istration of the Earl of Shelburne, the Duke of Portland, and Mr. Pitt, and for the immoderate attachment to American refugees which has appeared in all of them.

Mr. Pitt is very young; yet he has .discovered abilities and firmness upon some occasions; but I have never seen in him any evidence of greater talents than I have seen in members of Congress, and in other scenes of life in America, at his age. I have not yet seen any decided proofs of principle, or patriotism, or virtue; on the contrary, there are many symptoms of the want of these qualities, without which no statesman ever yet appeared uniformly great, or wrought out any memorable salvation for any country. In American affairs he has vibrated credit as a pendulum, and no one can yet guess when he will have fixed. His attention appears to have been chiefly given to two objects-preserving tranquillity and raising the stocks. His attention to these would have been laudable if he had not neglected others equally essential in the end, though not so urgent for the present period. The discontents of the nation, arising from their late disappointments, disgraces, and humiliations, as well as the pressure of taxes, would have broken out into seditions if the Ministers had not studiously avoided every thing which could raise a clamor or operate forcibly upon popular passions; and if the stocks could not have been supported, all would have been distraction at once. With all his care he has barely escaped from more furious tumults, at the expense of a few stones thrown at his carriage, and a few executions in effigy. The stocks he has raised, and if he can keep them up they will support him, and intoxicate the nation to such a degree that I presume it will be impossible for him to pursue that system towards America and Ireland, which is indispensable for the complete preservation of the remainder of the empire.

No Briton would deserve the character of a statesman, without a comprehensive view of the interests of the nation, relative to their liberties and form of government, relative to their manufactures, commerce, and navigation, relative to their foreign dominions in Asia, Africa, America, and in Europe, relatively to all the other Powers of Europe, especially their ancient enemy, who has always endangered their existence-I mean the Crown of Bourbon, and their ancient friends who have assisted in supporting them, and rearing up their wealth and power-I mean the Dutch and the United States of America, and all these relatively to the interest of

posterity and future ages. But I have not seen the least appearances of any man in the three kingdoms, among the men in power, who answers this description. Landsdowne is the most like it, but he is suspected, his selfishness is acknowledged, and his influence far from great. The posts upon our frontier give me great uneasiness.

The Ministers and people, the Chancellor, Mr. Dundas, Mr. Jenkinson, and Lord Gower, being of the old set of King's friends, it may be easily supposed that they think and feel like him, and consequently, that they are masters of his character; that they embarrass Mr. Pitt whenever his principles interfere with the King's. To their counsel, probably, is owing the late accession to the league in Germany, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer is thought to have opposed. To the same cause we may ascribe the undecided conduct towards Holland, where Sir James Harris is as complete a cypher as the Baron de Lynden and I have the honor to be at St. James's.

The King has been amused by his old deceivers, who are very much alike in America, Holland, and Ireland, by assurances that the Prince of Orange and his party would get the upperhand, and that the populace would rise to De Witt and the patriots. Under this fond delusion the time has been dreamed away, and those offers were delayed until they were too late to have any effect, which, if they had been in season, would have preserved the friendship, or at least the neutrality, of the Dutch to this country.

Lord Camden and the Duke of Richmond, if they ever had any just notions of the relation between England and America, are become soured by the company they keep, and if they are not inimical, they are at least peevish and fretful on every subject that concerns us. Lord Caermarthen is rich and of high rank, very civil and obliging, but is not enough of a man of business to have influence in the Cabinet, or to project or conduct any thing. Lord Sidney, with less wealth and a lower rank, has all the parts of the same character. If these traits of characters are just, you will easily be convinced, that we cannot expect from the present Ministry any reasonable arrangement with America for some time.

If we look to opposition, we see no better prospects. Lord North is supposed to have great influence, but how? By being at the head of the landed interest, which is but another term for the Tory interest. If he should depart from their system he would lose all consideration.

Mr. Fox has never been steady in American politics, and he has not at present the spirit to take any decided part; the Marquis of Lansdowne would be more liberal, but he has no chance to come in, and if he had he would not be able to carry any plan into execution; so numerous and violent, from all quarters, would be the opposition to him.

The Marquis of Buckingham has some good opinions of American commerce; but although he is celebrated for minute details of information in American affairs, by all I can learn of him, he has lost his judgment and the true system in the chaos of this very minutiæ; and he is extremely odious to great multitudes of the people.

