the respect of the soldiers placed under his command, but to rob him of that confidence which his Majesty had been pleased to repose in him. The object of this paragraph was to defame his character, and to rescue that of a more favoured Officer; but, in what he was about to say on the subject, he was far from wishing to shrink from the responsibility, and still less to disclaim the share he had in making an armistice, which, in the event, the more it was considered, the more it would be approved.

[Sir Hew Dalrymple here read the paragraph to which he alluded-insinuating that he (Sir Hew) had torn the laurels from the brow of an Officer (Sir A. Wellesley) who had deserved the admiration of his country for a splendid victory; and that he compel led that same Officer to sign an armistice which would for ever remain on record as a disgrace to his Majesty's arms.]

Sir Hew Dalrymple begged leave most solemnly to affirm, on the word and honour of an officer, that the conference with General Kellerman, which lasted from two o'clock in the day, till nine at night, on the 22d of August, was carried on by Sir A. Wellesley, Sir H. Burrard, and himself; during the whole of which Sir A. Wellesley made what observations he thought proper upon the treaty, and took that prominent part in the discussion which the victory he had recently gained, and the local knowledge he possessed of the country, seemed to justify. The conference was held in the French language; and when he (Sir H. D.) advanced to the table, in order to place his signature to the armistice, he was informed by Gen. Kellerman, that he, as a General of Division, was unable to treat with the Commander in Chief of the British forces; and, therefore, it was proposed that Sir A. Wellesley should place his name to the armistice, and Sir H. Dalrymple did not recollect that a single objection was at that time made by Sir Arthur to the provisions of the treaty, excepting so far as related to the duration of the armistice. Sir Hew Dalrymple did not mean, upon any account, to avail himself of any other means of retrieving his character than what the established laws of the country, allowed; his interest,

and the interest of truth were so nearly connected, that they could not be separated; nor should he enter into any details which could not regularly come before this tribunal.

He was extremely happy that he was placed in the situation in which he now stood; but if any individual had chosen to prefer specific charges against him, he had no doubt but he could have justified his conduct with regard to the transactions in Portugal; and there was not a single officer of whose services his Majesty had been deprived by him with a view to the present investigation.

Sir Arthur Wellesley hoped, that in delivering in his narrative to the Board, he should be justified in making a few observations upon what had fallen from Sir Hew Dalrymple. Certain paragraphs had appeared in the newspapers, which had ventured to speak upon his conduct in the late transactions in Portugal, as if the writers of them had received any authority or information from him or from his friends, as to the truth of the facts there stated. He had never authorized any person connected with him in the service, or any of his friends, to give an authority to publishers of newspapers to state that he was compelled, or even ordered, to sign the armistice in question.

Sir Arthur Wellesley then delivered in his statement, and the Court adjourned at a quarter before four o'clock till Saturday.

Third day, November 19.

The Judge Advocate rose, and was about to read some documentary evidence he held in his hand, when

Sir Arthur Wellesley observed, that as he was not prepared to answer the statement made by Sir Hew Dalrymple on Thursday, so explicitly as he could have wished at the moment, he entreated permission now to give that answer, and that the same might be considered as a document in the Board's proceedings.Sir Arthur then tendered a paper to the President, who signified the propriety of his first reading it aloud to the Board. Sir Arthur immediately acquiesced, and the contents of the statement were to the following effect:-"I cannot but lament with Sir Hew Dalrymple that any attempts should have been made, through the medium of the public prints,

to

to wound his feelings or injure his reputation; but I have also cause to complain, as well as the Commander in Chief, and I do solemnly protest, that I never authorised any publisher, nor did any of my friends authorise any publisher to state that I had been compelled to sign the treaty of armistice by the orders of my superior officer. It is true I was present when the terms of that armistice were discussed with Gen. Kellerman, and it is also true that I took part in that discussion; but I never did, nor ever will say, that I signed it by the order of my superior officer, and that it was not in my power to disobey. At the same time I must state, that I did differ in more points than one, respecting that armistice, but I fully concurred in the principle and the necessity of the French evacuating Portugal. When I spoke of the Commissariat being ill-composed, I had no intention whatever of casting a reflection upon any persons employed in that important department of the army, and it was not my wish that my remarks on that occasion should go forth to the public. My motive for giving this explanation is to remove the impression, if any has been made, that I meant to reflect on the individuals connected with the department in question."

Sir Arthur having finished his statement, the paper was handed in, and placed before the Members of the Board. The Judge Advocate then read some dispatches from Sir Hew Dalrymple to Lord Castlereagh; one dated the 3d of September, was published in the Gazette; others stating, that the terms of the armistice had been communicated to

the Portuguese General, and who had not objected to them until after the conclusion of the negociation, and the convention had been signed. A letter in French, from the Portuguese General, objecting to the terms of the convention, and an answer from Sir Hew Dalrymple, stating, that the good faith of the country was pledged to carry these conditions into effect. Some other letters were also read relating to points of detail. In one of these letters, Sir Hew Dalrymple expresses his surprise that so large a sum as 40,000l. mentioned in the protest, should have been carried off, and declares his intention of ordering restitution.

