man had any how slain another; if an adversary had killed his opposer, or a woman occasioned the death of her enemy; even these criminals would have been capitally punished by the Cornelian law: but if this guiltless infant, that could make no enemy, had been murdered by its own nurse, what punishment would not then the mother have demanded? With what cries and exclamations would she have stunned your ears! What shall we say then, when a woman, guilty of homicide, a mother, of the murder of her innocent child, hath comprised all those misdeeds in one single crime? a crime, in its own nature, detestable; in a woman, prodigious; in a mother, incredible; and perpetrated against one whose age called for compassion, whose near relation claimed affection, and whose innocence deserved the highest favour."

Amplification is produced by various methods: by ascending from particular to general things; by descending from generals to particulars; by an enumeration of parts; by illustrating a thing from a variety of causes; by exhibiting a number and variety of effects; by gradation; by the circumstances of time, place, manner, event, and the like; and by elucidating things by their opposites.

The blessings and advantages of peace, may be recommended from their opposites, the miseries and calamities of war. Thus Cicero endeavours to throw contempt upon Cataline and his party, by comparing them with the contrary side, as follows. But if omitting all these things, with which we abound, and which they want, the senate, the knights, the populace, the city, treasury, revenues, all Italy, the provinces, and foreign nations; if, I say, omitting these things, we compare the causes themselves, in which each side is engaged, we may learn from thence how despicable they are. For on this side modesty is engaged, on that impudence; on this chastity, on that lewdness; on this integrity, on that fraud; on this piety, on that profaneness; on this constancy, on that fickleness; on this honour, on that baseness; on this moderation, on that unbridled passion; in a word, equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, and all virtues, contend with injustice, luxury, cowardice, rashness, and all vices; plenty with want, reason with folly, sobriety with madness, and lastly good hope with despair. In such a contest, did men desert us, would not Heaven ordain, that so many and so great vices should be defeated by these most excellent virtues?"

As different figures of speech are often blended in the same passage, so the reader will perceive, that, in the preceding

extract, the figure of Amplification comprises that of Antithesis.

We bave now finished what was proposed, concerning Perspicuity in single words and phrases, and the accurate construction of sentences. The former has been considered, under the heads of Purity, Propriety, and Precision; and the latter, under those of Clearness, Unity, Strength, and the proper use of Figurative Language. Though many of those attentions which have been recommended, may appear minute, yet their effect upon writing and style, is much greater A sentiment which is exthan might, at first, be imagined

pressed in accurate language, and in a period, clearly, neatly, and well arranged, always makes a stronger impression on the mind, than one that is expressed inaccurately, or in a feeble or embarrassed manner. Every one feels this upon a comparison and if the effect be sensible in one sentence, how much more in a whole discourse, or composition that is made up of such sentences?

The fundamental rule for writing with accuracy, and into which all others might be resolved, undoubtedly is, to commu nicate, in correct language, and in the clearest and most natural order, the ideas which we mean to transfuse into the minds of others Such a selection and arrangement of words, as do mos justice to the sense, and express it to most advantage, make an agreeable and strong impression. To these points have tended all the rules which have been given. Did we always think clearly. and were we, at the same time, fully masters of the language in which we write, there would be occasion for few rules. Our sentences would then, of course, acquire all those properties of clearness, unity, strength, and accuracy, which have been recommended. For we may rest assured, that whenever we express ourselves ill, besides the mismanagement of language, there is, for the most part, some mistake in our manner of conceiving the subject. Embarrassed, obscure, and feeble sentences, are generally, if not always, the result of embarrassed, obscure and feeble thought. Thought and expression act and re-act upon each other. The understanding and language have a strict connexion; and they who are learning to compose and arrange their sentences with accuracy and order, are learning, at the same time, to think with accuracy and order; a consideration which alone will recompense the student, for bis attention to this branch of literature.

We now proceed to consider the Third Part of our subject, namely, the great principle or standard, by which the propriety of language is ascertained and determined.

PART III.

Of Perspicuity and Accuracy of Expression,

With respect to the Great Principle, which, on all occasions, decides the propriety of language.

AMIDST the diversity and fluctuation of sentiment, respecting the correctness of language and the true idiom of our tongue, which are so frequently found to prevail amongst writers and critics, the student will naturally wish to be directed to some authority and standard, by which his doubts may, on most if not all occasions, be removed, and the propriety of his literary compositions ascertained. This principle or standard, is reputable, national, and present use.

