to my mind are not less revolting than those of Mr. Godwin. Such, for example, is the argument by which he controverts the received maxim of criminal jurisprudence, that it is better for ten guilty persons to escape than for one innocent man to suffer. But on this subject I need not enlarge. The sophistry, and, I am sorry to add, the reckless inhumanity displayed in this part of Paley's work, have been triumphantly exposed by that great and good man Sir Samuel Romilly ;-a man whom, long before his talents and worth were known to the public, I admired and loved, and whose memory I shall never cease to revere.*

From this digression, (if it can be called a digression) with respect to the modern doctrine of utility, I return to Dr. Hutcheson's scheme of benevolence, by which the theory of Mr. Hume was plainly suggested, and to which all the more modern modifications of the same principle may be traced. Indeed, the theory of utility must tacitly take for granted the scheme of benevolence, in order to be complete and consistent. For whence the obligation to consult general utility but from the peculiar approbation with which the duty of benevolence is regarded?

To the strictures already offered on Hutcheson's writings I have only to add, that he seems to consider virtue as a quality of our affections, whereas it is really a quality of our actions; or (perhaps in strict propriety) of those dispositions from which our actions immediately proceed. Our benevolent affections are always amiable, but, in so far as they are constitutional, they are certainly in no respect meritorious. Indeed some of them are common to us with the brutes. When they are possessed in an eminent degree, we may perhaps consider them as a ground of moral esteem, because they indicate the pains which has been bestowed on their cultivation, and a course of active virtue in which they have been exercised and strengthened. On the contrary, a person who wants them is always an object of horror;

* Observations on the Criminal Law of England as it relates to Capital Punishments, and on the way in which it is administered. Printed for Cadell and Davies, 1810. See in particular Note D.

chiefly because we know they are only to be eradicated by long habits of profligacy, and partly in consequence of the uneasiness we feel when we see the ordinary course of nature violated, as in a monstrous animal production. It is from these two facts that the plausibility of Dr. Hutcheson's language on this subject in a great measure arises; but if the facts be accurately examined, they will be found perfectly consistent with the doctrine already laid down, that nothing is an object of moral praise or blame but what depends on our own voluntary exertions; and of consequence, that these terms are not applicable to our benevolent or malevolent affections, so far as we suppose them to result necessarily from our constitutional frame.

There is another consideration, too, which, on a superficial view, appears favorable both to Hutcheson's language and system,-the peculiar and enthusiastic admiration with which all mankind regard a man of enlightened and active benevolence. Such a character draws upon itself not merely the applauses but the blessings of the world, and assimilates human nature to what we conceive of those ministering angels who are the immediate instruments of the Divine goodness and mercy.

In order to think with accuracy on this very important point of morals, it is necessary to distinguish those benevolent affections which urge us to their respective objects by a blind impulse, from that rational and enlightened benevolence which interests us in the happiness of all mankind, and indeed of all the orders of sensitive being. This Divine principle of action appears but little in the bulk of our species; for although the seeds of it are sown in every breast, it requires long and careful cultivation to rear them to maturity; choked as they are by envy, by jealousy, by selfishness, and by those contracted views which originate in unenlightened schemes of human policy. Clear away these noxious weeds, and the genuine benevolence of the human heart will appear in all its beauty. No wonder, then, that we should regard, with such peculiar sentiments of veneration, the character of one whom we consider as the sincere and unwearied friend of humanity; for such

a character implies the existence of all the other virtues, more particularly of candid and just dispositions towards our fellow creatures, and implies, moreover, a long course of persevering exertion in combating prejudice, and in eradicating narrow and malignant passions. The gratitude, besides, which all men must feel towards one in whose benevolent wishes they know themselves to be comprehended, contributes to enliven the former sentiment of moral esteem; and both together throw so peculiar a lustre on this branch of duty, as goes far to account for the origin of those systems which represent it as the only direct object of moral approbation.

But what I am chiefly anxious to infer at present from these remarks is, that there is nothing in this approbation of a rational and enlightened benevolence which at all invalidates the doctrine, that virtue, in all its branches, supposes a course of voluntary exertion under the guidance of a sense of duty.

It may be worth while to add, before leaving the subject, that, when a rational and habitual benevolence forms part of a character, it will render the conduct perfectly uniform, and will exclude the possibility of those inconsistencies that are frequently observable in individuals who give themselves up to the guidance of particular affections, either private or public. How often, for example, do we meet with individuals who have great pretensions to public spirit and even to humanity, on important occasions, who affect an habitual rudeness in the common intercourse of society! The public spirit of such men cannot possibly arise from genuine benevolence, otherwise the same principle of action would extend to every different part of the conduct by which the comfort of other men is affected; and in the case of most individuals, the addition they are able to make to human happiness, by the constant exercise of courtesy and gentleness to all who are within the sphere of their influence, is of far greater amount than all that can result from the more splendid and heroic exertions of their beneficence. A similar remark may be applied to such as are possessed of strong private attachments and of humanity to objects in distress,

while they have no idea of public spirit; and also to those who lay claim to a more than common portion of patriotic zeal, while they avow a contempt for the general interests of humanity. In truth, all those offices, whether apparently trifling or important, which contribute to augment the happiness of our fellow creatures,civility, gentleness, kindness, humanity, patriotism, universal benevolence, are only diversified expressions of the same disposition, according to the circumstances in which it operates, and the relation which the agent bears to others.

CHAPTER SECOND.

OF JUSTICE.

THE word justice, in its most extensive signification, denotes that disposition which leads us, in cases where our own temper, or passions, or interests are concerned, to determine and to act without being biassed by partial considerations.

I had occasion formerly to observe, that a desire of our own happiness is inseparable from our nature as sensitive and rational beings; or, in other words, that it is impossible to conceive a being capable of forming the ideas of happiness and misery, to whom the one shall not be an object of desire and the other of aversion. On the other hand, it is no less evident that this desire is a principle belonging to such beings exclusively; inasmuch as the very idea of happiness, or of what is good for man on the whole, presupposes the exercise of reason in the mind which is able to perform it; and as it is only a being possessed of the power of self-government which can pursue steadily this abstract conception, in opposition to the solicitations of present appetite and passion. This rational self-love (or in other words, this regard to what is good for us on the whole) is analogous, in some important respects, to that calm benevolence which has been already illustrated. They are both characteristical endowments of a rational nature, and they both exert an influence over the conduct in proportion as reason gains an ascendant over prejudice and error, and over those appetites which are common to us and to the brutes.

The inferior principles of action in our nature have all a manifest reference to one or other of these rational principles; for, although they operate without any reflection. on our part, they all lead to ends beneficial to the individual or to society. Of this kind are hunger, thirst, the desire of knowledge, the desire of esteem, pity to the distressed, natural affection, and a variety of others. Upon the whole, these two great principles of action, self