distinguished by the titles of the arguments a priori and a posteriori; the former founded on certain metaphysical propositions which are assumed as axioms, the latter appealing to that systematic order, and those comDinations of means to ends which are every where conspicuous in nature.

The argument a priori has been enforced with singular ingenuity by Dr. Clarke, whose particular manner of stating it is supposed to have been suggested to him by the following passage in Newton's Principia. "Æternus est et infinitus, omnipotens et omnisciens, id est, durat ab æterno in æternum, et adest ab infinito in infinitum: omnia regit, et omnia cognoscit quæ fiunt aut fieri possunt. Non est æternitas et infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio et spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique, et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium constituit. ** * Deum summum necessario existere in confesso est: et eâdem necessitate semper est et ubique."

The substance of Clarke's argument is essentially the same, amounting to the following proposition, that space and time are only abstract conceptions of an immensity and eternity which force themselves on our belief; and as immensity and eternity are not substances, they must be, the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense and eternal."

"These," says Dr. Reid, "are the speculations of men of superior genius; but whether they be as solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination in a region beyond the limits of human understanding, I am unable to determine." After this candid acknowledgment from Dr. Reid, I need not be ashamed to confess my own doubts and difficulties on the same subject.*

*An argument, substantially the same with that of Newton, for the existence of God, is hinted at by Cudworth. Intell. System, Chap. v. Sect. 3, § 4. Also by Dr. Henry More, Enchirid. Metaph. Chap. viii. § 8. See Mosheim's Latin Translation of Cudworth, Tom. II. p. 356, Lug. Batav. 1773.

Dr. Price in the last edition of his Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, has attempted to illustrate and enforce Clarke's argument, by placing it in a light somewhat different from that in which it occured to the author; but he appears to me, by departing from the language of Clarke and Newton, to have involved their ideas in additional mystery. In the course of this reasoning he

But although the argument, as stated by Clarke, does not carry complete conviction to my mind, I think it must be acknowledged that there is something very peculiar and wonderful in those conceptions of immensity and eternity which force themselves on our belief Nay further, I think that these conceptions furnish important lights in the study of natural religion. For when once we have established the existence of an intelligent and powerful cause from the works of creation, we are unavoidably led to apply to him our conceptions of immensity and eternity, and to conceive him as filling the infinite extent of both with his presence and his power. Hence we associate with the idea of God those. awful impressions which are naturally produced by the idea of infinite space, and perhaps still more by the idea of endless duration. Nor is this all. It is from our ideas of space and of time that the notion of infinity is originally derived, and it is thence that we transfer the expression by a sort of metaphor, to other subjects. When we speak, therefore, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, our notions, if not wholly borrowed from space and time, are at least wonderfully aided by this analogy; so that the conceptions of immensity and eternity, if they do not of themselves demonstrate the existence of God, yet necessarily enter into the ideas we form of his nature and attributes. It may be worth while to add, that the notion of necessary existence which we derive from the contemplation of space and of time render the same notion, when applied to the Supreme Being,

observes, that "God is wisdom rather than wise, and reason rather than reasonable.' "In like manner," he continues, "he is eternity rather than eternal, immensity rather than immense, and power rather than powerful." (Review, &c. &c. p. 500, 3d Edit.) The excellent and learned writer seems to have considered this thought as entirely new; but it is to be found in Hobbes's Answer to Bishop Bramhall,` where it is quoted from the writings of that prelate. I presume (for I have never seen the bishop's works), that it is faithfully copied from some one of his publications. "Upon this silly conceit, he (Tho. Hobbes) charges me for saying that God is not just but justice itself, not eternal but eternity itself, which he calleth unseemly words to be said of God...I wish he had considered better with himself before he had desperately cast himself upon these rocks."-(Hobbes's Works, p. 428, Fol. Edit.)

On this point I cannot help agreeing with Hobbes, that, "though all men in the world understand that the eternal is God, yet no man can understand that the eternity is God, any more than that a wise man and his wisdom are the same; or that any attribute in the abstract is the same with the substance to which it is attributed." -(Hobbes's Works, p. 429.)

much more easy to be apprehended than it would otherwise be.

