ance by that brave army, who only wanted a chief of talents and courage to show themselves worthy of their descent ;—and thus an armistice was forced on them, whether their ridiculous king would or no. There were various opinions and doubts as to this truce. Some criticised the terms of it; others regretted it had not, in the delicate state of the war, been delayed a short time. The Russians predicted the fall of Colberg as likely to follow; the English were discontented with it; but Gustavus, consistent to the last, was only offended at the instrument calling Napoleon emperor and king. He ordered the words not to be used in the Swedish papers, and made his general inform the French marshal that such expressions would not be tolerated in any future transaction.

We cannot afford room for attending so closely on the steps of this infatuated prince, during the remaining part of his reign. The contemplation of folly, and unsupported extravagant pretension, is, when long continued, a very disgusting task. We shall therefore content ourselves with selecting some traits not hitherto sufficiently noted by the public in his character and conduct.

The work before us, repeatedly, and without any hesitation, charges him with a deficiency of personal courage; nor is there any passage in his life, as far as the world are aware of, which tends to refute the charge. This must certainly be esteemed a circumstance of some weight, considering the opportunities which he had of exposing himself to danger, if not of signalizing himself. The following note relates to this subject.

"During the retreat, the king sent to General Brune and proposed an armistice:-The general answered that as the war had not yet lasted thirty-six hours, such a proposal was rather premature from one who aspired to imitate Charles XII.

"Gustavus Adolphus was the first who reached Stralsund, and had not been exposed to the possibility of danger; yet he endeavoured to persuade some people that he had received a contusion in the leg from a musket-ball; and, as a proof of the fact, he exhibited a red spot on his leg, and a corresponding blemish on his boot, which refused to receive the usual polish. This story was sanctioned by the authority of an officious surgeon; but as it seemed to make little impression, it was soon forgotten." P. 57, 58.

His strange enthusiasm is said to have assumed the form of religious fanaticism. He got hold of a commentary on the revelations, which seems to have turned his brain. He persuaded himself that the letters of Bonaparte's name composed the mystic number 666, the number of the beast; that Napoleon was therefore the beast whose dominion should be of short duration, and for whose discomfiture he himself was the chosen instrument of providence. He was very particular in his directions to his ministers, &c. that

his name should be written Neapoleon, because this spelling was required to support the calculation. He ordered one day 888 oaks to be cut down for the navy, in the royal park; and people were a good deal puzzled to find what might be the reason for this MEASURE till they found in the commentary that 888 is stated as a sacred number. When a Russian prince was sent to treat with him at his palace of Lauenburg, he favoured him with the apocalypse, and afterwards sent him a letter to Berlin containing nothing but a chapter on the beast, translated into French from the Swedish bible; and when he was reminded of the risk he ran in ordering the troops at Rugen to fire on the English, he answered that nothing could happen without the permission of heaven. He also openly relied on supernatural assistance when the French, unopposed, were making their approaches to destroy Stralsund. With all this fanaticism he had so little of the real spirit of religion, that he was induced to listen to certain plans much against his will, merely because, from hatred to Denmark, he anxiously desired the success of the expedition to Copenhagen; and after the En glish convention had settled the evacuation of Zealand, he proposed, as a very honourable mode of executing it, that the army should pass over to Scania, and from thence again invade the

island.

As soon as the treaty of Tilsit had put an end to the war in Germany and Poland, it might have been expected that Gustavus would undertake some enterprise, single-handed, against all the continent; but he contented himself with getting into a passion at the Emperor Alexander for giving Bonaparte the order of St. Andrew. He resolved to send back the decorations of it which he had formerly received from Catharine; and wrote a letter to the emperor, enclosing a copy of his letter on a similar occasion to the King of Prussia. This notable epistle, however, was not sent; -nevertheless, in the course of a few months, after refusing every offer of accommodation with France, and coöperation with Russia, he contrived to plunge his unfortunate country into a war with that powerful neighbour, which threatened its existence as an independent state. The events of the campaign which ensued, and the near approach of an overwhelming force to the Swedish capital, though by a very circuitous route, are too well known to detain us here.

To the Russian war were added hostilities with Denmark; and, as if Sweden had not enough on her hands in other quarters, the king, by way of imitating Charles XII. must needs invade Norway. Yet in the midst of all this extended and voluntary warfare, he was wholly without any plan for conducting it; and when men of experience ventured to suggest the expediency of arranging some uniform and concerted scheme of operations, he only replied, that

the necessary orders should be ready on every emergency!-The only step taken towards more active measures, was a demand of more money, and of an auxiliary force from England, which the past experience of Gustavus's wisdom and vigour might have taught our government to refuse, had it been possible for us, at any time, or under any circumstances, to resist the temptation of spending money, and intermeddling to a small extent with a little expedition. The work before us states, that the troops were demanded for the express purpose of coöperating in the Norwegian expedition; that the English ministry, after much hesitation, in order to gratify, in some measure, the wishes" of Gustavus, agreed to send 10,000 men, on condition of their being under the separate command of their own general, and not being required to act at so great a distance from their shipping as to interrupt the communication with it. Gustavus agreed at once to these terms; but at the same time sent orders to prevent the troops from landing until General Moore, their commander, should agree to place them at the king's disposal, and not to re-embark them without a certain notice. The notice was agreed to; but the English government resolutely adhered to the condition of the separate command, and as resolutely prohibited the troops from embarking in a new attack on Zealand, the conquest of which was now become our heroic ally's most favourite project. Hence the animosity which speedily broke out against England-scarcely, if at all, inferior to this wise monarch's hatred of France.

