still more explicitly, his French translator, Boileau; "Le sublime "est en effet ce qui forme l'excellence et la souveraine perfection du "discours." To this version Boileau adds, Cela s'entend plus "aisément que cela ne se peut rendre en François. Axgorns veut “dire summitas, l'extremité en hauteur ; ce qu'il y a de plus élevé dans ce qui est élevé. Le mot so signifie à peu près la même chose, "c'est à dire, eminentia, ce qui s'éleve au-dessus du reste. C'est sur 66 66 ces deux termes, dont la signification est superlative, et que Lon"gin prend au figuré, que je me suis fondé pour soutenir que son "dessein est de traiter du genre sublime de l'eloquence dans son plus "haut point de perfection." (Remarques sur la Traduction du Traité du Sublime.)-Oeuvres de Boileau, Tom. V. Amsterdam, 1775. In defence of Longinus's application of the epithet sublime to Sappho's Ode, Mr Knight maintains, that the Pathetic is always Sublime. "All sympathies," he observes, "excited by just and "appropriate expression of energic passions, whether they be "of the tender or violent kind, are alike sublime, as they all tend "to expand and elevate the mind, and fill it with those enthusias"tic raptures, which Longinus justly states to be the true feelings "of sublimity. Hence that author cites instances of the sublime "from the tenderest odes of love, as well as from the most terrific "images of war, and with equal propriety." In a subsequent part of his work, Mr Knight asserts, that "in all the fictions, either of poetry or imitative art, there can be nothing truly pathetic, un"less it be at the same time in some degree sublime." In this assertion he has certainly lost sight entirely of the meaning in which the words Sublime and Pathetic are commonly understood in our language; a standard of judgment, upon questions of this sort, from which there lies no appeal to the arbitrary definition of any theorist; not even to the authority of Longinus himself. Upon an accurate examination of the subject, it will be found that, like most other authors who have treated of Sublimity, he has proceeded on the supposition of the possibility of bringing under one precise definition, the views of sublimity taken both by the ancients and by the moderns, without making due allowances for the numberless modifications of the idea, which may be expected from their different systems of manners, from their different religious creeds, and from various other causes. Whoever reflects on the meaning of the word Virtus as employed by the earlier Romans, and compares it with the Virtù of their degenerate descendants, will not be surprised at the anomalies he meets with, in attempting to reconcile completely the doctrines of ancient and modern critics concerning the Sublime: and will find reason to be satisfied, when he is able to give a plausible account of some of these anomalies from their different habits of thinking, and their different modes of philosophising upon the principles of criticism. "Appellata est a Viro virtus. Viri autem propria maximè est "fortitudo, cujus munera duo maxima sunt, mortis dolorisque con"temptio."-Cic. Tusc. 2. 18. "Virtus signifia d'abord la force, ensuite le courage, ensuite la "grandeur morale. Chez les Italiens, virtù ne designe guère que "la pratique des beaux arts; et le mot qui, dans son origine, ex"primait la qualité qui distingue éminemment l'homme, est donné "aujourd'hui à des êtres qui ont perdu la qualité distinctive de "l'homme. Un Soprano est le Virtuoso par excellence.”—Suard. Essai sur la vie et le caractère du Tasse. In the instance of the sublime, it seems to me to be much less wonderful that there should be some anomalies in the use made of this word by Longinus, when compared with our present modes of thinking and of speaking, than that the points of coincidence should be so many between his view of the subject, and that which we meet with in the best books of philosophical criticism which have yet appeared. I shall take this opportunity to remark (although the observation has no immediate connection with the foregoing train of thinking), that a talent for the pathetic, and a talent for humour, are generally united in the same person. Wit is more nearly allied to a taste for the sublime. I have found the observation verified, as far as my own knowledge extends, whether of men or of books. Nor do I think it would be difficult to explain the fact, from the acknowledged laws of the human mind. Note (L 1.) p. 436. The eloquent and philosophical passage which I am now to quote, with