from all other nations-a measure that may be very inconvenient to us. Should we not then endeavor to obtain a stipulation that Americans shall pay in British ports no higher duties than British subjects? No doubt, to obtain this, we must stipulate that Britons shall pay in our ports no higher duties than our citizens; and even this will be unequal, because that duties in general are higher in England than in America. This, however, cannot be avoided, and as it is our felicity, we have less cause to repine at it. But if the British Ministry should refuse to go further than the mutual privilege of the most favored nation, we shall have no remedy but in equalizing duties, which it will be absolutely necessary to lay on, in order to do ourselves justice. This cannot be done but by a concert of all the States. If such a concert can be effected by recommendations of Congress, so much the better. If it cannot, I see no other remedy but to give Congress the power.

This nation relies upon it that our States can never accomplish such a concert, either by giving Congress the power, or by complying with their recommendations. Proofs of this are innumerable. Lord Sheffield's writings; the constant strain of all the writings in the newspapers; the language of conversation; the report of the Committee of Council; but, above all, the system adopted by the Duke of Portland's administration, and uniformly pursued by him and his successor, Mr. Pitt, are a demonstration of it; for although many express a contempt of the American commerce, (and I am sorry to say that even Lord Camden has lately said, that while they had a monopoly of the American trade, it was a valuable thing, but now they had not, thought very little of it.) Yet those of the Ministry and nations who understood any thing of the subject, know better, and build all their hopes and schemes upon the supposition of such divisions in America as will forever prevent a combination of the States, either in prohibitions or retaliating duties. It is true that the national pride is much inflated at present, by the course of exchange, which is much in their favor, with all parts of the world, and disposes them to think little of American commerce. They say that the progress of the fine arts in this kingdom has given to their manufactures a taste and skill, and to their productions an elegance, cheapness, and utility so superior to any others, that the demand for their merchandizes from all parts of Europe is greater than ever ; that even Lord North's prohibiting bill has contributed to this

advantage, by occasioning a demand amongst foreigners during the war, for goods to supply America. The knowledge and taste for British manufactures, they say, has been, by this means, spread all over Europe, and the demand for them multiplied, which has turned the balance so much in their favor, and caused such an extraordinary influx both of cash and bills of exchange into these kingdoms. Those who reflect more maturely upon this, however, see that this advantage is but temporary, (if it is one;) they say that the long stagnation of business by the war had filled the country with manufactures; that upon the peace, extraordinary efforts were made to dispose of them, by sending factors abroad, not only to America, but to all parts of Europe; that these factors have not only sold their goods at a low price, but have sent home cash and bills at a high one, so that their own factors have turned their course of exchange in their favor (in appearance, and for the present moment only) at their expense, for the loss, both upon the sale of goods and the purchase of remittances, is theirs; if these conjectures are right, the present appearance of prosperity will be succeeded by numerous failures and great distress. Be this as it may, the present appearance has produced a self-sufficiency which will prevent, for some time, any reasonable arrangement with us. The popular pulse seems to beat high against America.

The people are deceived by numberless falsehoods, industriously circulated by the gazettes and in conversation, so that there is too much reason to believe that if this nation had another hundred million to spend, they would soon force the Ministry into a war against us. The Court itself, whatever may be thought of it, appears at present to be the principal barrier against a war, and the best disposed towards us, but whether they are restrained by any thing beside their own poverty may be justly questioned. Their present system, as far as I can penetrate it, is to maintain a determined peace with all Europe, in order that they may war singly against America, if they should think it necessary.

Their attachment to their navigation act, as well as that of all other parties here, is grown so strong, and their determination to consider us as foreigners, and to undermine our navigation, and to draw away our seamen, is so fixed in order to prevent us from privateering in case of a war, that I despair of any equal treaty, and therefore of any treaty, until they shall be made to feel the

necessity of it. It cannot, therefore, be too earnestly recommended to all the States to concur with the State of New York in giving to Congress full power to make treaties of commerce, and, in short, to govern all our external commerce; for I really believe it must come to that; whether prohibitions or high duties will be most politic is a great question. Duties may be laid which will give a clear advantage to our navigation and seamen, and these would be laid by the States upon the recommendations of Congress, no doubt, as soon as the principle is admitted that it is necessary that our foreign commerce should be under one direction. You will easily infer from all this that I have no hopes of a treaty before next spring; nor then, without the most unanimous concurrence of all our States in vigorous measures, which shall put out of all doubt their power and their will to retaliate.

With great esteem, I am, &c.,

JOHN ADAMS.

Sir,

FROM JOHN ADAMS TO JOHN JAY.

