Rational Changes in Science: Essays on Scientific Reasoning

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Joseph C. Pitt, Marcello Pera
Springer Science & Business Media, 30 jun 1987 - 248 páginas
THE PROBLEMS OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY Fashion is a fickle mistress. Only yesterday scientific rationality enjoyed considerable attention, consideration, and even reverence among phi losophers; "but today's fashion leads us to despise it, and the matron, rejected and abandoned as Hecuba, complains; modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens - nunc trahor exui, inops", to cite Kant for our purpose, who cited Ovid for his. Like every fashion, ours also has its paradoxical aspects, as John Watkins correctly reminds in an essay in this volume. Enthusiasm for science was high among philosophers when significant scientific results were mostly a promise, it declined when that promise became an undeniable reality. Nevertheless, as with the decline of any fashion, even the revolt against scientific rationality has some reasonable grounds. If the taste of the philosophical community has changed so much, it is not due to an incident or a whim. This volume is not about the history of and reasons for this change. Instead, it provides a view of the new emerging image of scientific rationality in both its philosophical and historical aspects. In particular, the aim of the contributions gathered here is to focus on the concept around which the discussions about rationality have mostly taken place: scientific change.
 

Índice

How Not to Talk About Conceptual Change in Science
xiv
The Myth of the Framework
35
A New View of Scientific Rationality
63
Science Protoscience and Pseudoscience
83
Methodology Heuristics and Rationality
103
The Case of the Tides
135
Some Historical Considerations
155
Galvanis Animal Electricity
177
The Rationality of Entertainment and Pursuit
203
INDEX OF NAMES
221
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Página ix - I refer is this; that when a prevalent theory is found to be untenable, and consequently, is succeeded by a different, or even by an opposite one, the change is not made suddenly, or completed at once, at least in the minds of the most tenacious adherents of the earlier doctrine; but is effected by a transformation, or series of transformations, of the earlier hypothesis, by means of which it is gradually brought nearer and nearer to the second...

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