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banal argument de toutes les oppositions dans tous les pays !) non-seule. ment pour avoir vendu des bâtiments de la marine de l'état sans avoir obtenu préalablement l'assentiment des états, mais aussi pour avoir depuis permis la résiliation des marchés, et s'être soumis, de cette sorte, à une perte en argent d'un chiffre élevé. Une commission fut nommée pour examiner la conduite du gouvernement, laquelle, après leur examen, fut trouvée irrépréhensible.

“ Les états sollicitèrent, il est vrai, du roi, que S. M. voulît bien prendre les mesures nécessaires pour faire rentrer au trésor les sommes que le gouvernement avait cru devoir sacrifier, quand il se vit mieux éclairó sur les inconvénients résultant de la vente effectuée et lorsqu'il céda aux représentations diplomatiques dont cette vente était devenue l'objet; mais la mort du Comte de Cederström, chef de l'administration de la marine, contre lequel la demande paraissait dirigée, mit fin à cette affaire; elle ne fut pas reprise, en *effet, dans le cours des séances (192] de la diète suivante.

“ Le gouvernement suédois en résiliant les contrats de rente, et en s'imposant un sacrifice d'argent en cette circonstance, agit dignement et loyalement; aussi longtemps qu'il ne vit dans la vente des bâtiments de guerre réformés et d'une partie de leur armement, qu'une opération purement commerciale, dont les résultats devaient profiter uniquement, tant au commerce d'aucun acquéreur, qu'au trésor de l'état, au moment où de nouvelles constructions navales allaient être entreprises, le gouvernement suédois était parfaitement dans son droit; mais du jour où il put croire que les bâtiments achetés par la maison de Stockholm et revendus à la maison de Londres étaient destinés effectivement à renforcer les armements maritimes d'une colonie que l'Espagne considérait encore comme insurgée contre son autorité et dont l'indépendance politique n'avait encore été reconnue par aucun des grands états européens, la Suède, alliée ou amie de l'Espagne, ne pouvait se prêter, sans porter atteinte au principe de la neutralité, à ce que ses vaisseaux de guerre réformés concourussent à accroître les forces navales du Mexique.

“Ce ne fut que le 26 décembre 1826 que la Grande-Bretagne signa, à Londres, un traité public avec les états mexicains; dans l'année 1827, *la France, les Pays-Bas, le Hanovre, le Danemark suivi. [193] rent cet exemple, en signant, avec le gouvernement mexicain, (les traités de commerce et de navigation ; le 28 décembre 1836, enfin, l'Es. pagne, compr ant l'inutilité de continuer la lutte contre des colonies qui s'étaient séparées d'elle sans retour, conclut avec le Mexique un traité de paix et d'amitié.

"En agissant autrement qu'elle le fit, c'est-à-dire en persistant à repousser les réclamations du chargé d'affaires d'Espagne, la Suède, nous le répétons, aurait manqué aux devoirs et aux obligations de la neutralité. C'eût été se prêter à favoriser l'un des deux belligérants (et, dans le cas actuel en 1825, le belligérant favorisé était un peuple dont la condition politique était encore indéterminée), que de ne pas prendre les mesures nécessaires pour que les bâtiments de guerre réformés, vendus avec un demi-armement, n'allassent pas accroître les forces navales d'une colonie de l'Espagne insurgée contre l'autorité du roi catholique." It may possibly be asserted that the construction, or the fitting ont,

or the arming, or the equipment by neutrals of vessels of war intended for the service of a belligerent were, before

the Treaty of Washington, to be regarded as standing upon the same footing with the dealings in articles *ordinarily [191] esteemed coutraband of war. Should this be the case, the United

Ofrending vessels not simply contra band of war.

