with this sole object, as they generally refer to claims which have not been regarded as admissible (on the hypothesis explained in the admiralty report) under the treaty, and consequently it has not been thought necessary to give their money value. ADMIRAL WILKES'S FLYING SQUADRON. The total amount claimed for the services of this flying squadron, which originally consisted of one converted merchant-steamer, four second-class steam sloops, three paddle-wheel steamers, one sailing-ship, one sailing store-ship, and one sailing ship occasionally, if not always, used as a coal-ship, is so large ($1,457,130) that it may not be thought an abundance of caution to add to the reasons which the admiralty committee justly looked on as conclusive why these claims should be considered wholly inadmissible: 1. The accounts of prizes captured by United States cruisers, which have been carefully examined, the returns of visits of United States ships-of-war to British West India Islands, and the incidental notices scattered here and there in the reports of the Secretary of the Navy to Congress, in other official papers, and in the newspapers of the day. abundantly prove that for the periods respectively claimed none of these ships, though the squadron is called "flying," proceeded beyond the limits officially designated by Mr. Welles as the "West Indies." When finally broken up under the command of Admiral Lardner, Admiral Wilkes's successor, Mr. Welles spoke of it as the "West India squadron;" the term "flying" is an ex post facto designation. 2. The continuance of this squadron as an organization had no refer ence whatever to the confederate cruisers, but solely to the duration of the trade at Matamoras. Mr. Welles stated in his report of 7th Decem ber, 1863, (page viii,) that "the occupation of Rio Grande and Brownsville (13th November, 1863) has put a final termination to the lately extensive commerce of Matamoras, which is becoming as insignificant as it was before the rebellion." Now at that date the Alabama, Florida, and Georgia were in being as confederate cruisers, and yet so little were their proceedings heeded in reference to this "flying squadron" that, taking the dates from the synopsis of orders, when that report was written the squadron had dwindled down to The Tioga, a paddle-wheel steamer of 809 tons; The sailing-vessel Gemsbok, which was frequently, if not always, used as a coal or as a store ship; And the sailing store-ship National Guard. 1 United States Navy Report, December, 1865, pp. 28, 77. 2 Ibid, December, 1864, p. xix. It cannot be supposed the Tioga was ever afterward detached from Admiral Lardner's squadron or sent in the actual pursuit of any of the confederate cruisers, (all then on the other side of the Atlantic,) since on the 24th March, 1864, she was off Elbow Light, (Bahamas,) and it may be assumed she was within the limits assigned to her by her orders until the claim on her account ceased, viz, 27th June, 1864.1 All the other vessels stated to have composed this squadron had, at different times, been previously withdrawn, and were afterward to be found attached to blockading squadrons. The words "stated to have composed" are used intentionally, as it is impossible to reconcile the dates given in the abstract of the claims with those given elsewhere; for instance, in the case of the Juniata, as already shown, there is an error of nearly five months; in the Navy Register for January, 1863, the Gemsbok and the Oneida are shown as attached to blockading squadrons, and in that for January, 1864, the Tioga is named as attached to the East Gulf blockading squadron-duties palpably inconsistent with the pursuit of the confederate cruisers. The claim on account of the Oneida commences on the very day (16th January, 1860) that she allowed the Florida to escape from Mobile. It is believed that after that date she continued to be employed in the blockade of that port, as she is stated in the Navy Register for 1863 to have been attached to the West Gulf squadron on the 1st February, 1863. MISCELLANEOUS CASES, Not affecting the claims considered by the admiralty committee as admissi ble (upon the hypothesis explained by them) for arbitration. VANDERBILT. It should be borne in mind that, notwithstanding her superior speed and armament, the Vanderbilt was an unfit vessel to send in pursuit of the Alabama, since she was wholly dependent on her steam-power; hence, after making a passage, if she could not replenish her coal, she was powerless; this explains parts of her proceedings. 2 On her way to the Cape she, in obedience to her orders, went to Fernando Noronha, Pernambuco, and Rio, there coaled, and notwithstanding she was in pursuit of an enemy remained in port nineteen days. As a matter of fact, if she had staid there about five or six days and sailed on the 20th July direct for the Cape, (as she was ordered,) she would, instead of never meeting the Alabama, have found her in Table Bay. From Rio she, however, went to St. Helena, there took all the coals she could get, (400 tons,) but on her arrival at Simon's Bay (where it was not known that she had been at St. Helena) she was again allowed to coal, taking nearly 1,000 tons.3 After remaining eight days "painting ship," (so Semmes says in "My Adventures," page 668,) she again put to sea and went to Mauritius, where she was again allowed to coal, (though under what circumstances, or what representations her captain made to the governor, it is nowhere stated,) but there is another unaccountable delay in port of seventeen days; she returned to Table Bay, United States Navy Report, December, 1865, p. 485; Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, p. 360. United States Navy Report, December, 1863, p. xxiv. Appendix to British Case, vol. v, pp. 228, 234. Ibid., p. 233. |