sation of colour): "Rien n'est peut-être plus extraordinaire dans "les operations de notre ame, que de la voir transporter hors "d'elle-même et étendre, pour ainsi dire, ses sensations sur une "substance à laquelle elles ne peuvent appartenir."

Berkeley has made a dexterous and amusing use of this very curious mental phenomenon, to prove that his scheme of idealism was perfectly consonant to the common apprehensions of mankind.

"Perhaps, upon a strict inquiry, we shall not find, that even "those who from their birth have grown up in a continued habit "of seeing, are irrecoverably prejudiced on the other side, to wit, "in thinking what they see to be at a distance from them. For "at this time it seems agreed on all hands, by those who have "had any thoughts of that matter, that colours, which are the 66 proper and immediate objects of sight, are not without the "mind. But then it will be said, by sight we have also the ideas "of extension, and figure, and motion; all which may well be "thought without, and at some distances from the mind, though "colour should not. In answer to this, I appeal to any man's 66 experience, whether the visible extension of any object doth "not appear as near to him as the colour of that object; nay, "whether they do not both seem to be in the very same place. "Is not the extension we see coloured, and is it possible for us, SO much as in thought, to separate and abstract colour from "extension? Now, where the extension is, there surely is the "figure, and there the motion too. I speak of those which are "perceived by sight."-Essay towards a new Theory of Vision, p. 255.

Note (M.) p. 158.

I intended to have introduced here some doubts and querics with respect to the origin, or rather to the history of the notion of Extension; not with any view to an explanation of a fact which I consider, with the eminent philosophers referred to in the text, as altogether unaccountable; but to direct the atten. tion of my readers to a more accurate examination than has been hitherto attempted, of the occasions on which this notion or idea is at first formed by the mind. Whatever light can be thrown on this very obscure subject may be regarded as a valuable accession to the natural history of the human understanding.

It was long ago remarked by Dr Reid (and, indeed, by other writers of a still earlier date), that to account for the idea of Extension by the motion of the hand, is a paralogism, as this supposes a previous knowledge of the existence of our own bodies.

* In the Dissertation prefixed to the First Volume of the Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica, I have endeavoured to throw some additional light on the difficulty here remarked by D'Alembert. See pp. 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, of the Dissertation, and also Ñote M, at the end of it.

Condillac does not appear to have been sufficiently aware of this; nor even that most acute and profound philosopher, the late Mir Smith. In his Essay on the External Senses (published in his posthumous volume), he all along supposes the mind in possession of the idea for the origin of which he is attempting to account. How do we get the notion of what Mr Smith calls externality, and Berkeley outness? Is not this only a particular modification of the idea of extension?

The same remark may be applied to some late speculations on this subject, by M. Destutt-Tracy. They are evidently the result of great depth and refinement of thought; but, like those of Mr Smith, they will be found, on an accurate examination, to involve what logicians call a petitio principii.

I am strongly inclined, at the same time, to think, that the idea of extension involves the idea of motion; or, to express myself more explicitly, that our first notions of extension are acquired by the effort of moving the hands over the surfaces of bodies, and by the effort of moving our own bodies from place to place. The reference which Smith and Destutt-Tracy, as well as many earlier inquirers, have made to the motion of the hand, in their attempts to clear up this mystery, furnishes a strong presumption, that motion is somehow or other concerned in the business. I differ from them only in this: that whereas they seem to have considered their theory as affording some explanation of the origin of the idea, to me it appears, if well-founded, to exhibit this problem in a form still more manifestly insolvable than that in which it is commonly viewed.

From the following query of Berkeley's, it may be inferred what his opinion was on the point in question: "Whether it be 66 possible, that we should have had an idea or notion of Exten"sion prior to Motion? Or whether, if a man had never per"ceived Motion, he would ever have known or conceived one "thing to be distant from another ?”

To this query I have already said, that I am disposed to reply in the negative; although, in doing so, I would be understood to express myself with the greatest possible diffidence. One observation, however, I may add, without the slightest hesitation, that if the idea of Extension presupposes that of Motion, it must, of necessity, presuppose also that of Time.

The prosecution of this last remark has led me into some speculations, which appear to myself to be interesting; but to which I find it impossible to give a place in this volume.

Note (N.) p. 171.

"Tous les systêmes possibles sur la génération des idées, peu"vent être rappelés, quant à leur principe fondamentale, à cette

simple alternative; ou toutes nos idées ont leur origine dans "les impressions des sens; ou il y a des idées qui n'ont point "leur origine dans ces impressions, et par consequent qui sont "" placées dans l'ame immédiatement, et qui lui appartiennent en " vertu de sa seule nature.

"Ainsi les opinions des philosophes anciens ou modernes sur "la génération des idées, se plaçeront d'elles même sur deux "lignes opposées; celles des philosophes qui ont adopté le prin"cipe, nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu; celles des "philosophes qui ont cru aux idées innées, ou inhérentes à l'in"telligence."-De la Génération des Connoissances Ilumaines, pp. 8 et 9. (A Berlin, 1802.)

Note (0.) p. 176.

I have substituted the words perception and consciousness, instead of the sensation and reflection of Locke, for two reasons: 1. Because sensation does not, in strict philosophical propriety, or, at least, not in a manner quite unequivocal, express the meaning which Locke intended to convey; the knowledge, to wit, which we obtain by means of our senses, of the qualities of mat. ter: 2. Because reflection cannot, according to Locke's own use of the term, be contrasted either with sensation or perception; inasmuch as it denotes an operation of the intellect, directing its attention to the subjects of consciousness; and bearing to that power the same relation in which observation stands to perception.

