THE CARNALITY OF RELIGIOUS CONTENTION: IN TWO SERMONS, PREACHED AT THE MERCHANTS' LECTURE, IN BROAD STREET. THE PREFACE TO THE READERS. THIS title, nobody can think, is meant to condemn all contention about matters of religion as carnal; but since there is too much which is apparently so, it only signifies it to be the design of the following discourse to show what contention that is, and when, or in what case, though it hath religion for its object, it may not have it for its principle; but that very frequently, the lust of the flesh hides itself under that specious name: and to show wherein, while it affects to hide, yet unawares it discovers itself in the management of affairs of that sacred kind. Thus it often really is; and then is that noble cause as ignobly served, as when, (according to that father's observation) a man proves to be unfaithful even for the faith, and sacrilegious for religion. Cypr. de Simplicit. Præl. When in one place, (Jude 3,) Christians are exhorted to contend earnestly for the faith; and in another, (2 Tim. ii. 24,) we are told the servant of the Lord must not strive; it is plain there is a contention for religion which is a duty, and there is a contention, even concerning religion too, which is a sin. And that sin the apostle, in this context, out of which our discourse arises, doth deservedly expose by the name of flesh, and of the lust, or of the works thereof; such as wrath, variance, envy, hatred, &c. Whence it is easy to collect in what sense it is said in the mentioned place, the servant of the Lord must not strive, viz. as that striving excludes the gentleness, the aptness to instruct, and the patience, which are in the same place enjoined, where that striving is forbidden. And from thence it is equally easy to collect, too, in what sense we ought to contend for the faith earnestly, i. e. with all that earnestness which will consist with these, not with such as excludes them as earnestly as you will, but with a sedate mind, full of charity, candour, kindness, and benignity towards them we strive with. We ought, we see (in the mentioned place) to be patient towards all men. Towards fellow Christians there should certainly be a more peculiar brotherly kind ness. The difference is very great, and most discernible in the effects, between the church's contentions against enemies without it, and contentions within itself. The former unite it the more, increase its strength and vigour. The latter divide and enfeeble it. As to those of this latter kind, nothing is more evident, or deserves to be more considered, than that as the Christian church hath grown more carnal, it hath grown more contentious; and as more contentious, still more and more carnal. The savour hath been lost of the great things of the gospel, which have less matter in them of dispute or doubt, but which only did afford proper nutriment to the life of goodness; and it hath diverted to lesser things, (or invented such as were, otherwise, none at all) about which the contentious, disputative genius might employ, and wherewith it might entertain, feed, and satiate itself. Thereby it hath grown strong and vigorous, and acquired the power to transform the church from a spiritual society, enlivened, acted, and governed by the Spirit of Christ, into a mere carnal thing, like the rest of the world. Carnality hath become, and long been in it a governing principle, and hath torn it into God knows how many fragments and parties; each of which will now be the church, enclose itself within its own peculiar limits, exclusive of all the rest, claim and appropriate to itself the rights and privileges which belong to the Christian church in common, yea, and even Christ himself, as if he were to be so enclosed or confined; and hence is it said, Lo! here is Christ, or there he is, till he is scarce to be found anywhere, but as, through merciful indulgence, overlooking our sinful follies, he is pleased to afford some tokens of his presence both here and there. Yet also how manifest are the tokens of his displeasure and retirement ! And how few will apprehend and consider the true cause! I will now adventure to offer these things to serious consideration. 1. Whether for any party of Christians to make unto itself other limits of communion than Christ hath made, and hedge up itself within those limits, excluding those whom Christ would admit, and admitting those whom he would exclude, be not in itself a real sin? When I say make to itself, this more peculiarly concerns those who form their own communions, having nothing herein imposed upon them by civil authority. Let others censure themselves as they see cause. They have a holy table among them, the symbol of their communion with one another in the Lord. I would ask, "Whose is this table? Is it the table of this or that man? or party of men? or is it the Lord's table ?" Then certainly it ought to be free to his guests, and appropriate to them. And who should dare to invite others, or forbid these? 