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val of religion-so much the more, of necessity, will they excite the opposition of all wrong hearts." the matter of preaching is right, and the sinner is pleased, there is something defective in the manner.” Page 13. "The more right and holy feeling there is, the more wrong and unholy feeling there will be, of course." Page 16. "If we walk with the lukewarm and ungodly, or they with us, it is because we are agreed; for two cannot walk together except they be agreed." Page 9. "We see why ministers are sometimes unsettled by revivals." He supposes the minister may awake, while the church will not, or that the church may awake while the minister will not. Page 10. "In either of these cases, they may find themselves unable to walk together, because they are not agreed. In the former case, let the minister obey the command of Christ, and shake off the dust of his feet for a testimony against them." In the latter, let the church shake off their sleepy minister; they are better without him than with him." These extracts I think clearly show, that the object of the discourse is, as before stated, to prove that the new measures are nearest

right, because they are most opposed; and that those ministers and Christians who oppose them, thereby give evidence that they are agreed in heart with the impenitent world, and should be treated accordingly.

The whole argument is highly sophistical, and the main conclusions of the discourse entirely unwarranted. Yet, the prejudices of many readers are no doubt so strongly enlisted in favour of the author's system, that they will think it a finished piece of sound reasoning, and the conclusions supported by irrefragable arguments. A few words might suffice to expose its sophistry to those whose minds are unbiassed; but a more extended examination is doubtless expedient, for the sake of such as are predisVOL, V.-Ch. Adv.

posed to embrace any thing the author may advance.

And perhaps it may tend to convince some that the reasoning is unsound, even though they should not be able to discover wherein, to let them see a few other conclusions which the same kind of reasoning would equally support.-Take the following:

Some impenitent sinners are greatly displeased with the new measures for promoting revivals; some professed Christians and ministers are greatly displeased with them also; therefore, it is concluded, they are walking together because they are agreed and are both equally wrong. This is the author's argument: But it will prove the contrary, just as well. For,

Some impenitent sinners are much taken, with the new measures, and are very anxious to have them introduced; some professed Christians are also much taken with them, and are as anxious to have them introduced; therefore, they are walking together because they are agreed, and are both equally wrong.

Again: Some professed Christians are pleased to hear a man preach, who treats his subject in a clear argumentative manner, though he is not very forcible in his delivery; some impenitent sinners are also pleased to hear him; therefore, it is concluded, they are walking together because they are agreed, and are both equally wrong. But,

Some professed Christians are displeased when they hear such a preacher, and complain of him as "a dull man;" some impenitent sinners are also displeased, and make the same complaint;-therefore they are walking together because they are agreed, and are both equally wrong.

Again: Some professed Christians wish to have the doctrines of the

gospel fully and clearly preached, and are best pleased with such

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preaching; some impenitent sinners also wish the doctrines preached, and are best pleased with such preaching; therefore, it is concluded, they are walking together because they are agreed, and are both equally wrong. But,

Some professed Christians are very unwilling to have the doctrines of the Bible dwelt upon, and are always displeased with such preaching; some impenitent sinners are also unwilling to have those doctrines dwelt upon, and are always displeased with such preaching; therefore, they are walking together because they are agreed, and are both equally wrong.

These examples may suffice to show how the method of argumentation adopted in the sermon will support opposite conclusions equally well. A few other examples will show how the same method of reasoning will support some conclusions which would be as offensive to the friends of the new measures, as some of these which are drawn in the sermon are to others. Take the following:

Impenitent sinners always pray for their own salvation without submission; it is an essential ingredient in the prayers of some at this day, that they be made without submission: therefore they walk together because they are agreed.

Some individuals now venture to predict certain future events, in consequence of impressions which they suppose have been made on their minds by the Holy Spirit; Stork, Munzer and their associates, in the days of Luther, did the same; therefore they walk together be cause they are agreed.

Stork, Munzer, and their associates, denounced Luther and Calvin, as carnal, unconverted men, and strangers to the influences of the Spirit, because they opposed their wild and extravagant notions and practices; some, in these days, do the same, in respect to those ministers who are most like Luther and

Calvin, in their sentiments and practice; therefore, they walk together because they are agreed.

Some fanatical sects have been in the habit of encouraging outward bodily expressions of feeling, and attaching great importance to them, such as groaning aloud in time of prayer, falling down, rolling about, and the like, and speaking of them as evidences of the special and powerful influences of the Spirit; some in these days do the same; therefore, they walk together because they are agreed.

