alone, that the intellectual character can attain, in every part, its fair and just proportions; and we may rest assured, that wherever these are distorted from their proper shape or dimensions, the dignity of the man is so far lowered, and his happiness impaired. It was with these views, chiefly, that I was led to attempt, in another publication, as comprehensive a survey of the principles of human nature as my own acquirements enabled me, however imperfectly, to execute; and it is with the same views, that, in the execution of this design, I have occasionally stopped short at what appeared to myself the most interesting and commanding stations, in order to open to the companions of my journey, such vistas on either hand, as might afford them a glimpse of the fertility and beauty of the regions through which they are travelling. This consideration will, I hope, suggest an apology for what may to some appear digressions from the principal line of inquiry pursued in that work; as well as for the space which I have allotted, in this volume, to my discussions concerning the Objects and the Principle of Taste.

To those who wish to prosecute the study of the Human Mind, the subject to which these last discussions relate possesses many additional recommendations. While it affords a pleasing avenue to their favourite department of knowledge, it turns the attention to a very numerous class of phenomena, without a knowledge of which it is impossible to form a just idea, either of the intellectual or moral constitution of Man. But, what is of far greater conse

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quence to themselves, considered individually, it furnishes (as will appear more fully in the course of some of my future inquiries) the most effectual of all remedies for those peculiarities of judgment and of feeling, which are the natural consequences of metaphysical pursuits, when indulged in to excess. In cases where the cultivation of Imagination and of Taste has been altogether neglected in early life, I would beg leave to recommend the study of Philosophical Criticism, as the most convenient link for connecting habits of abstract thought with these lighter and more ornamental accomplishments; and, although it would be too much to promise, to a person whose youth has been spent in metaphysical disquisition, that he may yet acquire a complete relish for the intellectual pleasures which he has so long overlooked, he may be confidently assured, that enough is still within his reach to recompense amply the time and pains employed in its pursuit. Even if little should be gained in point of positive enjoyment, his speculative knowledge of the capacities of the Mind cannot fail to be greatly and usefully enlarged. A sense of his limited powers will produce that diffidence in his own judgment, which is one of the most important lessons of philosophy; and, by engaging his attention to his personal defects, may be expected to render his plans of education, for those who are to come after him, more comprehensive and enlightened than that which was followed by his own instructors.

In thus recommending the study of Philosophical Criticism as a preparation for the culture of the arts

to which Imagination and Taste are subservient, I am perfectly aware that I propose an inversion of what may, in one point of view, be regarded as the order of nature: but, in the instances now in question, the mind is supposed to be in a morbid or mutilated state; and the effect to be produced is the developement of powers and capacities which have never yet been unfolded. In such circumstances, we must necessarily avail ourselves of the aid of such habits as happen to be already formed, in order to call forth whatever faculties and principles are still wanting to complete the intellectual system.

In cases, on the other hand, in which the Imagination or the Taste may be suspected to have gained an undue ascendant over the other powers of the understanding, the Philosophy of the Human Mind (supposing the attention to be judiciously and skilfully led to it, and the intellectual capacities not to be altogether unequal to the attempt) must necessarily prove the most profitable and interesting of all studies; and for this purpose, that branch of it which relates to Philosophical Criticism forms a connecting link, of which it is much easier for an instructor to avail himself, than when the curiosity is to be enticed (as was before proposed) in the contrary direction. The plan of study here suggested is copied from the order of Nature herself; the curiosity being led from known and familiar phenomena to an investigation of their general laws.

Nor do I apprehend, that there is any danger of weakening the pleasures of Imagination, by thus philosophizing concerning their sources; notwith

standing what Mr Burke has alleged in support of this conclusion, in the following very curious passage. I call it curious, as it appears to myself to be much more strongly marked with enthusiasm and extravagance, than with good sense and sober reflection. In point of mere expression, it is unquestionably one of the happiest in Mr Burke's writings; and even, in point of thought, I am far from considering it as altogether destitute of truth.

"The pleasures of imagination are much higher "than any which are derived from a rectitude of the 'judgment. The judgment is, for the greater part,

employed in throwing stumbling-blocks in the way "of the imagination, in dissipating the scenes of its "enchantment, and in tying us down to the dis"agreeable yoke of our reason; for almost the on"ly pleasure that men have in judging better than "others, consists in a sort of conscious pride and su

periority, which arises from thinking rightly; but "then, this is an indirect pleasure; a pleasure "which does not immediately result from the object which is under contemplation. In the morn

ing of our days, when the senses are unworn and "tender, when the whole man is awake in every part, and the gloss of novelty fresh upon all the objects that surround us, how lively at that time 66 are our sensations, but how false and inaccurate "the judgments we form of things? I despair of "ever receiving the same degree of pleasure from "the most excellent performances of genius, which "I I felt, at that age, from pieces which my present "judgment regards as trifling and contemptible.

"Every trivial cause of pleasure is apt to affect the "man of too sanguine a complexion; his appetite " is too keen to suffer his taste to be delicate; and "he is in all respects what Ovid says of himself in "love:

"Molle meum levibus cor est violabile telis,

"Et semper causa est, cur ego semper amein."

In this passage, the very eloquent writer states the pleasures of Imagination, and those connected with the exercise of Reason, as much more exclusive of each other than seems consistent with fact. Indeed, I am strongly inclined to think (although I do not mean at present to enter into the argument), that they are both enjoyed in their greatest perfection when properly combined together. The pleasures which Burke has so finely and pathetically touched upon, as peculiar to the imagination in the morning of our days, are the effects, not of the weakness of our reasoning powers, but of novelty, of hope, of gaiety, and of a great variety of other adventitious causes, which then concur to enhance the enjoyment; and with which the intellectual pleasures which come afterwards (so unfortunately, as Burke seems to suppose) to co-operate, are by no means, in the nature of things, incompatible, however rarely they may be combined in early youth. I question much, whether, in the picture he has here drawn, the numberless other enjoyments, which distinguish that happy stage of life, did not contribute powerfully to exalt in his conceptions that particular class of pleasures, on the memory of which he dwells