2. If it be a sin, is it not a heinous one? stood by considering what his limits are. This will best be under- true that one great object of the statute 25 Henry VIII. was to get rid of the interference of the Pope in the confirmation of bishops, but it was equally true that another great object was to get rid of freedom of election altogether. But the statute 23 Henry VIII. said that the bishop elect should be presented to the Pope for confirmation; and it was mentioned in a note to Gibson's Codex that Cranmer paid 900 golden ducats for his bulls. That statute provided that if the Pope delayed confirmation for an unreasonable time, the appointment of the bishop should vest absolutely in the crown. His learned friends on the other side must, therefore, contend that, such being the law under the statute 23 Henry VIII., a statute was afterwards passed in the 25th year of that sovereign to abridge the power of the king, and that Henry VIII. delegated to inferior persons in the church an inquiry into the fitness of a person who had been elected by the dean and chapter, and of whom he himself had approved. That latter statute of Henry VIII. was re-enacted by the statute passed in the 1st year of Elizabeth, and it was impossible to find language more conclusive to show that all the powers which the Pope might lawfully exercise within the realm of England were by that act transferred to the king. Up to the time of the act of 25 Henry VIII. the election of a bishop was considered free; but that statute took away freedom of election altogether. No confirmation was necessary under that act when the dean and chapter refused to elect the person nominated by the crown, in which case the king had an absolute power of appointment; but when they obeyed the king's letters missive confirmation became necessary. Upon that view of the facts of the case the whole object of the statute was plain and intelligible. If one form (that of election) was preserved, then it became requisite that the form of confirmation should be preserved also; otherwise not. His learned friends on the opposite side must either contend that a bishop elect, though not confirmed, must remain a bishop elect for life, or that the parties refusing confirmation had the power of rejection-a line of argument which was in direct opposition to the words of the statute, which said that "the election should be good and valid to all intents and purposes." There was another part of the case on which he should wish to cite a few authorities to the court. He submitted that the rule must be discharged, upon the principle that the matter had already been heard and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, assuming-and he found some difficulty in assuming it even for a moment-that his learned friend, Sir F. Kelly, had established the first part of his case. He maintained that, however erroneous the decision of the ecclesiastical court might have been, the Court of Queen's Bench could not interfere by mandamus. Another ground of objection was, that it was an established principle that this court would not issue a writ of mandamus to the ecclesiastical courts, where the ground for proceeding was that they had mistaken the ecclesiastical law. He would refer their lordships to the cases decided upon applications for writs of mandamus to the ecclesiastical courts. In the case of "Lucy v. the Bishop of St. David's," 1 Lord Raymond, 539, it was said by Lord Holt, that "it was without precedent to grant a prohibition to the ecclesiastical court because they had proceeded contrary to the canon law." He (Mr. Waddington) maintained that it was equally against principle to grant a mandamus against them because they had mistaken the canon law. In the case to which he had just referred the application for a writ of prohibition having been refused, the parties moved that a writ of mandamus I might issue, requiring the delegates to admit certain allegations which they had already said that, by the canon law, they could not admit. Lord Holt said, upon that occasion, "that the Court of King's Bench could not grant a mandamus to them to compel them to proceed according to their law," and that writs of mandamus were issued to compel the granting of probates, because wills concerned temporal rights. That the court might by mandamus compel the ecclesiastical court to grant probate when the will was not disputed, was clear from the case of "Rex v. Sir John Raines," 1 Lord Raymond, 362. The will in that case was not contested, but probate was refused because the executor mentioned in the will was a bankrupt, and could not find security for executing the will. That case was confirmed by another, "The King v. Dr. Hay," reported, 4 Burr., 2,995. There was a lis pendens respecting the validity of a will in that case, and when that fact appeared upon the return to the writ of mandamus which had issued, the writ was quashed. There were also some cases respecting applications for writs of mandamus to compel the civil courts to elect persons to offices. One of these was reported in 3 Mod., p. 335, where a party applied for a writ requiring the ecclesiastical court to appoint him to the office of proctor, but Lord Holt said that the ecclesiastical court had an original jurisdiction in this matter, and that a mandamus was in the nature of an appeal, which could not be granted when the court complained of had jurisdiction. Lord Holt said that parties could not be dragged ab uno ad aliud examen. So in "Rex. v. Archbishop of Canterbury," 8 East, 213, there was an application for a mandamus to the ecclesiastical court, requiring them to admit the applicant to practise in that court as a doctor of civil law. But Lord Ellenborough said that in every application for mandamus there must be a legal right, and the absence of a specific legal remedy. The principle of this decision was the same as that laid down by Lord Holt, but it was expressed in different