Some fanatical and disorderly persons in former times, have thought it highly meritorious, to crowd themselves into the parishes of settled ministers, and introduce such measures as were adapted to promote discord and strife; some in these days think the same; therefore, they walk together because they are agreed.

The Pharisees prayed long and loud, so as to attract the notice of men in the street; some in these days, do the same; therefore they walk together because they are agreed.

The Pharisees compassed sea and land to make proselytes to their peculiarities; some in these days, do the same; therefore, they walk together because they are agreed.

A person under the influence of an evil spirit followed Paul and his company, with the cry, "these men are the servants of the most high God;" some follow certain preachers now with the same cry; therefore, they are under the influence of the same evil spirit, and walk together because they are agreed.

Such deductions as these are made, after the method of reasoning pursued in the sermon; and they might be multiplied to an indefinite extent. If these examples should serve to convince any that the method of reasoning is unsound, and will equally support truth and falsehood, and equally prove both sides of a contradiction, my purpose

will be answered. I am not weak enough to suppose that such argumentation will fasten any of these conclusions upon the friends of the new measures, my object is to show them the fallacy of the reasoning by which the conclusions of the sermon are attempted to be fastened upon others.

But the foundation of the author's argument must be examined. It is assumed that the reasons why ministers and Christians oppose the new measures, are the same as the reasons why the impenitent oppose them. He says, "their objections are the same, they find fault with the same things, and use the same argument in support of their objections." "It is the fire, and the spirit, that disturbs their frosty hearts. For the time being, they walk together, for, in feeling, they are agreed."-So important a part of the argument as this, and one on which the conclusions so essentially depend, should not have been taken for granted, nor have been left to depend upon the naked assertion of any man. It should have been proved, beyond the possibility of doubt, that the objections of Christians, and the objections of the impenitent, are precisely the same, and are not only supported by the same arguments ostensibly, but must and do arise from the same state of heart. Ministers and Christians should not have been thus classed with the openly irreligious, while there is any room to suppose they may have different reasons for their opposition; or while the impenitent may have any good reasons for theirs.

It should not be thought that the single fact, if it were a fact, of their being opposed to the same things, is sufficient proof. Men are often opposed to the same things, for different reasons. A man may be a candidate for the office of chief magistrate of our nation, and have great numbers of individuals opposed to him, for reasons widely

different from each other. One may think he has injured him, and be opposed from personal resentment. Another may think he has personal advantages to expect from the elevation of his competitor. Another may think his competitor will pursue measures more for the interest of the particular section of the nation in which he resides. Another may think the candidate is incompetent in point of talent and experience. Another may be displeased with some vicious habits he believes him to indulge. And a Christian may be opposed because he thinks him a man void of religious principles, and not having the fear of God before his eyes. Many other reasons might be mentioned, by which those numerous individuals are influenced to unite in their opposition to the same candidate. The fact, then, that they agree in opposing the same candidate, is no proof of any likeness of character between them, unless they are opposed for the same

reasons.

Are the impenitent, then, and many ministers and Christians, opposed to the new measures for promoting revivals, for the same reasons? This is asserted; and they have been abundantly classed together, by the friends of the new measures, on this very ground. It should not be concluded that the fact, if it were a fact, of their using "the same arguments in support of their objections," is a sufficient proof that the reasons why they are opposed are the same; nor, if some of them are the same, that they are all the same. They may have more reasons, in their own minds, than they think it necessary to give, on every occasion. For instance, an impenitent sinner may feel opposed in heart to the doctrine of total depravity.-That doctrine may be exhibited to him in a manner that is peculiarly and unnecessarily offensive. He is displeased at the doctrine itself, and

he is displeased also at the offensive manner in which it was presented. He may not choose to complain of the doctrine itself, but only of the manner. A Christian who heard it, though he cordially receives the doctrine, might think the manner highly improper, and make the same complaint. Does the fact, in this case, of their making the same objection, prove a likeness of character between them? Such a conclusion would certainly be unfounded. It ought first to be proved that the manner was right, or that the Christian was as really offended with the doctrine itself, as the sinner was, before such a conclusion can be drawn. Suppose a sinner is conversed with, who assents to the truth of all the doctrines of the gospel, but acknowledges himself an impenitent sinner; and he "is told, he is as orthodox as the devil," but "his character is as black as hell," and "if he does not repent to-day he will be in hell to-morrow;" he will probably be displeased, and make objections to this treatment. And what objections will he state?He will probably object, that such language is harsh, unkind, not expressive of benevolent feeling, and savouring of profaneness; and that, in the prediction, the man is telling more than he knows. And if a Christian, who should hear it, should make the same objections, would it prove him to be of the same character as the impenitent sinner? If I should tell a child, "not to follow his ungodly parents, who were leading him to hell; not to listen to their instructions, which will destroy his soul; that his parents are so wicked, he had better leave them, and live with me, and I will take him with me to heaven;" the parents would probably be displeased, and make objections to such treatment. And what objections would they state? They would probably object, that it would be more proper to tell parents their own faults, than to tell