States might content themselves with a reference to the history of the legislation of the two countries, as a complete answer to such an assertion. While the subjects or citizens of either country have been left by lan free to manufacture or sell muskets or gunpowder, or to export them at their own risk, even if known to be for the use of a belligerent, the legislatures, the executives, and the judiciaries of both Great Britain and the United States have joined the civilized world in saying that a Fessel of war, intended for the use of a belligerent, is not an article in which the individual subject or citizen of a neutral State may deal, sub. ject to the liability to capture as contraband by the other belligerent. Such a vessel bas been and is regarded as organized war-more clearly

organized war than was that unarmed expedition which leit [195] Plymoutb in 1828 for Portugal,' and was arrested *by the British

navy at the same Terceira to which the Alabama fled to receive the arms and ammunition that she failed to take on board at Liverpool, either because the purposes of the Foreign Office were surreptitiously revealed, or because the insurgent agents had reason to believe that they could evade the law by the construction of the vessel on one side of the river Mersey, the collection of the armament on the other side of it, and the putting them together more than three miles out at sea.

It is not, however, necessary for the United States to rely in this respect upon the action of the several branches of the Governments of the two countries. The question has been considered by several of the leading publicists of the Continent. Ortolan, in his “ Diplomatie de la mer, savs, in addition to what has already been cited :

" À part toute prohibition faite législativement par telle ou telle nation, il faut, en droit international, considérer comme des actes décidément contraires à la neutralité, l'équipement, et l'armement et, à plus forte raison, la construction dans les ports neutres de bâtiments de guerre appartenant aux belligérants, ou destinés, par concert

ostensible ou dissimulé avec les belligérants par à être remis en leur [196] pouvoir. Nous croyons fermement *qu'il est impossible d'assimiler

de pareils actes à la contrebande de guerre proprement dite et que l'obligation pour un état neutre de s'opposer à ce qu'ils aient lieu sur son territoire est indépendante de toute loi intérieure ou particuliére à cet état ; que la loi intérieure peut et doit sanctionner cette obligation, mais qu'elle ne saurait ni la créer ni la détruire, parceque c'est une obli. gation qui résulte uniquement de la loi internationale, laquelle défend d'user, dans un but hostile, du territoire neutre.”

Heffter, the distinguished German publicist, says to the same effect:

66 C'est un devoir général pour les peuples restés spectateurs tranquilles de la lutte, de n'y prendre aucune part active, ni de participer directement aux actes de la guerre. Les gouvernements, les sujets étrangers qui fournissent à l'un des belligérants des secours directs

Opinion of Ortolan.

And of Hefter.

· During the contest in Portugal between Don Miguel and Donna Maria II, an uparmed expedition of the adherents of Donna Maria left Portsmouth, ostensibly for Brazil, but really for the Azores. The British Government of that day pursue it to Terceira, tired into it and broke it up; and they were sustained in the House of Lords by a vote of 120 to 31, and in the House of Commons by a vote of 191 to 78. (Hansard for 1830, Vol. XXIII. See also Annual Register for 1829, and Phillimore's International Lawr, Vol. I, page 229, et seq.) The Tribunal of Arbitration will not fail to observe how dit: ferently the powers and duties of the Government were construed by the British Goverument when it was a question of the disintegration and disruption of the commerce of the United States.

2 Diplomatie de la mer, Ortolan, tomo 2, page 214. 3 Heifter, Droit international, (French translation by Jules Bergson, Paris,) page 296.

S. Ex. 31-6

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ima Trinidad

commettent une violation du devoir de la neutralité, un acte d'immixion dans les hostilités auquel l'adversaire est eu droit de s'opposer par tous les moyens. Dans la pratique on regarde comme de tels actes d'hostilité :

“1°, le transport volontaire des soldats, matelots et autres hommes de guerre; “20, la construction dans les ports neutres de vaisseaux de guerre on

de commerce pour le compte de l'ennemi dès leur sortie;

le transport volontaire de dépêches de l'un des belligé. [197] rants.

