est folly; as their inevitable tendency is to produce misery both to ourselves and to others. In consequence of observing these established connexions, virtue and holiness, besides being viewed according to their own peculiar nature and excellence, are regarded as in the highest degree useful; and this bestows upon them, in our apprehensions, an additional beauty and excellence. In the same manner, wickedness is regarded not only in its proper character as intrinsically evil, but also as being in the highest degree hurtful and injurious; and this confers upon it an additional impropriety and deformity.

The beauty or deformity, reflected upon different actions from their consequences, is most likely to engage the attention of those writers, who, in the retirement of their study, indulge themselves in abstract speculations respecting the ends and the perfection of the social order; and respecting the causes which are favourable or unfavourable to them. In the view of such persons, it may be expect ed, the excellence or the evil of different actions will consist chiefly, if not entirely, in their tendency to promote or injure the movements of the general system. To obtain a correct decision of this question, it will be proper to form a conception as distinct as possible of particular examples of moral conduct, and to attend with accuracy to the judgment of the mind in relation to them; and especially, to examine the sentiments, which naturally and spontaneously arise in our minds, upon witnessing real instances of moral excellence or depravity. What decision does the mind give in such instances? In what manner does it proceed? Is it engaged in tracing out consequences, or in comparing and balancing them? There can be no doubt that the essential duties of piety and morality are immediately approved as right

and excellent in their own nature; and that the violation of them is as immediately disapproved and condemned. We decide, promptly and confidently, that an act of obedience to the will of God is intrinsically right; and that an act of idolatrous worship or of blasphemy is intrinsically wrong; without any of the hesitation or uncertainty which a calculation of future contingencies might produce. We judge in the same manner respecting particular acts of justice or injustice, of truth or falsehood, of fidelity or treachery. Separate from any view of their consequences, they excite a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation corresponding to their peculiar and appropriate character.

It is a remark which deserves to be kept in mind, that we often ascribe to the wisdom of man what, in reality, belongs to the wisdom of God. As soon as a beneficial effect is observed to result, however remotely, from some active principle of our nature, there are not wanting persons, who profess to believe, that it was with a view to this remote effect, that our operations were originally directed. Nothing can be more illogical than this conclusion; nothing more inconsistent with fact. Some of the most astonishing works of human labour, some of the most venerable and beneficent institutions of society, had their beginning in a remote and perhaps a barbarous age, and have been brought to their present state of perfection by the united or successive operations of vast numbers, who cannot be supposed to have had a distinct conception of the final result, or to have directed their different operations with a view to it. That their exertions conspired so harmoniously for the accomplishment of the ultimate effect, must be attributed, not to the contrivance or foresight of men, but to the wisdom of God; who ordained their principles of action,

and who directed and overruled their operations for the attainment of the grand results, which He, not they, had in view.*

We may observe something analogous to this in the works of inferior creatures. A hive of bees, by following the active impulses of their nature, construct a habitation and storehouse, the different parts of which are formed and adjusted with the nicest accuracy,-according to the exactest mathematical rules; and the whole admirably fitted for convenience and utility. Yet the bees know nothing of mathematicks; nor can it be supposed that they have a distinct conception, during the different steps of their progress, of the final result of their united labours. Their numerous and diversified operations are immediately prompted, we have reason to believe, not by a regard to future convenience, or general expediency, but by a few simple principles which terminate upon objects directly before them. The various impulses, from which they act, refer not to the ultimate effect, but to the different intermediate steps which lead to it. And the admirable adjustment of the intermediate steps to the final result, the harmonious tendency of their different operations to produce a work of so much individual and general advantage, is to be imputed rather to the wisdom of God, than to the sagacity or foresight of the bees.

The operations of men, and the remote effects to which they some

"When, by natural principles," says Dr. Adam Smith, "we are led to advance those ends which a refined and enlight

ened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wis. dom of man, which, in reality, is the wisdom of God. Upon a superficial view, this cause scems sufficient to produce the

effects which are ascribed to it; and the

system of human nature seems to be more simple and agreeable, when all its different operations are, in this manner, deduced from a single principle."

