pears to me to have suffered himself to be misled in the very "foundation of it, merely by philosophers happening to call "ideas the images of external things; as if this was not known "to be a figurative expression, denoting, not that the actual shapes "of things were delineated in the brain, or upon the mind, but "only that impressions of some kind or other were conveyed to "the mind by means of the organs of sense and their corresponding nerves, and that between these impressions and the sensa❝tions existing in the mind, there is a real and necessary, though "at present an unknown connection."

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To those who have perused the metaphysical writings of Berkeley and of Hume, the foregoing passage cannot fail to appear much too ludicrous to deserve a serious answer. Do not all the reasonings which have been deduced from Locke's philosophy against the independent existence of the material world hinge on that very principle which Priestley affects to consider as merely an accidental mode of speaking, never meant to be understood literally? Where did he learn that the philosophers who have "happened to call ideas the images of external things," employed this term as a figurative expression, denoting, not that the actual "shapes of things were delineated in the brain or upon the mind, "but only, that impressions of some kind or other were conveyed "to the mind by means of the organs of sense and their corresponding nerves?" Has not Mr Locke expressly told us, that "the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, "and that their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; "but that the ideas produced in us by secondary qualities have 66 no resemblance of them at all?"* And did not Mr Hume understand this doctrine of Locke in the most strict and literal meaning of the words when he stated, as one of its necessary consequences, "That the mind either is no substance, or that it ❝ is an extended and divisible substance; because the ideas of "extension cannot be in a subject which is indivisible and unex"tended." +

Vol. I. p. 99, 13th edit. of his Essay.

"The most vulgar philosophy informs us, that no external object can "make itself known to the mind immediately, and without the interposition "of an image or perception. That table, which just now appears to me, is "only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. Now, "the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. The perception consists "of parts. These parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance " and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thickness. The termination of these "three dimensions is what we call figure. This figure is moveable, separable, "and divisible. Mobility and separability are the distinguishing properties "of extended objects. And to cut short all disputes, the very idea of exten❝sion is copied from nothing but an impression, and, consequently, must per"fectly agree to it. To say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended."

The free-thinker may now triumph in his turn; and having found there

But why should I refer, on this occasion, to Hume or to Locke, when quotations to the very same purpose are furnished by various writers of a much later date? The following is from a book published in 1782:

"It will not be disputed, but that sensations or ideas proper"ly exist in the soul, because it could not otherwise retain them 66 so as to continue to perceive and think after its separation from "the body. Now, whatever ideas are in themselves, they are 26 evidently produced by external objects, and must therefore correspond to them; and since many of the objects or arche66 types of ideas are divisible, it necessarily follows, that the ideas "themselves are divisible also. The idea of a man, for instance, "could in no sense correspond to a man, which is the archetype "of it, and THEREFORE COULD NOT BE THE IDEA OF A MAN, "if it did not consist of the ideas of his head, arms, trunk, legs, "&c. It therefore consists of parts, and consequently is divi

sible. And how is it possible, that a thing (be the nature of "it what it may) that is divisible, should be contained in a sub66 stance, be the nature of it likewise what it may, that is indivi"sible?

"If the archetypes of ideas have extension, the ideas expressive ❝of them must have extension likewise; and therefore the mind, "in which they exist, whether it be material or immaterial, must ❝ have extension also."

It will surprise and amuse some of my readers, as a specimen of the precipitation and inconsistency of Dr Priestley, when they learn, that the passage just quoted is extracted from his disquisitions of matter and spirit, published eight years after his attack on Dr Reid. No form of words could have conveyed a more unqualified sanction than he has here given to the old hypothesis concerning ideas;-a hypothesis which he had before asserted to have been never considered by any philosopher, but as a figurative mode of expression; and which, when viewed in the light of a theory, he had represented as an absurdity too palpable to deserve a serious refutation.

The ignorance which Priestley, and his associates of the Hartleian school, have discovered of the history of a branch of philosophy which they have presumed to decide upon with so much dogmatism, renders it necessary for me to remark once more, in this place, that the IDEAS of Descartes, and of his successors, were little else (at least so far as perception is concerned) than a new name for the species of the schoolmen ;-the various ambi guities connected with the word idea, having probably contri

are impressions and ideas really extended, may ask his antagonists, how "they can incorporate a simple and indivisible subject with an extended perception."-Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I. pp. 416, 417.

buted not a little to shelter the doctrine, in its more modern dress, against those objections to which it must, at a much earlier period, have appeared to be liable, if the old Peripatetic phraseology had been retained.

The following passage from Hobbes, while it demonstrates the prevalence, at no very distant period, in its most absurd form, of the dogma which Reid has combated, may serve to illustrate, at the same time, the inefficacy of reason and common sense, when opposed to an established prejudice:

"The Philosophy Schools, through all the Universities of "Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of Aristotle, teach, "that for the cause of vision, the thing seen sendeth forth, on "every side, a visible species (in English), a visible shew, appa "rition, or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof into the eye is seeing. And for the cause of hearing, that the "thing heard sendeth forth an audible species, that is, an audible 66 aspect, or audible being seen; which entering at the ear, maketh "hearing. Nay, for the cause of understanding also, they say "the thing understood sendeth forth an intelligible species, that "is, an intelligible being seen; which, coming into the under"standing, makes us understand.”—“ I say not this," continues Hobbes," as disapproving of the use of Universities, but bec use,

as I am to speak hereafter of their office in a commonwealth, "I must let you see, on all occasions, by the way, what things "should be amended in them, amongst which, the frequency of in66 significant speech is one."-Of Man, Part 1. Chap. i.