" Ces diverses contraventions, lorsqu'elles sont régulièrement constatées, entraînent la saisie et la confiscation du navire employé au transport. La confiscation s'étend également à la cargaison, si il est établi que les propriétaires avaient connaissance du but illicite du voyage. Toutefois cette pénalité n'est pas toujours exécutée à leur égard avec la même sévérité. En réalité elle constitute un acte de légitime défense auquel le neutre qui se rend complice de l'un des belligérants ne saurait échapper du côté de l'adversaire.

6 En dehors des cas qui viennent d'être énumérés, il existe encore un certain nombre d'objets dont le commerce est regardé, d'une manière plus ou moins générale dans la pratique des états, comme prohibé. constitute la contrabande de guerre proprement dite."

Without wearying the patience of the Tribunal in the further disCase of the Santis. cussion of this question, it will be assumed that a vessel of

war is not to be confounded with ordinary contraband of war. Indeed, the only respectable authority wbich has been cited even apparently to the contrary, is an observation which Mr. Justice Story thrust into the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, upon the case of the Santisima Trinidad. *If that eminent jurist (198) had said that a vessel of war was to be regarded in public law as an article which might be legitimately constructed, fitted out, armed, equipped, or dealt in by a person in the territory of a neutral, with the intent that it should enter the service of a belligerent, subject only to a liability to capture as contraband of war by the other belligerent, the United States would have been forced, with great regret, to ask this tribunal to disregard an opinion so at variance with common sense, and with the whole current of the actions of nations. Happily they are under no fecessity of casting an imputation on the memory of one of their brightest judicial ornaments.

During the last war between the United States and Great Britain a privateer, called the Monmouth, was constructed at Baltimore, and cruised against the enemy. After the peace she was stripped of her armament, and converted into a brig. She was subsequently loaded with munitions of war, armed with a portion of her original armament, and sent to Buenos Ayres, (which was then a revolted colony of Spain recognized as a belligerent, but not recognized as an independent government,) to find a market for her munitions of war.

The supercargo was also authorized " to sell the vessel to the Government of Buenos Ayres if he could obtain a suitable price.” He did sell her, and she *went into the service of that Government as a man-of-war. She [199] subsequently put into a port of the United States, and wbile there enlisted thirty new men, and took with her, when she put to sea, the newly enlisted men, and a tender, which carried some mounted guns and twenty-five men. After this addition to her effective power for injury, assisted by the tender, she captured the Spanish vessel Santisima Trinidad, and carried her cargo into Norfolk, one of the ports of the United States. On the instigation of the Spanish authorities, proceedings were taken for the restitution of this property, on the ground, first, that the Independencia bad been originally illegally fitted out, armed, or equipped in the United States; secondly, that she had, after entering the service of Buenos Ayres, illegally recruited men and augmented her force within the United States. The court decreed a restitution of the property on the second ground. Any remarks, therefore, upon the first point were outside of the requirements of the case, and, under the American practice, would be regarded as without authority; but inasmuch as they were made by one of the most eminent writers on public law, they deserve the consideration which they have received. Taking them in con

17 Wheaton's Reports, page 283.

nection with the facts as skown in evidence, it is clear that the dis[200] tinguished judge intended to con*five his statement to the case

of a vessel of war equipped and dispatched as a commercial venture, without previous arrangement or understanding with the belligerent, and at the sole risk of the owner. "It is apparent,” he says, " that she was sent to Buenos Ayres on a commercial venture.” The whole of his subsequent remarks turned upon the absence of an intent, in Baltimore, in the mind of the owner, before she sailed, that she should, in any and at all events, whether sold or not, go into the service of the belligerent.