In the course of our grammatical labours, we have occasionally referred, or alluded, to this standard: but the nature and importance of it require a more extensive and particular examination. A proper view of the subject involves, indeed, much critical discussion, and many necessary cautions, rules, and distinctions. But though the execution of such a work, is a delicate and arduous task, it has been happily accomplished by the learned and ingenious Doctor Campbell, in his "Philosophy of Rhetoric." We shall therefore, availing ourselves of his labours, produce a copious extract (with some additions and alterations) from what he has written on the subject; which we hope will afford the ingenious student complete satisfaction.

CHAPTER I.

The nature and characters of the use which gives law to language.

EVERY tongue whatever is founded in use or custom,

"Whose arbitrary sway

"FRANCIS.

Words and the forms of language must obey."

Language is purely a species of fashion, (for this holds equally of every tongue,) in which, by the general, but tacit consent

"Usus

Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus, et norma loquendi." HORACE.

of the people of a particular state or country, certain sounds come to be appropriated to certain things, as their signs; and certain ways of inflecting and combining those sounds come to be established, as denoting the relations which subsist among the things signified.

It is not the business of grammar, as some critics seem preposterously to imagine, to give law to the fashions which regulate our speech. On the contrary, from its conformity to these, and from that alone, it derives all its authority and value. For, what is the grammar of any language? It is no other than a collection of general observations methodically digested, and comprising all the modes previously and independently established, by which the significations, derivations, and combinations of words in that language, are ascertained. It is of no consequence bere to what causes originally these modes or fashions owe their existence; whether to imitation, or reflection, to affectation, or to caprice: they no sooner obtain and become general, than they are laws of the language, and the grammarian's only business is, to note, collect, and methodise them.* Nor does this truth concern only those more comprehensive analogies or rules, which affect whole classes of words; such as nouns, verbs, and the other parts of speech; but it concerns every individual word, in the inflecting or the combining of which, a particular mode has prevailed. Every single anomaly, therefore, though departing from the rule assigned to the other words of the same class, and on that account called an exception, stands on the same basis, on which the rules of the tongue are founded, custom having prescribed for it a separate rule.-If use be here a matter of such consequence, it will be necessary, before advancing any farther, to ascertain precisely, what it is. We shall otherwise be in danger, though we agree about the name, of differing widely in the notion that we assign to it,

SECTION 1.

Of reputable use.

In what extent then must the term be understood? It is sometimes called general use; yet is it not manifest, that the generality of people speak and write very badly? Nay, is not this a truth that will be even generally acknowledged? It will be so; and this very acknowledgment shows, that many terms and idioms may be common, which, nevertheless, have

It is scarcely necessary to observe, that, with the moral misapplication of words and phrases, this work has not any conei n. No usage whatever can justify such perversions of language.

not the general sanction; no, nor even the suffrage of those that use them. The use bere spoken of, implies not only currency, but vogue. It is properly reputable custom.

This leads to a distinction between good use, and bad use in language, the former of which will be found to have the approbation of those who have not themselves attained it. The far greater part of mankind, perhaps ninety-nine of a hundred, are, by reason of poverty and other circumstances, deprived of the advantages of education, and obliged to toil for bread, almost incessantly, in some narrow occupation. They have neither the leisure nor the means of attaining scarcely any knowledge, except what lies within the contracted circle of their several professions. As the ideas which occupy their minds are few, the portion of the language known to them must be very scanty. It is impossible that our knowledge of words should oustrip our knowledge of things. It may, and often does, come short of it. Words may be remembered as sounds, but cannot be understood as signs, whilst we remain unacquainted with the things signified.

From the practice of those who are conversant in any art, elegant or mechanical, we may always take the sense of the terms and phrases belonging to that art: in like manner, from the practice of those who have had a liberal education, and are therefore presumed to be best acquainted with men and things, we judge of the general use in language. If, in this particular, there be any deference to the practice of the great and rich, it is not ultimately because they are greater and richer than others; but because, from their greatness and riches, they are imagined to be wiser and more knowing. The source, therefore, of that preference which distinguishes good use from bad in language, is a natural propension of the human mind to believe, that those are the best judges of the proper signs, and of the proper application of them, whe understand best the things which they represent.

But who are they, that in the public estimation are possessed of this character? This question is of the greatest moment for ascertaining that use, which is entitled to the epithets reputable and good. Vangelas makes them in France to be, "the soundest part of the court, and the soundest part of the authors of the age."-With us Britons, the first part, at least, of this description, will not answer. Use in language requires firmer ground to stand upon. No doubt, the conversation of men of rank and eminence, whether of the court or not, will have its influence. And in what concerns merely the pro