Add to all these unfavorable considerations, that the stocks are at a great height, and the nation consequently in high spirits, as they have now evidence, they think, that their commerce flourishes, and their credit is established without a treaty with the United States, and without opening the West Indies, or Canada, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, to us, without taking off the alien duty upon oil, or admitting our ready-built ships for sale, they will not now think it necessary to do any of these things. The general opinion is that an act of Parliament will be made at the ensuing Parliament, placing the United States upon the footing of the most favored nation, and then let things take their course; let the United States do as they please, lay on duties or prohibitions, or make navigation acts, as they judge proper.

France is not idle amidst all this; the language they hold is that of perpetual and universal peace; their Ambassadors in all the Courts of Europe speak in this style. The corps diplomatic here have it familiarly in their mouths, that the Courts of London and Versailles have now the best disposition towards each other, and that there is every prospect of a long peace between them; and there is such a fund of gullibility in this nation, that these lullabies soothe them into perfect security. Indeed, it is possible the peace may be maintained for some years-long enough for the English to get a little money to go to war again. But if, at the end of fifteen or twenty years, the navies of France and Holland shall be pitted against that of Great Britain, and especially if the United States shall join their privateers and aids to the confederacy, the crisis of the British Empire will then be complete, and its destruction certain.

Some men see, but posterity and futurity, though not very distant, appear to be less attended to in this country at present, than in any other in the world. Present advantage is all they aim at, present evil is all they hope to shun; are so assured of peace with all their neighbors in Europe, that they hold all we can do in indifference. They think that if we should raise an army and take these posts, as we have a right to do, it would not oblige them to go to war with us; but if we should march an army to Quebec and take it, and another to Nova Scotia and take that, it would be no great harm to them; if we should fit out privateers against their trade, they could easily send a line of frigates along our coast that would do us more harm, so that they are quite easy; but they rely upon it that we shall not raise an army to take the posts. The expense and difficulty they know will be great, and, therefore, they think they may play with us as long as they please. The refugees are doing all they can to persuade the King and Ministry to build a fleet of armed ships upon the lakes, and to negotiate with all the Indian nations in order to attach them to their side. If these people can prevail, our posts will not be evacuated until this new system is accomplished. The resolutions of some of the United States, staying proceedings at law for old debts, and some other resolutions concerning the Tories, represented to have been in some instances counter to the treaty, will be the pretence. In short, sir, I am likely to be as insignificant here as you can imagine. I shall be treated as I have been, with all the civility that is shown to other foreign Ministers, but shall do nothing; I shall not even be answered; at least this is my opinion; but Congress will no doubt insist upon an answer. Perhaps it may be most convenient to wait till the session of Parliament is over, that we may have a full knowledge of their designs. It is most certain that what is called high language, which you and I have heard so much of in the course of our lives, would be misplaced here at this time. I would not be answered with high language, but with what would be more disagreeable and perplexing, with a contemptuous silence.

To borrow an expression from the late Governor Bernard, I find myself at the end of my tether. No step that I can take, no language I can hold, will do any good, or, indeed, much harm. It is Congress and the Legislatures of the States who must deliberate and act at present.

The only system they can pursue to help themselves is to complete their regulations for the encouragement of their own manufactures and navigation; to consider of more intimate commercial connexions with France and other nations of Europe; to push their trade to the East Indies, and, perhaps, to extend their political relations with France and Holland. How far it will be wise to go in these projects, I pretend not to judge; but I hope they will proceed with caution and deliberation. The United States stand on high ground at present, and they will consider whether it would not even be descending to form any closer political connexions at present. They are certainly at present on "advantageous ground," if they can unite in a system; if not, they must trust to the chapter of accidents. I am, dear sir, &c., JOHN ADAMS.

Report of Secretary Jay on Mr. Adams's letter of December, 1785, in cypher.

Office for Foreign Affairs, May 8, 1786.

The Secretary of the United States for the Department of Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred a letter from the honorable Mr. Adams of December last, in cypher, reports,

That the contents of this letter may be classed under three heads:

1. The characters of the British King and his Ministers; which, for the reasons assigned by Mr. Adams, should be kept secret.

2. The restrictive and unfriendly system of trade with respect to America, which the British Government and the nation in general appear to prefer and will probably adopt. Of this system the United States have much to be apprehensive; and their inability to meet it by general and proper regulations will doubtless encourage and promote it.

Congress at present can do nothing on the subject except in the way of recommendation; which, being a very ineffectual way, had better not be tried, lest non-compliance should diminish their respectability and impair the little authority they possess. In the opinion of your Secretary, recommendations should be avoided as much as possible, and every constitutional requisition impartially enforced with uniform punctuality and decision.