times lead, are, in many respects, similar to the labours and works of these interesting insects. By acting from those moral principles and rules, which God has given to us for the immediate direction and regulation of our conduct, we find, in the event, that we take the most effectual way to promote our own highest welfare, as well as that of all who are connected with us. We are not, however, to conclude from this, that our conception of the fundamental principles of right and wrong is primarily suggested by a view of these remote and general consequences; nor that, in the performance of every part of our duty, we must have an immediate regard to them. They are in fact not the effects of human contrivance, but of the appointment of God; who gave to man the active principles of his nature, and the laws which he is bound to obey; and who ordained those connexions, which, upon an accurate and enlarged survey, we observe to exist between different actions and their consequences. "Among the qualities connected with the different virtues," says Mr. Stewart, "there is none more striking than their beneficial influence upon social happiness; and accordingly, moralists of all descriptions, when employed in enforcing particular duties, such as justice, veracity, temperance, and the various charities of private life, never fail to enlarge on the numerous blessings which follow in their train. The same observation may be applied to self interest; inasmuch, as the most effectual way of promoting is universally acknowledged to be by a strict and habitual regard to the obligations of morality.-In Consequence of this unity of design, which is not less conspicuous in the moral than in the natural world, it is easy for a philosopher all our duties from one principle: to give a plausible explanation of because the general tendency of all of them is to determine us to the

it

same course of life. It does not, however, follow from this, that it is from such a comprehensive survey of the consequences of human conduct, that our ideas of right and wrong are derived; or that we are entitled, in particular cases, to form rules of action to ourselves, drawn from speculative conclusions concerning the final causes of our moral constitution.*

The views and the actions of men, are, in general, confined within very narrow limits. Most persons are incapable of taking a comprehensive survey of the connexion of events, and of the remote consequences of human conduct. And even those of the soundest and most comprehensive understandings, often find themselves disappointed in their most confident anticipations. The adoption of the principle of expediency in practice, as the sole rule of right and wrong, would be, in effect, to unhinge the human understanding, to annihilate all moral distinctions, to destroy all uniformity of conduct, and to leave every person to act according as conjecture, prejudice, or passion, might dictate what is best upon the whole. The Author of our nature has not abandoned us to a guide so incompetent and vacillating. In accommodation to the weakness of our capacity, and the circumstances of our condition, he has instructed us, by the original principles of our moral constitution, and still more perfectly by his word, respecting the duties which we are bound to perform. He has given plain and particular information of what he requires us to do; the grand results of his providence he has reserved to himself.

The conduct of Divine Wisdom, in this respect, may be illustrated

Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. ii. chap. vi. sect. vi. In the section referred to, the reader will find many acute and admirable remarks, which cannot fail of giving satisfaction to all, who take an interest in the subject of this

essay.

by that of an architect who intends to erect a magnificent and complicated structure, and who employs for this purpose a number of workmen in the preparation of materials, and in the construction of the several parts. He does not communicate to them the whole plan of the building; perhaps they are incapable of comprehending it; but he describes in the plainest manner the particular work which each person is required to perform.— Every individual has his distinct and precise department of labour assigned to him. During the progress of their labours the workmen would be able, by a comparison of the materials and the different parts of the work, to form a conception of the general plan of the building, approaching with greater or less nearness to the truth. The plan of the architect would be gradually developed, as the building advanced towards its completion. And when completed, it would be apparent to all that their different operations conspired, in the exactest manner, to the accomplishment and perfection of the whole. It was not, however, by a knowledge of the ultimate effect that their operations were directed, but by the particular orders which they received from their employer; and they could infer the final result only by an examination and comparison of the effects which proceeded from an exact obedience to his orders. It is likewise manifest, that the adaptation of means to the ultimate end, and the accurate adjustment of the several parts to the perfection of the whole, is to be ascribed, not to the wisdom of the workmen, but to that of the architect.

For the accomplishment of the designs of Infinite Wisdom, every man has his distinct and appropriate sphere of action assigned to him. Our Maker has marked out the line of conduct which he requires us to pursue. By an attentive and general survey of the con

sequences of human actions we are led to perceive, that a uniform regard in all our conduct to the duties of virtue and religion, contributes in the best manner possible to the welfare and general interests of society. But will any person assert, that it is from such an enlarged survey that our conceptions of right and wrong are originally derived? Must we form a notion of general expediency, of what is advantageous or injurious upon the whole, before we can have any conception of moral duty? Does a discovery of the general utility of speaking truth, for instance, primarily suggest the conviction of its obligation? Is it not self-evident, that our knowledge of the tendency of virtue to promote the highest welfare of mankind, pre-supposes the existence and practice of virtue to a certain extent? Were this not the case, in what way could this fact be discovered? Virtue and vice, therefore, must have existed, and their consequences must have been observed, before men could possibly know that the former is uniformly beneficial, the latter uniformly hurtful upon the whole. These considerations, if I am not deceived, prove in the most satisfactory manner, that the obligation of the rules of duty cannot be resolved into their general utility.

