THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF

THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN.

INTRODUCTION.

In my former work on the Human Mind I confined IN my attention almost exclusively to Man considered as an intellectual being; and attempted an analysis of those faculties and powers which compose that part of his nature commonly called his intellect or his understanding. It is by these faculties that he acquires his knowledge of external objects; that he investigates truth in the sciences; that he combines means in order to attain the ends he has in view; and that he imparts to his fellow creatures the acquisitions he has made. A being might, I think, be conceived, possessed of these principles without any of the active propensities belonging to our species, at least without any of them but the principle of curiosity; a being formed only for speculation, without any determination to the pursuit of particular external objects, and whose whole happiness consisted in intellectual gratifications.

But although such a being might perhaps be conceived to exist, and although, in studying our internal frame, it be convenient to treat of our intellectual powers apart from our active propensities, yet, in fact, the two are very intimately, and indeed inseparably, connected in all our mental operations. I already hinted, that, even in our speculative inquiries, the principle of curiosity is necessary to account for the exertion we make; and it is still more obvious that a combination of means to accomplish particular ends presupposes some

determination of our nature, which makes the attainment of these ends desirable. Our active propensities, therefore, are the motives which induce us to exert our intellectual powers; and our intellectual powers are the instruments by which we attain the ends recommended to us by our active propensities:

"Reason the card, but passion is the gale."

It will afterwards appear, that our active propensities are not only necessary to produce our intellectual exertions, but that the state of the intellectual powers, in the case of individuals, depends, in a great measure, on the strength of their propensities, and on the particular propensities which are predominant in the temper of their minds. A man of strong philosophical curiosity is likely to possess a much more cultivated and inventive understanding than another of equal natural capacity, destitute of the same stimulus. In like manner, the love of fame, or a strong sense of duty, may compensate for original defects, or may lay the foundation of uncommon attainments. The intellectual powers, too, may be variously modified by the habits arising from avarice, from the animal appetites, from a bition, or from the benevolent affections; insomuch that the moral principles of the miser, of the elegant voluptuary, of the political intriguer, and of the philanthropist, are not, perhaps, more dissimilar than the acquired capacities of their understandings, and the species of information with which their memories are stored. Among the various external indications of character, few circumstances will be found to throw more light on the ruling passions of individuals than the habitual direction of their studies, and the nature of those accomplishments which they have been ambitious to attain.

When Montaigne complains of "the difficulty he experienced in remembering the names of his servants; of his ignorance of the value of the French coins which he was daily handling; and of his inability to distinguish the different kinds of grain from each other, both in the earth and in the granary; "* his observations, instead

Montaigne's Essays, Book II. Chap. xvii.

of proving the point which he supposed them to establish, (an original and incurable defect in his faculty of memory) only afford an illustration of the little interest he took in things external, and of the preternatural and distempered engrossment of his thoughts with the phenomena of the internal world. To this peculiarity in his turn of mind he has himself alluded, when he says, "I study myself more than any other subject: This is my metaphysic; this my natural philosophy." A person well acquainted with the peculiarities of Montaigne's memory, might, I think, on comparing them with the general superiority of his mental powers, have anticipated him in this specification of the study which almost exclusively occupied his attention.*

Helvetius in his book de l'Esprit, (a work which, among many paradoxical and some very pernicious opinions, contains a number of acute and lively observations) has prosecuted with considerable success, this last view of Human Nature, and has collected a variety of amusing facts to illustrate the influence of the passions on the intellectual powers. "It is the passions," he observes, "that rouse the soul from its natural tendency to rest, and surmount the vis inerte to which it is always inclined to yield; and it is the strong passions alone that prompt men to the execution of those heroic actions, and give birth to those sublime ideas which command the admiration of ages.

"It is the strength of passion alone that can enable men to defy dangers, pain, and death.

"It is the passions, too, which, by keeping up a perpetual fermentation in our minds, fertilize the same ideas, which, in more phlegmatic temperaments, are barren, and resemble seed scattered on a rock.

The following remarks of the learned and ingenious Dr. Jortin are not unworthy of the attention of those whose taste leads them to the observation and study of character.

"From the complexion of those anecdotes which a man collects from others, or which he forms by his own pen, may, without much difficulty, be conjectured what manner of man he was.

"The human being is mightily given to assimilation, and, from the stories which any one relates with spirit, from the general tenor of his conversation, and from the books or associates to which he most addicts his attention, the inference cannot be far distant as to the texture of his mind, the vein of his wit, or, may we add, the ruling passion of his heart."-Jortin's Tracts, Vol. I. p. 445.

"It is the passions which, having strongly fixed our attention on the object of our desire, lead us to view it under aspects unknown to other men; and which, consequently, prompt heroes to plan and execute those hardy enterprises which must always appear ridiculous to the multitude till the sagacity of their authors has been evinced by success." *

To this passage, which is, I think, just in the main, I have only to object, that, in consequence of the ambiguity of the word passion, it is apt to suggest an erroneous idea of the author's meaning. It is plain that he uses it to denote our active principles in general; and, in this sense, there can be no doubt that his doctrine is well founded; inasmuch as, without such principles as curiosity, the love of fame, ambition, avarice, or the love of mankind, our intellectual capacities would for ever remain steril and useless. But it is not in this sense that the word passion is most commonly employed. In its ordinary acceptation it denotes those animal impulses which, although they may sometimes prompt to intellectual exertion, are certainly on the whole unfavorable to intellectual improvement. Helvetius himself has not always attended to this ambiguity of language; and hence may be traced many of the paradoxes and errors of his philosophy.

To these slight remarks it may not be useless to subjoin an observation of La Rochefoucald, which is equally refined and just; and which, in its practical tendency, calls the attention to a source of danger in a quarter where it is too seldom apprehended. "It is a mistake to believe that none but the violent passions, such as ambition and love, are able to triumph over the other active principles. Laziness, as languid as it is, often gets the mastery of them all; overrules all the designs and actions of life, and insensibly consumes and destroys both passions and virtues."

From the foregoing observations it appears, that, in accounting for the diversities of genius and of intellectual character among men, important lights may be de

* De l'Esprit, Discours iii. Chap. vi.

rived from an examination of their active propensities. It is of more consequence for me, however, to remark at present the intimate relation which an analysis of these propensities bears to the theory of morals, and its practical connexion with our opinions on the duties and the happiness of human life. Indeed it is in this way alone that the light of nature enables us to form any reasonable conclusions concerning the ends and destination of our being, and the purposes for which we were sent into the world: Quid sumus, et quidnam victuri gignimur.* It forms, therefore, a necessary introduction to the science of ethics, or rather is the foundation on which that science rests.

In prosecuting our inquiries into the Active and the Moral Powers of Man, I propose, first, to attempt a classification and analysis of the most important principles belonging to this part of our constitution; and, secondly, to treat of the various branches of our duty. Under the former of these heads, my principal aim will be to illustrate the essential distinction between those active principles which originate in man's rational nature, and those which urge him, by a blind and instinctive impulse, to their respective objects.

In general, it may be here remarked, that the word action is properly applied to those exertions which are consequent on volition, whether the exertion be made on external objects, or be confined to our mental operations. Thus, we say the mind is active when engaged in study. In ordinary discourse, indeed, we are apt to confound together action and motion. As the operations in the minds of other men escape our notice, we can judge of their activity only from the sensible effects it produces; and hence we are led to apply the character of activity to those whose bodily activity is the most remarkable, and to distinguish mankind into two classes, the active and the speculative. In the present instance, the word active is used in its most extensive signification, as applicable to every voluntary exertion.

Persius, Sat. iii. 1. 67.