The judges who were brought in contact with the witnesses in that case, and had access to all the original papers, and knew personally both the men and the facts, and who, therefore, had opportunities which are denied to us of judging of the merits of the case, seem to have reached the conclusion that this particular transaction was a purely commercial venture; and they placed the decree of restitution of the captured property úpon later violations of law. It may, however, be said that the ordinary experiences of human life show that such deeds border upon the debatable ground between good faith and fraud. The court which decided that case evidently did so on the impressions which

the judges received from the particular evidence before them; [201] for, on the very next *day, the most illustrious of

American judges, John Marshall, then Chief Justice case of the GranPara of the United States, in the parallel case of the Irresistible, a vessel built at Baltimore, sent to Buenos Ayres, and there commissioned as a privateer, pronouncing the opinion of the same court, declared that the facts as to the Irresistible showed a violation of the laws of the United States in the original construction, equipment, and arming of the vessel; and that, should the court decide otherwise, the laws for the preserration of the neutrality of the country would be completely eluded. In justice to the highest court of the United States, these two cases should ve read together by all persons wishing to know its views upon the duties of a neutral nation in time of war, since if there be any difference in the principles involved in the two cases, then the true construction of the law is to be found in the carefully considered language of the court in the case of the Gran Para. The cases were both argued in February, 1822: the Gran Para upon the 20th, and the Santisima Trinidad on the 28th. The opinions were delivered in March : that of the Santisima Trinidad on the 12th; that of the Gran Para on the 13th.

Tbere can be no doubt that they were considered together in the [202] consultation-room. Therefore any apparently broad or ill *con

Controlled by the

· The Gran Para, 7 Wheaton's Reports, 471.

Effect of a com.

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sidered expressions in the opinion rendered on the12th of modo revelacel March are to be regarded as limited and corrected by the

carefully considered espressions of the Chief Justice on the following day.

Having thus demonstrated that the principles for which the United States contend have been recognized by the statesmen, the jurists, the publicists, and the legislators of Great Britain ; that they have the approbation of the most eminent authorities upon the continent of Europe; and that they have been regarded by the other Powers of Europe in their dealing with each other, it only remains to show how the liability of the neutral for the acts of cruisers illegally built, or equipped, or fitted out, or armed within its ports, may be terminated.

It has been intimated, in the course of the discussions upon these questions between the two Governments, that it may be said, on the part of Great Britain, that its power to interfere with, to arrest, or to detain either of the belligerent cruisers whose acts are complained of ceased when it was commissioned as a man-of-war; and that, consequently, its liability for their actions ceased.

The United States might well content themselves with calling the attention of the Tribunal of Arbitration to the utter uselessness discussing these questions, if the liability to make com*pensation [203] for the wrong can be escaped in such a frivolous way. It is well known how the several British-built and British-manned cruisers got into the service of the insurgents. Few of them ever saw the line of the coast of the Southern insurgent States. The Florida, indeed, entered the harbor of Mobile, but she passed the blockading squadron as a British mau-of-war. In most cases the commissions went out from England-froin a branch office of the insurgent Navy Department, established and maintained in Liverpool at the cost and expense of the insurgent (so-called) Government. From this office the sailing orders of the vessels were issued; here their commanders received their instructions; and hence they departed to assume their commands and to begin the work of destruction. They played the comedy of completing on the high seas what had been carried to the verge of completion in England. The parallel is complete between these commissions and those issued by Genet in 1793, which were disregarded by the United States at the instance of Great Britain. If a piece of paper, emanating through an English office, from men who had no nationality recognized by Great Britain, and who had no open port into which a vessel could go unmolested, was potent not only to legalize the depredations of British built and manned cruisers * upon the commerce of the United [201] States, but also to release the responsibility of Great Britain therefor, then this arbitration is indeed a farce. Such, however, cannot be the case.

Sir Roundell Palmer, the Attorney General of Lord Palmerston's Opinion of Sir

Cabinet, as well as of the present Government, well said, in

the House of Commons, in 1864, when defending the course of Great Britain as to the Tuscaloosa, a tender of the Alabama, "Can it be said that a neutral Sovereign has not the right to make orders for the preservation of his own neutrality, or that any foreign Power whatever violating these orders, provided it be done willfully or fraudulently, is protected to any extent, by International Law, within the neutral territory, or has the right to complain, on the ground of International Law, of any means which the neutral Sovereign may see fit to adopt for the assertion of his territorial rights ?” “ It is a mere ques

Roundell Palmer.

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