respect to the final cause of the pleasures connected with the emotion of Sublimity, affords a proof, that the views of Longinus occasionally rose from the professed and principal object of his book to other speculations of a higher and more comprehensive nature. I shall give it to my readers in the words of Dr Akenside. "Those godlike geniuses were well assured, that nature had "not intended man for a low-spirited or ignoble being; but, "bringing us into life and the midst of this vast universe, as be"fore a multitude assembled at some heroic solemnity, that we 66 might be spectators of all her magnificence, and candidates "high for the prize of glory, she has, therefore, implanted in our "souls an unextinguishable love of every thing great and exalted, "of every thing which appears divine beyond our comprehen. ❝sion. Whence it comes to pass, that even the whole world is "not an object sufficient for the depth and capacity of human "imagination, which often sallies forth beyond the limits of all "that surrounds us. Let any man cast his eye through the "whole circle of our existence, and consider how especially it " abounds with excellent and grand objects, he will soon acknow"ledge for what enjoyments and pursuits we were destined. Thus, 66 by the very propensity of Nature, we are led to admire, not "little springs or shallow rivulets, however clear and delicious, "but the Nile, the Rhine, the Danube, and much more than all, "the Ocean."-Longin. Sect. 24. Note (M m.) p. 441. Longinus himself was plainly impressed with the same association, when he remarked: “ 'ύψος δε πε καίριως εξενεχθεν τα τε πραγ 46 ματα δικών σκηπτε παντα διεφορησεν, και την τε έήτορος ευθυς αθρόαν σε ενεδείξατο δυναμιν." The beginning of this sentence is thus translated by Boileau: "Quand le sublime vient à éclater," &c. :-upon which version Dacier observes as follows: "Notre langue n'a que ce mot "éclater pour exprimer le mot eeveev, qui est emprunté de la tempête, et qui donne une idée merveilleuse, à peu près comme ce mot de Virgile, abruptis nubibus ignes. Longin a voulu "donner ici une image de la foudre que l'on voit plutôt tomber 66 que partir."-Oeuv. de Boileau, p. 16. Tom. V. ed. Amst. 66 66 Note (N n.) p. 448. After consulting Bailly's History of Astronomy, I find that my memory has not been so faithful on this occasion as I had imagined, and that I have connected with this particular description, several ideas which occur in other parts of the same work. As it appears to me, however, of more consequence, at present, to illustrate my own idea than to rectify this trifling inadvertency, I have allowed the passage to remain as it was originally written. (See Hist. de l'Astron. Mod. liv. 7.) In the hurry of preparing for the press the notes on this Essay, I neglected to refer, on a former occasion (when speaking of the intimate connection between the ideas of the literal and of the religious Sublime), to the description given by Thomas of the sublime eloquence of Bossuet. It is a description not unworthy of Bossuet himself; but I am prevented by its length from quoting it here. I cannot, however, deny myself the pleasure of transcribing a few unconnected sentences: "Jamais personne n'a parlé de Dieu avec tant de dignité. La "Divinité est dans ses discours comme dans l'univers, remuant "tout, agitant tout.-Dans son éloquence sublime, il se place entre "Dieu et l'homme, il s'adresse à eux tour-a-tour.- -Qui mieux que lui, a parlé de la vie, de la mort, de l'éternité, du tems? Ces "idées par elles-même inspirent à l'imagination une espèce de terreur, qui n'est pas loin du sublime.A travers une foule de "sentimens qui l'entraînent, Bossuet ne fait que prononcer de temps en temps des mots; et ces mots alors font frissonner, comme les 66 "cris interrompus que le voyageur entend quelquefois pendant la "nuit, dans le silence des forêts, et qui l'avertissent d'un danger "qu'il ne connoit pas. Mais ce qui le distingue le plus, c'est l'impétuosité de ses mouvements, c'est son âme qui se mêle à Il semble que du sommet d'un lieu élevé, il decouvre des "grands événemens qui se passent sous ses yeux, et qu'il les ra" conte à des hommes qui sont en bas." "tout. Note (O o.) p. 458. In his argument concerning the Coup d'Oeil Militaire, Folard rests his opinion, not on any general philosophical considerations, but on the results which his good sense suggested to him from the records of military history, and from his own personal observation and experience. The following short quotation will confirm what I have stated in the text, concerning the universality of the prejudice there mentioned, at the period when he wrote; a circumstance which, when contrasted with the glaring absurdity which it now presents to the most superficial inquirers, may be regarded as good evidence of the progress which the theory of the human mind has made during the course of the last century. 