A variety of other documents were then read; some addresses from the Portuguese expressed satisfaction at the removal of the French from Portugal, and others protested in the strongest terms against the articles of the convention.

After the conclusion of the documentary evidence, Sir Arthur Wellesley rose, and read a narrative of the proceedings from the time that he took the command of the army. Sir Arthur sailed from Cork on the 12th July, landed at Corunna on the 30th; heard there of the defeat of the Spaniards at Rio Seco; had frequent conferences with the Junta of Gallicia, offered them the assistance of his army, but was expressly told that they did not want men, but money, arms, and ammunition, and that the most valuable service that he could render to Spain would be to drive the French from to Oporto, learnt from the Bishop that the Portugal. After leaving Corunna, he went Portugueze force consisted of about 5000 regulars and militia, about 1500 scattered over the country, and 1500 Spaniards. The Bishop promised mules for the conveyance of the artillery and ammunition waggons. Sir Arthur next visited Sir C. Cotton, to consult with him on the means of entering the Tagus, and attacking the forts in the vicinity of Lisbon. When there, he received a letter from General Spencer off Cadiz, intimating that he waited his orders. object was to drive the French from PorIt being Sir Arthur's opinion that the first tugal, and understanding that the Junta of Seville did not think Gen. Spencer's presence absolutely necessary to the operations in Andalusia, he ordered the General to join him. He was at first informed that the French force in Portugal was about 16,000 or 17,000 men, of which about 14,000 were in Lisbon and the forts in the neighbourhood, and the remainder dispersed in small garrisons in the different strong places; but he afterwards learnt that they were nearly 24,000. In these circumstances, he conceived that it would be extremely dangerous to attempt a landing in any of the small bays to the north of the Tagus, where he would be immediately exposed to an attack from the main body of the French army. He therefore resolved on landing at Mondego Bay, where he could speedily co-operate with the Portugueze force which had proceeded to Coimbra.

When off the Bay, he was informed, by a letter from Lord Castlereagh, that

5000 men under General Anstruther, and above 10,000 more under Sir John Moore, were proceeding to join him. He also heard of Dupont's defeat, and that Loison, with 4000 or 5000 French, had been detached to the province of Alentejo, to suppress an

insurrection in the south of Portugal. The landing in Mondego Bay was effected on the 5th, with considerable difficulty. Ge neral Spencer landed on the 7th and 8th. Having ascertained the enemy's force, he wrote a letter to Sir H. Burrard, with a plan of operations for the corps that he was to bring into Portugal, and on the 9th the advanced guard of the army marched forward towards Lisbon. On that day he heard of Joseph Bonaparte having left Madrid, and of the probability of Marshal Bessieres making an irruption into the north of Portugal. It was necessary to gain some important advantages before this plan should be effected, and the army continued its march. The Portugueze Generals soon demanded to be supplied with provisions from the British stores, which it was impossible to comply with. The Portugueze separated, and continued to remain separate from the British till after the 22d of August. Sir Arthur did every thing to induce them to co operate; he demanded only a reinforcement of 1000 infantry, 400 light troops, and 200 cavalry, and promised that they should receive provisions from the British stock; but even to this the Portugueze General would not consent! We have then the battle of Roleia, with a reference to the Gazette for particulars. Before that action, Sir Arthur had thought of attacking the French posts upon the coast, but being so miserably disappointed of the Portugueze co-operation, and having wit nessed the gallantry of the French in the action of the 17th, he resolved to change his plan, and to make towards the French position of Terres Vedras. General Anstruther's force landed on the 20th. We have then the battle of Vimiera, with a reference to the Gazette for particulars, and with it terminated Sir Arthur's command, and of course his narrative ends.

Fourth day, Nov. 21.-Answers were read to a number of questions in writing given in to Sir Arthur Wellesley by the President, in which there is nothing of importance. Lord Moira asked whether Sir Arthur thought the force under his command sufficient to drive the French from Lisbon and the forts on the Tagus? The answer was in the affirmative. His Lordship then asked to what extent provisions had been supplied by the country, and whether it could have afforded a sufficiency for the wants of the army, if means had been employed to collect them? Sir Arthur replied, that no exertions would have drawn from the Portugueze a supply of bread sufficient for the army. The country afforded no provisions but beef and wine; of these there was at first abundance, but wine was afterwards frequently exFeb. 1809.

hausted, when the troops halted more than one day in a place, and latterly a sufficient supply could not be obtained; and it was also soon found, that without killing the draught bullocks in the country people's carts, the supply of cattle was not sufficient in Portugal for a large army. In fact, before Sir Arthur quitted the army, more than half the food was in salt provisions, and afterwards, he believes, the whole. Sir Arthur believed the expulsion of the French from Portugal to be an object of the high est importance to the Spanish nation.