Important use may also be made of these conceptions of immensity and eternity in stating the argument for the future existence of the soul. For why was the mind of man rendered capable of extending its views in point of time beyond the limits of human transactions, and in point of space, beyond the limits of the visible universe, if all our prospects are to terminate here ?-or why was a glimpse of so magnificent a scene disclosed to a being, the period of whose animal existence bears so small a proportion to the vastness of his desires? Surely this conception of the necessary existence of space and time, of immensity and eternity, was not forced continually upon the thoughts of man for no purpose whatever. And to what purpose can we suppose it to be subservient, but to remind those who make a proper use of their reason, of the trifling value of some of those objects we at present pursue, when compared with the scenes on which we may afterwards enter; and to animate us in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, by affording us the prospect of an indefinite progression ? *

After what I have already said of the argument a priori, it will not be expected that I should enter here into a particular illustration of it. Such as wish to examine it with attention may consult Dr. Clarke's work on the Being and Attributes of God; the last edition of Dr. Price's Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals; and a book published by Dr. Hamilton, late Bishop of Ossory,† where, after an historical review of the different forms in which the argument a

* Cicero had plainly the same argument in view when he remarked, "Nescio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium futurorum ; idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis et exsistit maximè, et apparet facillimè."-Tuscul. Disput. Lib. 1. c. 15.

*

In the Bibliotheca Britannica, published by the late Dr. Watt of Glasgow, I find this work ascribed to Hugh Hamilton, author of a Treatise of Conic Sections, which appeared at Dublin in 1758, and which I remember to have admired many years ago for its originality and elegance. If Dr. Watt's information (which is not always to be implicitly relied upon) be in this instance correct, I cannot help saying that, in my opinion, Mr. Hamilton's genius appears to much greater advantage as a geome-. trician than as a philosopher.

"De Sectionibus Conicis. Tractatus Geometricus. In quo, ex Naturâ ipsius Coni, Sectionum Affectiones facillime deducuntur." Methodo Nova. Dublinií, 1758.

priori has been stated by preceding writers, he proposes a new one of his own, more clear, (according to him) and more conclusive.

But whatever opinion be formed upon the argument a priori, all parties must allow that the argument a posteriori is more level to the comprehension of ordinary men, and more satisfactory to the philosopher himself. Indeed, in inquiries of this sort the presumption is strongly in favor of that mode of reasoning which is the most simple and obvious.

The existence of a Deity, however, does not seem to be an intuitive truth. It requires the exercise of our reasoning powers to present it in its full force to the mind. But the process of reasoning consists only of a single step, and the premises belong to that class of first principles which form an essential part of the human constitution. These premises are two in number. The one is, that every thing which begins to exist must have a cause. The other, that a combination of means conspiring to a particular end implies intelligence.

CHAPTER SECOND.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL RELIGION.

SECTION I.

Of the Foundations of our Reasoning from the Effect to the Cause, and of the Evidences of Active Power exhibited in the Universe.

IT was before observed that our knowledge of the course of nature is entirely the result of observation and experiment, and that there is no instance in which we perceive such a connexion between two successive events as might enable us to infer the one from the other as a necessary consequence.

From experience, indeed, we learn that there are many events so conjoined that the one constantly follows the other. It is possible, however, that this connexion, though a constant one as far as our observation has reached, is not a necessary connexion; nay, it is possible, for any thing we know to the contrary, that there may be no necessary connexions among any of the phenomena we see; and if there are any such connexions existing, we may rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them.

With this principle, when stated in general terms, most people I apprehend will now agree. Nor is the principle a new one, (as has been commonly supposed) and peculiar to Mr. Hume's system. Of this assertion I have produced sufficient proof in a note at the end of the first volume of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, where I have quoted various passages from Hobbes, Barrow, Butler, Berkeley, and others, demonstrating clearly that their notions on the subject were precisely the same with Mr. Hume's.* To the list of names there mentioned, perhaps that of Socrates ought to be added, who, as Xenophon tells us in the Memorabilia, blamed

* For some curious passages to the same purpose, see Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. Note (0.)