I must own, at the same time, that I could never assent entirely to the justness of the following criticism on Locke's classification, which occurs in the conclusion of Dr Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind: "The division of our notions into ideas of sen"sation, and ideas of reflection, is contrary to all rules of Logic; "because the second member of the division includes the first. "For, can we form clear and just notions of our sensations any "other way than by reflection? Surely we cannot. Sensation "is an operation of the mind of which we are conscious; and 66 we get the notion of sensation by reflecting upon that which we are conscious of."

66

That this criticism would have been perfectly just, if Locke had used the words sensation and reflection, in the definite and precise acceptations invariably annexed to them in Reid's writings, must undoubtedly be granted. Nay, I am inclined to think, that it applies nearly to Locke's own opinion, when interpreted according to some subsequent applications which he himself has made of it; and which, by resolving every thing into the evidence of consciousness, have an obvious tendency to confound our sensations and our perceptions together. But, in proposing this classification, in the beginning of his Essay, there can be no

doubt, that Locke meant by sensation what Reid calls perception; and, therefore, to those who have not studied, with more than ordinary care, the whole of Locke's system, it is not surprising that Reid should have the appearance of availing himself of a verbal ambiguity to gain an undue and uncandid advantage over his illustrious predecessor. (See Priestley's Remarks on this subject in his Examination of Reid.)

Dr Reid's criticism, too, on Locke's trespass against the rules of logical division, is, I think, too severe; and derives its plausi bility from the ambiguity of the word reflection, which Locke, in this instance, as well as in many others, employs as synonymous with consciousness.* It is for this reason that I have substituted the latter word instead of the former, as expressing Locke's meaning with greater precision and clearness.

When Locke's statement is thus interpreted, it does not seem to merit, in all its extent, the censure which Reid has bestowed on it. The account which it gives, indeed, of the origin of our ideas, is extremely incomplete; but it cannot be said that one member of his division includes the other; the first relating exclusively to the properties of Matter, and the second exclusively to the internal phenomena of Mind."

I grant, upon the other hand, that if, with Locke's statement, we combine all the subsequent reasonings in his essay, Dr Reid's criticism is not so wide of the mark; for I have already endeavoured to shew, that some of his favourite doctrines involve, as a necessary consequence, that consciousness is the sole and exclusive source of all our knowledge. But this is merely an argumentum ad hominem; not a proof, that the division would have been faulty, if detached from the speculations which afterwards occur. Nor would it have been even a correct enunciation of the error on which this argument turns, to say, that the second member of the division included the first;-the first and second members, according to that interpretation, being completely identified.

Note (P.) p. 214.

Mr Locke himself prepared the way for Mr Tooke's researches, by the following observations, of which, however, I do not recollect that any notice is taken in the Diversions of Purley. "It

may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions "and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our

This ambiguity in the term reflection is particularly taken notice of in Dr Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers. “Reflection ought to be distinguish"ed from consciousness, with which it is too often confounded even by Locke. "All men are conscious of the operations of their own minds, at all times, "while they are awake; but there are few who reflect upon them, or make "them objects of thought.”—P. 60. 4to edit.

words have on common sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed "from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sen"sible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and "made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of "our senses, viz. to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, instil, disgust, disturbance, tranquillity, &c. are all "words taken from the operations of sensible things, and ap"plied to certain modes of thinking. Spirit, in its primary "signification, is breath: Angel, a messenger; and I doubt not, "but if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in "all languages, the names which stand for things that fall not un"der our senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas." From the sentence which follows, it also appears, that Locke, as well as his ingenious disciple, was disposed to connect this philological speculation with his own account of the origin of our ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess what kind "of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their "minds, who were the first beginners of languages; and how "nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to "men the originals and principles of all their knowledge."

Condillac, in his Essai sur l'origine des Connoissances Humaines, has given his sanction to this conclusion of Locke. (Seconde Partie, Sect. 1. chap. x.) And another writer, far superior, in my opinion, to Condillac, as a metaphysician, has brought forward the philological fact stated in the foregoing paragraph, as a new argument in favour of the theory which refers to sensation the elements of all our knowledge.

"L'imperfection des langues en ce qu'elles rendent presque "toutes les idées intellectuelles par des expressions figurées, "c'est-a-dire par des expressions destinées, dans leur significa. ❝tion propre, à exprimer les idées des objets sensibles; et re66 marquons en passant, que cet inconvénient, commun à toutes "les langues, suffiroit peut-être pour montrer que c'est en effet ❝à nos sensations que nous devons toutes nos idées, si cette "verité n'etoit pas d'ailleurs appuyée de mille autres preuves in

❝contestables." *

to

Hobbes seems to have been the first, or, at least, one of the first who started the idea of this sort of etymological metaphysics. "If it be a false affirmation," he observes in one passage, 66 "say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle sigui"fies nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise, if it be false to 66 say, that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the words "in-poured (infused) virtue,-in-blown (inspired) virtue, are as "absurd and insignificant as a round quadrangle. And, there"fore, you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant Mélanges, Tome V. p. 26. Amsterdam, 1767.