language. There was also a large class of cases, to which he should refer very shortly, in which applications had been made for a mandamus to justices of the peace. His learned friend, Sir F. Kelly, had cited "Rex v. the Justices of Kent," 14 East, as an authority in his favour. The court certainly had granted a mandamus in that case, because the justices had declined to act under a statute which clearly gave them jurisdiction; but that was done upon the principle that the court would interfere wherever a court of competent jurisdiction refused to act, and the case was no authority at all for saying that this court would interfere when the justices had mistaken the law on a matter within their own jurisdiction, and had acted upon such an erroneous view. In "Ex parte Smith,” 3 Ad. and Ell., 719, there was an application for a mandamus, and also for a prohibition, the latter point being reported in 2 C. M. and R., and in this case the Court of Queen's Bench and the Court of Exchequer refused to interfere with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, upon an application suggesting that there was error in the refusal of the Judicial Committee to hear a petition. The cases relating to magistrates were so familiar to the court that he would not dwell upon that point, but would only refer to "Ex parte Pratt," 7 Ad. and Ell., 27, and " The Queen v. Kesteven," 3 Queen's Bench Reports. He should not occupy their lordships' time further, having now discussed the two principal points of the case, though he by no means abandoned the ground which had been already urged having reference to the interest of the opposers in this proceeding. Dr. ADDAMS then rose in support of the rule, and commenced his observations by saying that, in the absence of his learned friend, Sir F. Kelly, he felt that he could not do the case that justice which it demanded, because he could only address their Lordships in aid of the argument which he had expected from his learned friend; and next, because he had not the slightest notion last night that he should be called on to address the Court that day at all. Under these circumstances, he trusted he should receive their lordships' indulgence. In moving the discharge of this rule, his learned friend, the Attorney-General, stated that he meant to contend, first, that the act of the archbishop in confirming was merely ministerial; secondly, that assuming him to act in a judicial capacity, the remedy was by an appeal to the Privy Council, and not by an application to this Court for a mandamus; and thirdly, that if, as he (Dr. Addams) contended, the Court in which these proceedings were originally instituted was a court, it was unavailing to send the parties back to be re-heard, because the Court had no means of satisfactorily investigating the charge. Fourthly, he understood his learned friend to say, that the charge ought to be inquired into, if at all, under the Church Discipline Act, and that this Court had no right to enter into the investigation of questions of that nature; and, lastly, his learned friend contended that this was, at all events, not a case for a mandamus. Now, with respect to the act of the archbishop, or of the vicar-general, representing the archbishop, being merely ministerial, that would depend on the true construction of the statute 25th Henry VIII. His learned friend, in order to introduce what he considered to be the true construction of the act, entered into the general history of the appointment of bishops anterior to that act, from times of the earliest antiquity. Without following the Attorney-General into the particulars, he would state very briefly what he understood to be the state of the case prior to the establishment of the canon law, and from that period down to the present time. Prior to the existence of the canon law, the appointment of bishops was in the people and the clergy. In process of time, the people were excluded, and then the diocesan clergy appointed the bishop, and afterwards the diocesan clergy also were excluded, and the appointment came to be vested in the clergy of the cathedral. The nomination of bishops, under the last was, however, to all intents and purposes, vested in the crown. No one could doubt that the "placing" of a bishop was in the crown, but that was not the case in the "making" of a bishop, which was a totally different thing. The Attorney-General assumed that an attack was made on the prerogative, because he (Dr. Addams) and his learned friends maintained that the appointment of a bishop was not valid without confirmation; but the prerogative of the crown was no more attacked than it was when it presented a clerk to a living, and a bishop inquired into his fitness for office. Without meaning to question the right of the crown to appoint to bishoprics, he maintained that, at all times, and under all circumstances, whether the appointment belonged to the people and clergy, the diocesan clergy, or the clergy of the cathedral, the election or nomination was incomplete until consummated by confirmation. That this was the case under the canon law, and anterior to its existence, was proved by authority beyond dispute. The learned advocate referred to Justinian, novel 123, who said that "the person by whom the bishop is to be consecrated is to make sufficient inquiry, with regard to the clerk to be consecrated, before he proceeds to consecrate him; and if any one challenges his eligibility to consecration, he shall |