from a cautious and enlightened philosophy, as they can receive detriment from one that is presumptuous and spurious. The discussion will relate to subjects, which, it may be presumed, your readers regard as highly interesting and important. They will be conducted with a constant reference to differences of opinion which exist at the present time, in relation to these subjects.

To ascertain the principles of Christianity, we must have recourse to the scriptures alone. They have been exhibited and defended by innumerable writers, with the greatest clearness and strength of argument; abundantly sufficient to satisfy all who submit their understandings to the authority of inspiration. It may, however, be satisfactory to perceive, that the dictates of Divine revelation are in perfect accordance with the principles of sound and legitimate science; and that, in many instances, they receive the most decisive support from it.

ESSAY I.

Egevra.

Sources of our Judgments, in relation to Subjects of a Moral and Religious Nature.

The Creator has endowed the soul of man, with the capacity of discovering truth on a great variety of subjects; among which, those of a moral and religious nature hold a distinguished place. The same comprehensive capacity of understanding receives different names, according to the occasions upon which it is exercised, or according to the peculiar nature of the subject about which it is employed. What is called the moral faculty, means nothing different from the human understanding, exercised upon subjects of a moral

nature.

Some persons have maintained that antecedently to all acquired.

knowledge, the mind of man is endowed, immediately, by its Creator, with certain ideas, which they have therefore denominated innate; and which they have considered as a part of the original furniture of the human understanding. With regard to this theory, it is sufficient to observe, that it is wholly unsupported by evidence. No proof has ever been furnished of the existence of ideas coeval with the existence of the human mind. Besides, it is completely at variance with unquestionable facts, in relation to the occasions on which our ideas are first suggested.

In regard to many of our simple notions, there can be no difficulty in determining the occasions upon which they are first suggested to the mind. We form a notion of colour by the exercise of sight; of sound by the exercise of hearing. In the same manner, all our simple notions respecting the qualities of material objects, are primarily suggested, by the exercise of our powers of external perception. person destitute of any of the external senses, must ever remain ignorant of those peculiar qualities of matter, which are the appropriate objects of that sense of which he is

destitute.

A

In like manner, we are capable of pointing out the occasion, upon which many of our notions have been formed about intellectual and moral subjects. And if we should be unable to trace all our simple notions to the occasion which first suggested them, it would by no means be a matter of astonishment. It would be unreasonable to expect the case to be otherwise, considering the weakness of memory; the rapidity of our mental operations; and above all, that many of our most important ideas are formed during our early years, before the mind has acquired the power of attending to the subjects of its consciousness.

It is agreeable therefore to all

the facts submitted to our examination, and to the analogy of other parts of our constitution, to believe that all our simple ideas are suggested primarily by the exercise of our external senses; and by the various occasions upon which the human understanding is called into operation.

The celebrated doctrine of Mr. Locke, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection, is equally wide of the truth with the doctrine of innate ideas; unless, indeed, the word reflection be used with a latitude of meaning, which is altogether unwarranted; so as to include consciousness, memory, abstraction, reasoning, and in fact every mode and exercise in which the mind can be employed, except sensation, or external perception.

That the suggestions of our moral faculty, or in other words, that the dictates of the human understanding upon subjects of a moral nature, are essentially different from every other class of intellectual operations, seems incontrovertible by any rational being. To as sert the contrary, would amount to a contradiction in the very terms of the proposition. The suggestions in question constitute a chief characteristick of man; by which he is distinguished and elevated above the different tribes of lower animals.

Moral and religious truth is suggested to the mind in various ways; according to the nature and faculties which our Maker has bestowed upon us; and according to the circumstances in which we are placed.

A variety of moral sentiments are immediately excited, by a view of the conduct of rational beings towards each other, in the different relations of social life. Such is the constitution of our rational nature, that whenever suitable occasions are presented, various moral sentiments and judgments are suggest

ed to our minds. The human understanding is as well adapted to the perception of moral truth, as any other kind of truth. Notwithstanding the natural and culpable blindness of the human mind, in relation to spiritual and divine excellence, we cannot, when the subjects are duly presented to our consideration, avoid perceiving the essential difference between right and wrong, justice and injustice, truth and falsehood.

These are the natural and appropriate objects of the understanding. No laboured reasonings, or refined speculations, are necessary to enable us to perceive that justice, goodness, and truth, are excellent and commendable in their own nature; and that injustice, malevolence, and falsehood, are intrinsically wrong, and deserving of punishment. Accordingly, we find that the most unenlightened nations have a conception of right and wrong in human conduct, and a conviction of the intrinsick excellence and indispensable obligation of certain actions, and of the unlawfulness and turpitude of others.

The constitution of society, and the dispensations of Providence towards men, serve to suggest many of our moral judgments. We perceive that certain duties belong to men, according to the situation in which they are placed, and according to the relation which they sustain to others. It is judged to be the duty of parents to protect and support their children of children to honour and obey their parentsof rulers to be just and beneficent

of subjects to be respectful and obedient. All the relations of life are thus believed to infer certain duties, as being peculiar and appropriate to the persons who sustain them.

The exceptions to these remarks, which some may suppose are furnished by the history of human opinions, are only apparent. They do not prove a contrary judgment,

will lead our minds to a knowledge of the glory of his nature; his wisdom, power and goodness, his incomprehensible greatness, universal supremacy, and his unremitted and irresistible agency.