Captain Malcolm, of the Denegal, described the dangerous nature of the coast, and the extreme difficulties of the debarkation. Many of the transports were insufficient; out of 200, 60 lost their anchors and cables, and had the hard weather continued, the whole must have gone to the bottom; about 20 flat bottomed boats were lost, and seven or eight men drowned,

Sir Hew Dalrymple then came forward, and read his narrative of the operations of the army under his command. On the 15th of July, he received dispatches announcing his appointment to the chief command of the armies in Spain and Portugal, with instructions, not only to expel the French from Portugal, but to cut off their retreat from Spain, with an outline of measures to be pursued when these objects were accomplished. On embarking on the 13th of August, he was informed by Lord Collingwood of the French having abandoned Madrid, probably with a view to more active operations in conjunction with Bessieres. He also heard of the landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley in Mondego Bay. On the 19th he had an interview with Admiral Cotton, who informed him that the coast, and that he relied chiefly on Sir A. Wellesley was proceeding along the victualling transports for provisions. The Admiral thought lightly of the French force at Lisbon, but Sir Hew did not think with him. He also resolved to land at Mondego Bay, but not to interfere with the plans of Sir Arthur in that separate command for which he had been selected, as he had been recommended to his particular confidence; great confidence was expressed in his well-known talents, and attention which the rules of the service a sort of wish was expressed that every would allow, should be paid to his advice and opinion. On learning that Sir H. Burrard had taken the command of

the

the army, he landed on the 22d, perfect ly ignorant of the state of the Portugueze insurgents, their numbers, discipTine, and efficiency, and had shortly after an interview with Sir Arthur Wellesley. He found the army in the same position that it occupied the day before, and his first order was for it to move forward. He knew not why other officers thought that, if the army had advanced on the 21st, the result of the action would have been more important; it was true that the French had lost more men than we in the battle of Vimiera; but the great loss which we sustained in our very small body of cavalry in a great measure balanced that advantage. None of the officers saw any difficulty in forcing the French to cross the Tagus; but he himself had not had time to learn the strength of the Portugueze or of the French, or the state of the British ordnance, or of the Commissariat. A short time after his landing, the French appeared to be moving forward, and it was expected that another action was to be fought on the same ground; but it proved to be the cavalry attending Ge. neral Kellerman, who came to solicit an armistice. There were few objections made to the conditions of the armistice. As to the article respecting private property, about which such a clamour had been raised in this country and in Portugal, it was nothing different from the customary articles on all similar occasions; he might instance the capitulations of Malta, Alexandria, and Egypt. It never was intended to include any sort of merchandise or public property; it was declared by Kellerman himself to mean nothing but what was strictly the private property of the French; but it was not to be expected that we should be able to restore to the Portugueze the full effects of eight months of French plunder; when he (Sir Hew) heard of some attempts to carry off plunder, he declared that any persons, whatever their rank, presuming to carry off what was not strictly private property, should be detained as prisoners of war. If the armistice had not been agreed to, the army must have marched forward, not exceeding 16,000 men, exposed perhaps to the horrors of famine as well as those of war, and, being once embarked in so hazardous a service, rapidity of movement was every thing; but this was im

possible, as many of the artillery horses were insufficient; and if it had been resolved on to attack the enemy, the British army must have been confined to a position near the sea, to ensure the junction of Sir John Moore. (Some uninteresting conversation with a Portugueze General respecting the armistice is then detailed.) On the 24th Col. Murray returned from Sir C. Cotton, and was sent off to Lisbon to report the Admiral's objection to the article respecting the Russian fleet. The French Commander agreed that the article should be expunged. On the 29th Captain Dalrymple returned with the convention. Of some of the articles he disapproved, and assembled all the prin cipal officers for their advice. The armistice expired next morning, so that he must either have ratified the convention or recommenced hostilities. With the approbation of Generals Burrard, Wellesley, Moore, Hope, &c. he did ratify it. He conceived the chief responsibility of the measure to lie upon him, and he should therefore give his reasons for agreeing to it. The first was the probability of a scarcity of provisions, in consequence of which, and of the danger of the surf, it had been deter. mined that Sir J. Moore's corps should be landed gradually, and that each division should bring along with it provi sions sufficient for its own use. Such was the state of the weather, that on the very day after the signature of the convention, the whole British fleet was dri ven out to sea, and there was no cal. culating how long such weather might last ;-thus was the provisioning of the army most uncertain, for no supply of corn could be had from the Portugueze, and the sole dependence was on our own victualling ships. Farther, the attack of the forts on the Tagus was not the light matter that had been represented. Fort St Julien was in the best state of defence, and could not have been re. duced without battering cannon; and if it had been resolved to attack the French in their strong positions, much time must have been required for making the necessary preparations-much more for reducing the enemy to such a condition as would have obliged him to surrender at discretion. A battle must have been fought almost in the city of Lisbon, and Kellerman's threat of destruction