The singular treatment of General Moore was the beginning of this rupture. Upon the wisdom of the plan which sent that gallant and most able person to Sweden, we shall make no comments. Our readers have seen with what kind of ally he was designed to coöperate; and they may probably be of opinion that the authors of the scheme showed about as much judgment in adopting it, as they did fairness towards their predecessors in perpetually accusing them of imbecility and want of vigour for not having intrusted fleets and armies to Gustavus the year before-those accusers. being certainly in full possession of all the passages in Gustavus's life which have now been described. But General Moore was sent; and as it would have evinced a folly quite equal to the royal Swede's, if our government had reposed any confidence in that infatuated prince, the general was directed to proceed, so as to afford him no real assistance, and, without a miracle, no kind of gratification or satisfaction. This was the chief object of the expedition. It was merely to maintain a show of vigour at home, and (in the words of the work before us) "to gratify, in some measure, the wishes" of Gustavus. It failed most signally; for the people of England, who paid for it, only knew of its arrival by hearing of its having produced a quarrel with the prince whom

1

it was sent to gratify; and they therefore received as little satis faction from it as he did. Gustavus quarrelled with General Moore because he would not disobey the positive orders under which he acted, and surrender the guidance of the army to the insane or drivelling councils of the Swedes. The account of the interview in this volume is so singular, that we must pause a little upon it. Like other great princes, Gustavus fancied he could carry every thing by his own power of conference-" of talking folks over," as the phrase is;-and he was pleased to draw up, or at least revise, a minute of an interview, which had completely failed indeed, but still redounded so much to his credit as a talker as to deserve to be recorded among the greater exploits of his reign. Gustavus had declared, that "he never would permit the English to land; and that he considered the very proposal as an insult, which he hoped never to hear again." The general, not quite approving of the plan of keeping his army on board of their transports until some symptoms of reason should appear in the king, expressed his resolution to sail for England, if they were not permitted to land. This determination being communicated through the British minister, an interview between the king and the general took place. The matters chiefly to be noted in this conference are, General Moore's calm and steady behaviour, and the king's obstinacy and impertinence, even by his own narrative.

The result of the conference was, that the general most civilly and respectfully represented the necessity of his return to England. The king begged him to delay at Gottenburg as long as possible. The general agreed to do so, that he might oblige his majesty, and await fresh instructions; and he notified also, that he should proceed to Gottenburg, and not remain in Stockholm. This was indeed announced in the courtly form of a request to be permitted to join his army at Gottenburg. But immediately after this interview, a closer attention to his instructions suggested to him the necessity of delaying as short a time as possible the return of the troops. This he announced in the most respectful manner; stating, that he should still proceed "leisurely to prepare for his departure; and in the mean time communicate the orders which might arrive." Gustavus immediately broke out into the following vigo rous and able note.

Palace of Haga, 24th of June, 1808.

"This is a new and unexpected insolence of General Moore, for which he cannot appeal to any instruction; as, during the interview, he desired and received my orders to remain with the troops under his command on the Swedish coast, till new instructions should arrive from England. General Moore, therefore, for this disrespectful conduct, shall be personally answerable to me; and for this reason shall receive

my commands not to leave Stockholm without my permission, or being ordered home to England by the king his master.

"GUSTAF ADOLPH." P. 314.

The British minister of course protests, and sends home a cou rier with an account of this unheard-of arrest. The king, however, will not release General Moore without an apology: and on being told that such a demand was out of the question, he said he did not require actually an apology; but that General Moore should use certain expressions to explain his conduct, and should "finally affirm that it was not his intention to fail in his respect for the king." And if he had succeeded in detaining our gallant countryman, no doubt he would have put forth a bulletin, describing his achievement; and probably have ordered an illumination for it. But fortunately the general contrived to get away, and sailed to England with his army, leaving Gustavus to look out elsewhere for new conquests. In the mean time, he was with great difficulty prevented from seizing on all the English vessels in the Baltic, and laying a general embargo on them in his ports; and nothing but the necessity of the subsidy could have kept him from immediately declaring war against this country. He took an unconquerable dislike to the English minister, for obeying the instructions of his court, and proposing to him that peace so essential to the interests of Sweden, but so odious to Gustavus, because it looked as if he could do nothing in war. Nor could any thing have appeased him, had not the English admiral luckily captured a Russian vessel, and sent her flag as a present to Gustavus, who was infinitely mollified by this compliment, and sent it on as a present to the King of England!

Like every truly weak prince, Gustavus was perpetually interfering in all the departments of his government-and, in all, doing mischief. He could do every thing himself, and nobody else could do any thing. Nor would this have signified, had his attention been confined to those things which were suited to his capacity; as the details of patronage, the arrangement of his household, or the dresses of himself and his troops. On these subjects, indeed, especially the latter, he was busy in the extreme, like alf mighty princes. After describing his regulations for a levy, the work before us adds, "But nothing was of so much importance with the king, as the uniform to be employed; and one of the first orders concerning the new levies, long before they were orga nized, was to new model and ornament their hats." (P. 179.) But unhappily he did not confine himself to such frivolities. After exhausting the country by a rigorous conscription, he took care to charge himself with the clothing department; and managed to leave the men sick and dying for want of clothes, while he was discussing the patterns.

Many things were, by way of vigour, despatch and secrecy,