One important use of genuine science, is to enable us to perceive the immediate operation of Divine power, in all the changes presented to our view in the material universe. It is agreeable to the most enlightened philosophy, that matter, however modified or combined, is essentially inert; and consequently that all its changes are produced by the immediate agency of mind. Mind alone is essentially active, and capable of originating and continuing motion. The laws of nature, or the laws of motion, which some ignorantly mistake for efficient causes, denote either general facts, or different modes of Divine operation.

Philosophical inquirers have generally discovered a disposition to exclude God from the government of the world, both intellectual and material; and to account for the various changes which take place, independently of his universal and immediate interposition. Men will rather speak absurdly, and without any rational meaning, than ascribe the events and changes which we witness, to the Almighty Creator and Governor of the world. They are disposed rather to ascribe them to nature, to the laws of nature, to the natural tendency of things; words which have no distinct and Antelligible meaning; unless they are employed to signify that order of events which God has established, and which he carries into effect by his incessant operation.

This conduct is both irrational and impious. It assimilates the general style of philosophical systems to Epicurean atheism and absurdity. It invests nature, and the laws of nature, with the attributes of Deity, and the government of the world, to the exclusion of the VOL. V. Ch. Adv.

almighty and intelligent Author of all things. It deprives God of the glory due to him for his wonderful works of creation and providence; and tends to lead away our minds from the contemplation of his perfections and universal agency. (To be continued.)

TRAVELS IN EUROPE FOR HEALTH IN

1820. BY AN AMERICAN CLERGY

MAN OF THE SYNOD OF PHILADEL-
PHIA.

(Continued from p. 13.)

London, Aug. 26th, 1820. My dear Friend,―That I may not entirely disappoint your reasonable curiosity, I must try to say something of my short sojourn in this vast metropolis, which I expect to leave in a few days. I have had a busy time since I came here. Anxious to make the most of my brief stay in the place, I have been from morning till night, going from place to place, taking a hasty look at the multiplicity of objects which crowd upon the stranger's attention; and the result is, a perfect. chaos in my mind. By the time I am a few months out of London, it will be to me like a dream, that ever I have been in it. And in truth my very curiosity has become jaded; so that I cease to look with half the interest I did at first, or that a stranger would who had just arrived in full health, and with time on hand to allow him to go leisurely to work, without making "a toil of a pleasure." I mentioned in my last, that the day which brought me here, was one of exquisite enjoyment. The idea of being in Old England, and on the road to London, combining with the fineness of the weather, the beauty and fertility of the country on the whole route, could hardly fail to produce an excitement in the mind, of a very high grade. But our animal system is so constructed, that high excitement kept I

our nature, leads us to refer these operations to a thinking and active being, whose nature and capacity correspond to them. It is evident, therefore, that our notions, of the powers and qualities of mind, are first formed by reflecting upon the various mental operations of which we are conscious.

From the external actions of our fellow creatures, which indicate activity, intelligence, and sensibility, we infer that they are active, intelligent, and sentient beings like ourselves.

From the various effects and changes, which we observe every where around us, we infer the existence of a Being, whose attributes correspond to them; a Being of infinite power, wisdom and goodness, who is the almighty and intelligent Author of all things.

Although we are unable to form a distinct conception of an attribute of mind, entirely dissimilar to any thing of which we are conscious, yet we find no difficulty in conceiving of powers, very different in degree from our own. When we witness effects far above what we are able to produce, we naturally ascribe a corresponding superiority of power to the agent, by whom they are produced. Hence we are led to ascribe to our Creator, all the excellences that belong to our constitution, in an infinite degree. The magnitude, grandeur, and variety of his works the wisdom, the beneficence and the righteousness of his dispensations-manifest the infinite perfection of his nature, our absolute dependence upon him, and consequently, our obligation to serve and glorify him, with all the powers which we possess.

The process of the mind which I have described, although natural, and to a certain extent unavoidable, requires the direction of a cautious and sound judgment. We are in danger of great error, if we suppose that others are, in every respect, like ourselves. In regard

to the essential powers and principles of rational natures, we have no other way of judging; and if our conceptions are defective, or erroneous, we have no means of correcting them. When our conceptions relate to the attributes and operations of the Divine Being, they must, in many respects, be very inadequate and defective; this must be the case even when the fundamental laws of our rational constitution furnish the principle upon which they are founded: but when they are suggested by the necessary imperfections of our limited nature; and still more by the vicious irregularities of our corrupt minds; they must be not only inadequate, but false and criminal.

The natural tendency of our minds is to invest with qualities resembling our own, not only our fellow men, but also those invisible and superior beings, whom religion or superstition brings to our knowledge. Idolatrous nations ascribe to their imaginary deities, not only the original and essential attributes of our rational constitution, but also many of the weaknesses and vices, which belong to man as an imperfect and depraved being. Corrupt men, whatever their opportunities of acquiring information may be, are extremely liable to form corrupt notions of God. Hence the severe reproof contained in the language of the Psalmist: "But unto the wicked God saiththou thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as thyself: but I will reprove thee, and set them in order before thine eyes."

From the same cause we are liable to judge erroneously of our fellow men. The innocent and virtuous are slow in believing ill of their neighbour. The rogue and the profligate, judging by themselves, will scarcely give to any man, the credit of integrity and disinterestedness.

An attentive consideration of the works and dispensations of God,