pidity, his general principle to its most paradoxical and alarming consequences.

"TRUE, as we now write it; or TREW, as it was "formerly written; means simply and merely,"that which is TROWED. And instead of being a "rare commodity upon earth, except only in words, "there is nothing but TRUTH in the world.

"That every man, in his communication with "others, should speak that which he TROWETH, is "of so great importance to mankind, that it ought "not to surprise us, if we find the most extravagant "praises bestowed upon TRUTH. But TRUTH sup

poses mankind; for whom, and by whom, alone "the word is formed, and to whom only it is appli"cable. If no man, no TRUTH. There is, there

fore, no such thing as eternal, immutable, ever“lasting TRUTH; unless mankind, such as they are "at present, be also eternal, immutable, and everlasting.

But what connection, it may be asked, have these quotations with the question about the Origin of Human Knowledge? The answer will appear obvious to those who have looked into the theories

* Mr Tooke observes immediately afterwards, that "the Latin verus also means TROWED, and nothing else." In proof of which he reasons thus: "Res, a thing, gives REOR, i. e. I am "thing-ed; Vereor, I am strongly thing-cd; for ve, in Latin composition, means valde, i. e. valide. And verus, i. e. strongly im"pressed upon the mind, is the contracted participle of vereor."

It was not without some cause that M↑ Tooke's fellow dialogist (whom he distinguishes by the letter F.) ventured to exclaim, on this occasion: I am thinged! Who ever used such language before?"

which have been built on the general principle just referred to;-a principle which it seems to have been the main object of Mr Tooke's book to confirm, by an induction of particulars; * and which,

* I think it proper to quote here a few sentences from Mr Tooke, in confirmation of this remark.

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Perhaps it was for mankind a lucky mistake (for it was a "mistake) which Mr Locke made, when he called his book an "Essay on Human Understanding; for some part of the inesti"mable benefit of that book has, merely on account of its title, "reached to many thousands more than, I fear, it would have "done, had he called it (what it is merely) a grammatical essay, or a treatise on words, or on language.".

necessary

here

-“It may appear presumptuous, but it is "to declare my opinion, that Mr Locke, in his Essay, never did "advance one step beyond the origin of ideas, and the compo"sition of terms."

In reply to this and some other observations of the same sort, Mr Tooke's partner in the dialogue is made to express himself thus:

"Perhaps you may imagine, that if Mr Locke had been aware "that he was only writing concerning language, he might have "avoided treating of the origin of ideas; and to have escaped "the quantity of abuse which has been unjustly poured upon "him for his opinion on that subject."

Mr Tooke answers: "No. I think he would have set out "just as he did, with the origin of ideas; the proper starting"post of a grammarian who is to treat of their signs. Nor is "he singular in referring them all to the senses; and in begin"ning an account of language in that manner."

To this last sentence, the following note is subjoined, which may serve to shew in what sense Mr Tooke understands Locke's doctrine; and that, in expounding it, so far from availing himself of the light struck out by Locke's successors, he has preferred the dark comments of an earlier age.

“Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, is, as well as its แ converse, an ancient and well known position.

if it were admitted as sound, would completely undermine the foundations both of logic and of ethics. In truth, it is from this general principle, combined with a fact universally acknowledged among philosophers (the impossibility of speaking about mind or its phenomena, without employing a metaphorical phraseology), that so many of our late philologists and grammarians, dazzled, as it should seem, with the novelty of these discoveries, have shewn a disposition to conclude (as Diderot and Helvetius formerly did from other premises), that the only real knowledge we possess relates to the objects of our external senses; and that we can annex no idea to the word mind itself, but that of matter in the most subtile and attenuated form which imagination can lend it. Nor are these the only, or the most dangerous consequences, involved in Locke's maxim, when thus understood. I point them out at present, in preference to others, as being more nearly related to the subject of this Essay.

Mr Tooke has given some countenance to these inferences, by the connection in which he introduces the following etymologies from Vossius.

"Animus, Anima, veuμa and Yun are parti"ciples.""-Anima est ab Animus. Animus vero "est a Græco Areμcs, quod dici volunt quasi Aɛuos,

"Sicut in speculo ea quæ videntur non sunt, sed eorum "species: ita quæ intelligimus, ea sunt re ipsâ extra nos, eorumque species in nobis. EST ENIM QUASI RERUM SPE" CULUM INTELLECTUS NOSTER; CUI, NISI PER SENSUM RE"PRESENTENTUR RES, NIHIL SCIT IPSE.”—(J. C. Scaliger, chap. 66.) Diversions of Purley, Vol. I. pp. 42, 43, 46, 47.

"ab Aw sive Aɛui, quod est Пvew; et Latinis a Spi"rando, Spiritus. Immo et Yun est a Yuxa quod "Hesychius exponit Пrew."

I have already, on various occasions, observed, that the question concerning the nature of mind is altogether foreign to the opinion we form concerning the theory of its operations; and that, granting it to be of a material origin, it is not the less evident, that all our knowledge of it is to be obtained by the exercise of the powers of Consciousness and of Reflection. As this distinction, however, has been altogether overlooked by these profound etymologists, I shall take occasion, from the last quotation, to propose, as a problem not unworthy of their attention, an examination of the circumstances which have led men, in all ages, to apply, to the sentient and thinking principle within us, some appellation synonymous with spiritus or veμa; and, in other cases, to liken it to a spark of fire, or some other of the most impalpable and mysterious modifications of matter. Cicero hesitates between these two forms of expression; evidently, however, considering it as a matter of little consequence which should be adopted, as both appeared to him to be equally unconnected with our conclusions concerning the thing they are employed to typify: "Anima sit animus, ignisve nescio: nec me pudet, fateri nescire quod "nęsciam. Illud si ulla alia de re obscurâ affirmare

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possem, sive anima sive ignis sit animus, eum ju66 rarem esse divinum.” This figurative language, with respect to Mind, has been considered by some of our later metaphysicians as a convincing proof,

that the doctrine of its materiality is agreeable to general belief; and that the opposite hypothesis has originated in the blunder of confounding what is very minute with what is immaterial.

To me, I must confess, it appears to lead to a conclusion directly opposite. For, whence this disposition to attenuate and subtilize, to the very verge of existence, the atoms or elements supposed to produce the phenomena of thought and volition, but from the repugnance of the scheme of Materialism to our natural apprehensions; and from a secret anxiety to guard against a literal interpretation of our metaphorical phraseology? Nor has this disposition been confined to the vulgar. Philosophical materialists themselves have only refined farther on the popular conceptions, by entrenching themselves against the objections of their adversaries in the modern discoveries concerning light and electricity, and other inscrutable causes, manifested by their effects alone. In some instances, they have had recourse to the supposition of the possible existence of Matter, under forms incomparably more subtile than what it probably assumes in these, or in any other class of physical phenomena;-a hypothesis which it is impossible to describe better than in the words of La Fontaine :

"Quintessence d'atôme, extrait de la lumière."

It is evident that, in using this language, they have only attempted to elude the objections of their adversaries, by keeping the absurdity of their theory a little more out of the view of superficial inquirers; divesting Matter completely of all those properties