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learn to speak; if ye hear no other, ye speak not yourself; and whom ye only hear, of them ye only learn.

"And therefore if ye would speak as the best and wisest do, ye must be conversant where the best and wisest are; but if you be born or brought up in a rude country, ye shall not choose but speak rudely. The rudest man of all knoweth this to be true.

"Yet nevertheless, the rudeness of common and mother tongues is no bar for wise speaking. For in the rudest country, and most barbarous mother language, many be found that can speak very wisely; but in the Greek and Latin tongues, the two only learned tongues, which be kept not in common talk, but in private books, we find always wisdom and eloquence, good matter and good utterance, never or seldom asunder. For all such authors, as be fullest of good matter and right judg ment in doctrine, be likewise always most proper in words, most apt in sentence, most plain and pure in uttering the same.

"And contrariwise, in those two tongues, all writers, either in religion or any sect of philosophy, whosoever be found fond in judgment of matter, be commonly found as rude in uttering their minds. For stoics, ana baptists, and friars, with epicures, libertines, and monks, being most like in learning and life, are no fonder and pernicious in their opinions, than they be rude and barbarous in their writings. They be not wise, therefore, that say, 'What care I for man's words and utterance, if his matter and reasons be good!' Such men say so, not so much of ignorance, as either of some singular pride in themselves, or some special malice of others, or some private and partial matter, either in religion or other kind of learning. For good and choice meats be no

more requisite for healthy bodies, than proper and apt words be for good matters; and also plain and sensible utterance for the best and deepest reasons: 'In which two points standeth perfect eloquence, one of the fairest and rarest gifts that God doth give to man.'

"Ye know not what hurt ye do to learning, that care not for words, but for matter, and so make a divorce betwixt the tongue and the heart. For mark all ages, look upon the whole course of both the Greek and Latin tongues, and ye shall surely find, that when apt and good words began to be neglected, and properties of those two tongues to be confounded, then also began ill deeds to spring; strange manners to express good orders; new and fond opinions to strive with old and true doctrine, first in philosophy, and after in religion; right judgment of all things to be perverted; and so virtue with learning is contemned, and study left off. 'Of ill thoughts cometh perverse judgment; of ill deeds springeth lewd talk.' Which four misorders, as they mar man's life, so destroy they good learning withal."

Our author then instances, as illustrating "the goodness of God's providence for learning," the circumstance (which, however, is not quite the fact), that the books of the old Stoics and Epicureans (the sects "which were fondest in opinion and rudest in utterance") have all perished. But "again," he exclaims, "behold on the other side, how God's wisdom hath wrought that, of the Academics and Peripatetics, those that were wisest in judgment of matters, and purest in uttering of their minds, the first and chiefest that wrote most and best in either tongue (as Plato and Aristotle in Greek, and Tully in Latin), be so either wholly, or sufficiently left unto us, as I never knew yet scholar,

that gave himself to like and love, and follow chiefly those three authors, but he proved both learned, wise, and also an honest man; if he joined withal the true doctrine of God's Holy Bible; without the which, the other three be but fine edge tools in a fool's or madman's hand."

It is then remarked that there are three kinds of imitation in matters of learning. First, "the whole doctrine of comedies and tragedies is a perfect imitation, or fair lively painted picture of the life of every degree of man." "The second kind of imitation is to follow, for learning of tongues and sciences, the best authors. Here riseth among proud and envious wits a great controversy, whether one or many are to be followed; and if one, who is that one." "The third kind of imitation belongeth to the second; as when you be determined whether you will follow one or more, to know perfectly, and which way to follow that one; in what place; by what mean and order; by what tools and instruments ye shall do it; by what skill and judgment ye shall truly discern whether ye follow rightly or no."

"Erasmus, the ornament of learning in our time," proceeds our author, "doth wish that some man of learning and diligence would take the like pains in Demosthenes and Tully, that Macrobius hath done in Homer and Virgil; that is, to write out and join together, where the one doth imitate the other." This wish of Erasmus he admits is good, "but surely," he adds, "it is not good enough." He would have much more to be done than Macrobius has attempted. “If a man," he says, "would take this pains also, when he hath laid two places of Homer and Virgil, or of Demosthenes and Tully together, to teach plainly withal, after this sort:

"1. Tully retaineth thus much of the matter, these sentences, these words.

"2. This and that he leaveth out, which he doth wittily to this end and purpose.

"3. This he addeth here.

"4. This he diminisheth there.

"5. This he ordereth thus, with placing that here, not there.

"6. This he altereth and changeth either in property of words, in form of sentence, in substance of the matter, or in one or other convenient circumstance of the author's present purpose.

"In these few rude English words are wrapped up all the necessary tools and instruments, wherewith true imitation is rightly wrought withal in any tongue. Which tools I openly confess be not of mine own forging, but partly left unto me by the cunningest master, and one of the worthiest gentlemen that ever England bred, Sir John Cheke; partly borrowed by me out of the shop of the dearest friend I have out of England, Joh. Sturmius. And therefore I am the bolder to borrow of him, and here to leave them to others, and namely to my children. Which tools if it please God that another day they may be able to use rightly, as I do wish, and daily pray they may do, I shall be more glad than if I were able to leave them a great quantity of land."

Ascham considers it as disgraceful to students "who having so fair examples to follow as Plato and Tully, do not use so wise ways in following them for the obtaining of wisdom and learning, as rude, ignorant artificers do for gaining a small commodity." "For surely," he says, "the meanest painter useth more wit, better art, greater diligence in his shop in fol

lowing the picture of any mean man's face, than commonly the best students do even in the University, for the attaining of learning itself."

"Some ignorant, unlearned, and idle student, or some busy looker upon this little poor book, that hath neither will to do good himself, nor skill to judge right of others, but can lustily contemn by pride and ignorance all painful diligence and right order in study, will perchance say, that I am too precise, too curious in marking and pidling thus about the imitation of others; and that the old and worthy authors did never busy their heads and wits in following so precisely either the matter what other men wrote, or else the manner how other men wrote. They will say, 'It were a plain slavery, and injury too, to shackle and tie a good wit, and hinder the course of a man's good nature, with such bonds of servitude in following others. Except such men think themselves wiser than Cicero for teaching of eloquence, they must be content to turn a new leaf." "that

The best book, he then proceeds to argue, ever Tully wrote by all men's judgment, and by his own testimony too, in writing whereof he employed most care, study, learning, and judgment, is his book De Oratore ad Q. Fratrem." Now both in matter and in manner this work is altogether an imitation. The matter is Aristotle's, and the manner is avowedly after Plato.

He then examines what has been said upon the subject of imitation by various writers, both ancient and modern. Of those who have treated the subject, he says, he has read as many as he could get diligently. We can only, however, here enumerate the names of the authors whose opinions he reviews. They are Cicero,

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