About 150 years ago, when the dreams of the cloister were beginning to vanish before the dawning light of experimental science, the arguments which the schoolmen were obliged to have recourse to in their own defence, afford a commentary on the real import of their dogmas, which we should search for in vain in the publications of those ages, when they were regarded as oracles of truth, which it was the business of the philosopher not to dispute, but to unriddle. With this view, I shall extract a few remarks from a vindication of the Aristotelian doctrines, in oppo. sition to some discourses of Sir Kenelm Digby, by an author of considerable celebrity among his contemporaries; but who is indebted chiefly for the small portion of fame which he now enjoys to a couplet of Hudibras. The aim of the reasonings which I am to quote is to shew, as the author himself informs us, that objects work not materially, but intentionally, on the sense; and notwithstanding the buffoonery blended with them, they may be regard. ed as an authentic exposition of the scholastic opinion on this memorable question; a question which Alexander Ross appears to have studied as carefully, and as successfully, as any of the writers who have since undertaken the task of resolving it

"The atoms are your sanctuary to which you fly upon all oc

"casions. For you will now have these material parts of bodies "work upon the outward organs of the senses, and, passing "through them, mingle themselves with the spirits, and so to the "brain. These little parts must needs get in at the doors of our "bodies, and mingle themselves with the spirits in the nerves, and, "of necessity, must make some motion in the brain. Doubtless, "if this be true, there must needs be an incredible motion in the "brain; for, if the atoms of two armies fighting should rush in"to your brain by the eye, they will make a greater motion than "Minerva did in Jupiter's brain. You would call for a Vulcan "to cleave your head, and let out those armed men, who would "cause a greater struggling in your head than the twins did in "Rebecca's womb: For I do not think these little myrmidons "would lie so quiet in your brain, as the Grecians did in the "Trojan horse. But, if the material atoms of the object pierce "the organ; as, for example, of a horse; then tell us, how many "atoms must meet to make up a little horse; and how can that "horse, being bridled and saddled, pierce your eye without hurt

ing it, especially if you should see mounted on his back such a "gallant as St George, armed with a long sharp lance; or Bel"lerophon on Pegassus? And if a thousand eyes should look at "one time upon that object, will it not be much lessened, by "losing so many atoms and parts, as enter into so many eyes?— "Or can the object multiply itself by diminution, as the five "loaves did in the gospel?-Or, suppose you should see as many "horses at a time as were in Xerxes his army, would there be " stable-room enough in your brain to contain them all?—Or, if "( you should see a thousand horses, one after another, doth the "coming in of the latter drive out the former ?-Which way do "they come out?-The same way they went in ?-Or some other "way? Or do they stable altogether there?-Or do they die in "the brain?-Will they not perish the brain, and poison your "optic spirits, with which you say they are mingled?-Or, sup66 pose you should see, in a looking-glass, a horse; doth the """atoms of that horse pierce first the glass to get in, and then break "through the glass again to get into your eye? Sure, if this be your new philosophy, you are likely to have but few sectaries "of these deambulatory wise men, whom you call vulgar philo"sophers. Is it not easier, and more consonant to reason, that "the image or representation of the object be received into the sense, which reception we call sensation, that is to say, that the 66 very material parts which you call atoms should pierce the or"gan? for then the same object must be both one and many; " and so, if all the inhabitants of either hemisphere should look "at once on the moon, there must be as many moons as beholders.

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Compare this with Dr Beattie's attempts at pleasantry on the very theory which Alexander Ross considered as indisputable.

"Again, we distinguish that which you confound, to wit, first, "the organ which is called sensorium: secondly, the sensitive "faculty, which resides in the spirits: thirdly, the act of sensa"tion, which is caused by the object: fourthly, the object itself "which causeth sensation, but not the sense or faculty itself: "fifthly, the species which is the image of the object: sixthly, the "medium, which is air, water, &c.: seventhly, the sensitive soul, 66 actuating the organ, and in it judging and perceiving the ob "ject, which diffuses and sends its species, or spiritual and inten"tional qualities, both into the medium and the sensorium; and "this is no more impossible than for the wax to receive the im"pressions or figure of the seal, without any of its matter."*

From this precious relic of scholastic subtility we learn, 1st, that the author conceived the species by means of which perception is obtained to be really images or representations of external objects; 2d, that he conceived these species to be altogether unembodied; 3d, that the chief ground of difference between him and his opponent consisted in this, that while the one supposed the species to be immaterial, the other fancied them to be composed of atoms which enter by the organs of sense, and "make some mo❝tion in the brain." In this respect, Sir Kenelm Digby's hypothesis seems to be merely a revival of the old Epicurean doctrine with respect to the tenuia rerum simulacra; which Lucretius plainly considered as images or resemblances of sensible qualities; perfectly analogous to the species of the Peripatetics in every particular but this, that they were supposed to partake of the matter as well as of the form of their respective archetypes.

In the present state of science, when the phraseology of the schoolmen is universally laid aside; and more especially, since the time that the absurdity of their theory of perception has been so fully exposed by Dr Reid, it is very easy to argue from this absurdity against the probability that the theory was ever matter of general and serious belief. It is easy, for example, to ask what notion it was possible to annex to the words image or representation, when applied to the sensible species, by which we perceive hardness or softness, roughness or smoothness, heat or cold? The question is surely a very pertinent one, and, to all appear. ance, sufficiently obvious; but it does not therefore follow, that it was ever asked, or that it would have produced much impression, if it had been asked, during the scholastic ages. Such is the influence of words upon the most acute understandings, that when the language of a sect has once acquired a systematical coherence and consistency, the imposing plausibility of the dress in which

The Philosophical Touchstone, or Observations upon Sir Keuelm Digby's Discourses of the Nature of Bodies, and of the Rational Soul By Alexander Ross, London, 1645.