them to their children; that such treatment is adapted to alienate the affections of children from their parents, break up families, and teach children to disregard the fifth commandment, which requires children to love and honour their parents. And if a Christian who should hear all this, should make the same objections, would it prove him to be of the same character as the impenitent sinner? If an impenitent sinner should be prayed for by name, at a publick meeting, and the occasion should be embraced to hold him up to publick notice, as an uncommonly odious and abandoned character, and to tell God and the world all the bad things that have been known or thought about him, it would probably give offence to him and his friends. And what objections would they state? They would probably say, that such treatment was abusive and defamatory, and not adapted to do the individual any good. And if a Christian, should happen to feel, and express the same opinion of it, would that be a conclusive proof that he is of the same character with the impenitent? If a minister of the gospel should happen to be such an one as Paul requires all to be, having "a good report of them which are without," and one that, by a long life of uniform piety, had commanded the respect and confidence, even of the unconverted part of his congregation; and he should be publickly prayed for, by some stranger, as "an

an old grey headed apostate, who was leading souls to hell," or as "the head Achan in the camp of the Lord;" it is probable some of the unconverted would be offended at it, as well as some of the church; and that both would complain that their aged pastor should be treated with such indignity; and if it should happen, that "their objections should be the same," and that they should use the same

arguments in support of them," would it certainly prove that they were all alike in their moral character? If a preacher should, in a publick assembly, in the presence of ministers and others, exhort the females to lead in prayer, and represent them as grieving the Spirit by refusing; and not prevailing by arguments should drop on his knees and tell the Lord how proud they were because they would not comply, and then repeat his exhortations; and if the fear of resisting the Spirit, or of being thought proud, should prevail with some to comply; the whole transaction would probably be objected to, by their impenitent friends.-And what would they say? They would be likely to quote the apostolick prohibition, "Let your "Let your women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted unto them to speak." And if it should so happen that some Christians too should think the practice was forbidden, and should quote the same direction of the apostle, would it certainly prove that they were of the same moral character with those impenitent friends?

It is evident then, that if ministers and Christians did "find fault with the same things, and use the same arguments in support of their objections" that the impenitent do, it would not be sufficient to prove a likeness of character between them, unless it were first proved that the things objected to are right, and that all the reasons why both classes objected were the same. Let it first be shown that the measures objected to are right, and that there can be none but sinful objections made against them; and then let it be shown that the objections which ministers and Christians make are the same in all respects, not only as those which the impenitent avow, but as those which they inwardly feel; and something will be done towards laying a foundation for the conclusion that

there is some likeness of character between them.

But I am disposed to question the fact, that the objections which ministers and Christians make to the new measures, are, in general, the same as those which the impenitent make. To many of them, I have no doubt, they are, in part, the same. For wherever the impenitent discover any thing in professors of religion which is really wrong, they can, if they please, bring solid objections against it, and support them by sound arguments, both from reason and scripture. Some of the unconverted are men of good sense, and have sufficient acquaintance with the scriptures to form a pretty accurate judgment, whether the conduct of Christians is consistent with their profession or not. And some of them are men of good breeding, are disgusted with whatever violates the common rules of propriety, wherever they see it. If, therefore, in some things, their judgment should accord with that of ministers and Christians, it is no sufficient reason why reproaches should be cast upon either.

A brief statement of the most common objections which I have heard made, by both classes, against the new measures, will show how far they agree. Those out of the church have complained of harsh and uncivil treatment in conversation, being called by hard names, and provoking epithets, and addressed with coarseness and vulgarity, and in a manner which they deemed insolent, overbearing, and insulting. They have complained of being spoken of to others, in terms which they consider defamatory and abusive. They have complained that their children were unreasonably frightened, by being threatened with immediate and inevitable damnation, and told that there was no help for them.They have complained that their children should be told such things