Grosvenor Square, Westminster, July 29, 1785.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter to the Marquis of Caermarthen, of the 14th July, (another of the 27th,) with a project of a declaration concerning the construction of an armistice; and another of this date, with a project of a treaty of commerce. It is high time something should be done to turn the attention of the Administration to the relation between this country and the United States; and it seemed most advisable to lay the project of a treaty directly before the Ministry, rather than first negotiate the appointment of any other Minister to treat with me than the Marquis of Caermarthen himself. If I had first proposed the appointment of a Minister, they would have procrastinated the business for six months, and perhaps twelve, before I could have communicated anything to them; now they can have no excuse. The offer is made, and hereafter they may repent of their error if they do not accept it, or something nearly like it immediately. I am very sensible it will greatly embarrass the Administration, because most of them, I believe, are sensible that some such treaty must be one day agreed to, and that it would be wise to agree to it now; but they are afraid of

oppositions from many quarters. I must not, however, disguise my real sentiments. The present Ministry are too much under the influence of Chalmers and Smith, and others of that stamp, and have been artfully drawn into so many manifestations of a determipation to maintain their navigation laws relative to the United States, and of a jealousy of our naval powers, small as it is, that I fear they have committed themselves too far to recede. Their Newfoundland act, as well as their proclamations, and the fourth of their Irish propositions, are in this style. I have no expectation that the proposed treaty will be soon agreed to, nor that I shall have any counter project, or indeed any answer for a long time. It is very apparent that we shall never have a satisfactory arrangement with this country until Congress shall be made, by the States, supreme in matters of foreign commerce, and treaties of commerce, and until Congress shall have exerted that supremacy with a decent firm

ness.

I am, with great esteem, &c.,

JOHN ADAMS.

FROM JOHN ADAMS TO LORD CAERMARTHEN.

Grosvenor Square, July 14, 1785.

My Lord, The twenty-second article of the preliminary treaty of peace between Great Britain and France, signed on the 20th of January, 1783, is in these words, viz: "In order to prevent all causes of 'complaint and dispute which may arise on account of prizes that 'may be taken at sea, after the signing of these preliminary articles, it is reciprocally agreed, that the vessels and effects which may be 'taken in the channel and in the north seas, after the space of twelve days, to be computed from the ratification of those preliminary articles, shall be restored on each side. That the term shall be one 'month from the channel and the north seas, as far as the Canary 'Islands, inclusively, whether in the ocean or in the Mediterranean; 'two months from the said Canary Islands, as far as the said 'equinoctial line or equator; and, lastly, five months in all other 'parts of the world, without any exception or any other distinction 'more particular of time and place."

In the preliminary articles of peace between Great Britain and Spain, a cessation of hostilities was stipulated in the same manner. VOL. II.-26

On the same twentieth of January, it was agreed between the Minister Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty on the one part, and the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the United States of America on the other, that the subjects, citizens, and possessions of both Powers should be comprised in the suspension of arms abovementioned, and that they should consequently enjoy the benefits of the cessation of hostilities at the same periods, and in the same manner, as the three crowns aforesaid, and their subjects and possessions respectively. It appears, however, that many vessels which were taken after the expiration of one month from the 3d of February, 1783, the day of the ratification of the said preliminary articles, within that part of the ocean which lies between the channel and north seas and the Canary Islands, have not been restored; but, on the contrary, in some instances, such vessels have been condemned as lawful prizes upon an opinion that the words "as far as," said to be used in the preliminary articles, meant the distance from Paris to the southernmost parts of the Canaries.

It must be obvious to your Lordship, that this construction is extremely foreign from the intention of the contracting parties, who never had Paris in contemplation as a boundary of the region of one month, nor as any limit of a measure of distance. The channel and north seas being expressly marked as the northern boundary, and the southernmost Canary as the southern, and every part of the ocean from the channel and north seas up to the Canary Islands, inclusively, is comprehended.

Indeed, the words "as far as " are scarcely a proper translation of the words "jusqu'aux" in the article of treaty. The original words are "depuis la manche et les mers du nord jusqu'aux Isle Canaries,” and not "depuis Paris jusqu'aux Isle," &c., &c.

The intention of the contracting parties is so clear, and their expression so plain, that it is not easy to account for the misinterpretation of them; but as many law-suits are depending upon the point, and several Americans are now in London waiting the decision of them, I do myself the honor to propose to your Lordship a particular convention to determine all those controversies on both sides, by inserting the words "jusqu'à la latitude des Isles Canaries," instead of "jusqu'aux Isles Canaries ;" and also the words "depuis la latitude des dites Isles Canaries," instead of "des dites Isles Canaries," it being apparent from the mention of Mediterranean,