66 "C'est le sentiment général que le coup d'œil ne dépend pas "de nous, que c'est un présent de la nature, que les campagnes ne le donnent point, et qu'en un mot il faut l'apporter en naissant, sans quoi les yeux du monde les plus perçans ne voy"ent goute et marchent dans les tenèbres les plus épaisses. On se trompe; nous avons tous le coup d'œil selon la portion d'esprit "et de bon sens qu'il a plu à la providence de nous départir. Il "nait de l'un et de l'autre, mais l'acquis l'affine et le perfectionne, " et l'expérience nous l'assure.”. 66 66 "Philopamen avoit un coup d'œil admirable. On ne doit pas le considérer en lui comme un présent de la nature, mais "comme le fruit de l'étude, de l'application, et de son extreme "passion pour la guerre. Plutarque nous apprend la méthode "dont il se servit pour voir de tout autres yeux que de ceux des "autres pour la conduite des armées," &c. &c. &c. Note (P p.) p. 471. "Ceux qui passeut leur vie dans la societé la plus étendue sont "bien bornés, s'ils ne prennent pas facilement un tact fin et délicat, " et s'ils n'acquièrent pas la connoissance du cœur humain."-Les deux Reputations. Conte moral, par Madame de Sillery. Quinctilian seems to employ the phrase sensus communis in the same acceptation nearly with the French word tact. "Sensum « ipsum, qui communis dicitur, ubi discet, cum se a congressu, qui non hominibus solum, sed multis quoque animalibus naturalis est, segregarit?" 66 On which passage Turnebus remarks; "per sensum communem, "intelligit peritiam quandam et experientiam, quæ ex hominumn "congressu sensim colligitur, appellaturque a Cicerone Communis "Prudentia." D'Alembert occasionally uses tact to denote one of the qualities of Taste ;—that peculiar delicacy of perception, which (like the nice touch of a blind man) arises from habits of close attention to those slighter feelings which escape general notice; a quality which is very commonly confounded (sometimes by D'Alembert himself) with that sensibility to beauty, which is measured by the degree of pleasure communicated to the observer. It appears to me, at the same time, to be probable, that when he thus employed the word, he had an eye chiefly to those questions concerning taste, which (as I before said) fall under the province of the connoisseur. No person, I apprehend, would use tact to express a quick perception of the beauty of a fine prospect-nor does it seem to be often or very correctly applied to a quick and lively perception of the beauties of writing." On peut, ce me semble, d'après ces reflexions, ré"pondre en deux mots à la question souvent agitée, si le sentiment "est préférable à la discussion, pour juger un ouvrage de goût. "L'impression est le juge naturel du premier moment, la discus❝sion l'est du second. Dans les personnes qui joignent à la finesse "et à la promptitude du tact la netteté et la justesse de l'esprit, "le second juge ne fera pour l'ordinaire que confirmer les arrêts "rendus par le premier," &c. &c. Note (Q q.) p. 487. In the article Beau of the French Encyclopédie, mention is made of a treatise on the beautiful, by St Augustine, which is now lost. Some idea, however, we are told, may be formed of its contents from different passages scattered through his other writings.-The idea here ascribed to St Augustine amounts to this, that the distinctive character of beauty is, that exact relation of the parts of a whole to each other, which constitutes its unity. "C'est l'unité "qui constitue, pour ainsi dire, la forme et l'essence du beau en "tout genre. Omnis porro pulchritudinis forma, unitas est.”—The theory certainly is not of very great value; but the attempt is curious, when connected with the history of the author and with that of his age. With respect to this attempt (which may be considered as a generalization of the theory of Utility), it may be remarked farther, that although evidently far too confined to include all the elements of the Beautiful, yet that it includes a larger proportion than many others, of those higher beauties, which form the chief objects of study to a man of refined taste. "Denique sit quod vis, simplex duntaxat et unum." "Still follow sense of every art the soul: |