If any of the workmen, in the case we have supposed, neglecting the instructions which they had received, should regulate their operations according to their own conceptions of what would be best in relation to the ultimate effect, in all probability their conceptions would be very erroneous: and although the wisdom of their employer might render their irregular exertions subservient to his ultimate designs, they would still be guilty of disobedience to his orders, and therefore they would be entitled to no approbation or reward from him. Those persons, who,

disregarding the universal moral judgments of mankind, as well as the authoritative injunctions of Divine revelation, profess to deduce their rules of conduct from calculations of general expediency, have given the most convincing evidence of the folly and danger of preferring their own wisdom to the wisdom of God. They have furnished the most decisive proof of the dangerous consequences of this system when reduced to practice, even by men of the most acute and powerful understandings. "Of this theory of utility," says Mr. Stewart, "so strongly recommended to some by the powerful genius of Hume, and to others by the well merited popularity of Paley, the most satisfactory of all refutations is to be found in the work of Mr. Godwin. It is unnecessary to inquire how far the practical lessons he has inculcated are logically inferred from his fundamental principle; for although I apprehend much might be objected to these even on his own hypothesis, yet if such be the conclusions to which, in the judgment of so acute a reasoner, it appeared to lead with demonstrative evidence, nothing farther is requisite to illustrate the practical tendency of a system, which, absolving men from the obligations imposed on them, with so commanding an authority, by the moral constitution of human nature, abandons every individual to the guidance of his own narrow views concerning the complicated interests of political society." The licentious maxims of Mr. Hume, and the loose and very exceptionable morality of Dr. Paley, professedly deduced from the same fundamental principle of general expediency, may also be adduced to evince the pernicious tendency of this system; and to show the absolute necessity of a foundation far less precarious, for the great interests of religion and virtue. That some of its patrons have not proceeded to a length,

equally extravagant and dangerous, must be attributed to the restraints imposed on their calculations and deductions by the paramount authority of scripture; by the common judgments of mankind; and even by the moral judgments of their own minds. The great rules of life are so clear and commanding, that no sceptical system, no theoretical speculations, can completely disguise their nature, or cast off their authority. And although they profess to derive many of these rules from considerations of general utility, and to believe that this is the sole ground of their obligation, we have reason to think that they were originally suggested even to them by the moral constitution of man, or by information derived from Divine revelation; and therefore, that they ought to be regarded as the laws of God, to which, by his authority, all are bound to yield an implicit and unreserved obedience.

It is also of great importance to remark, that what is done solely from a regard to expediency cannot, whether our judgment of its expediency be correct or not, be considered as an act of obedience to God. He has indeed commanded us to do good to all men as far as we have opportunity; and when we are employed in promoting the welfare of our brethren, according to his will, and from a regard to his authority, we are certainly performing our duty, and are accepted of him. But if a regard to general utility be the sole motive from which our beneficent actions proceed, we are destitute of the principle of obedience,-the peculiar and essential characteristick of holiness; and, consequently, we deceive ourselves, if we expect either approbation or reward from Him whom we have not served and glorified. The conclusion then is manifest and incontrovertible. A regard to general expediency cannot VOL. V.Ch. Adv.

be either the rule, or the principle of virtuous and holy action. Not the rule; for the reasons already assigned and illustrated,-that the human understanding is too limited to determine whether a particular action or course of conduct would be best upon the whole or not; and especially, that prior to our experience and observation of the consequences of different actions, nothing could have been determined respecting them. Neither can it be the principle; this would amount to a complete annihilation of the authority of God over the determinations and actions of his creatures. Divine revelation, although it may serve to point out with infallible accuracy the way to obtain the object we have in view, will, according to this hypothesis, have no more authority or commanding power than that which belongs to a map, by which the traveller is enabled to ascertain the nearest and the best road to the place of his destination. If it be true, as Dr. Paley asserts, that it is the utility of moral rules alone which constitutes their obligation, it seems a very great impropriety and absurdity to call them the laws and commands of God; since these terms are universally and necessarily understood to mean, that the rules to which they are applied derive their obligation from the authority of him whose laws and commands they are. For those, therefore, who acknowledge that God has given a revelation of his will, that he has issued laws and commands for the regulation of our conduct, for them to attempt to assign any extrinsical reason or ground of their obligation, appears, to say the least, a very superfluous undertaking; but to assert that utility, or any other consideration distinct from the Divine authority, constitutes the sole ground of their obligation, amounts to nothing short of a direct contradiction. 3Z