Imágenes de página
PDF
ePub
[blocks in formation]

The second thing, in which the writers we have mentioned are agreed is, that the readiest way to get rid of these thoughts, after ask ing deliverance from God in prayer, is to pay as little attention to them as possible. "To attempt to think them down is madness" is the decision of Johnson. Luther, as quoted in Middleton's Biographia Evangelica, says" Though it be the most difficult point to work upon the mind, yet it is the most present remedy, if they can, through grace, persuade themselves, that these grievous thoughts are not their own, but Satan's; and that therefore they should earnestly endeavour to turn the heart to other objects and quit these evil suggestions: For to dwell upon them, or fight with them, or aim to overcome them, or to wait for an end of them, is only to irri

tate and strengthen them, even to perdition, without relief."

For ourselves, we pretend not to decide, how much of these evil thoughts and alarming emotions, is to be attributed to the great adversary of souls; and how much may, without his agency, arise from the mysterious connexion between matter and mind, which exists in the present state. One thing however we are clear in, and that is, that while these thoughts and feelings are hated and rejected, let the cause of them be what it may, they are a sore trial, but not the sin of the party concerned. We think that our correspondent gives the most unequivocal evidence, that she is so far from approving, even for a moment, of the sensations of which she complains, that she detests them utterly, most earnestly desires to avoid them, and would use any lawful means to be freed from them entirely. Our advice therefore to her is, not to suffer the occurrence of these transient and distressing mental affections, to mar, more than she can help, her joy in God, nor to form a reason why she should question her gracious state, more than if they had not occurred

The less she thinks of them, and the more she disregards them when they assail her, the sooner they are likely to leave her altogether; and if they never leave her till death, we think she has good reason to hope that she will then be quit of them for ever.

Miscellaneous.

PHILOSOPHY SUBSERVIENT TO RELI- theory of optimism from the sup

[blocks in formation]

posed necessity of the Divine determinations to that which is best. find much more difficult than I had The performance of this promise I any reason to anticipate. This arises not from the clearness and validity of the argument, but from

the vague and indefinite language in which it is expressed, the impossibility of distinctly comprehending the ideas it involves when referred to the Divine Being; and still more from the fact that the argument is a mere assumption of the theory in question. The argument I think is fairly stated in the following propositions-God infinitely wise and good must necessarily choose that system which in the nature of things, and all things considered, is best; he has actually chosen the present system of the universe; therefore of all possible systems the present must be the best. "We have no other way properly and truly to demonstrate," says President Edwards, "the moral perfections of God, but the way that Mr. Chubb proves them, viz. That God must necessarily perfectly know what is most worthy and valuable in itself, which in the nature of things is best and fittest to be done. And as this is most eligible in itself, he being omniscient, must see it to be so; and being both omniscient and self-sufficient, cannot have any temptation to reject it; and so must necessarily will that which is best. And thus, by this necessity of the determination of God's will to what is good and best, we demonstrably establish God's moral character."

1. In relation to the foregoing reasoning, I beg leave to observe, that it manifestly assumes the truth of the theory of Optimism, in the very terms in which its premises are stated. To those, therefore, who do not admit the truth of the premises, nothing is proved. As the premises of every syllogism, which is not radically defective, really include, in the same or different words, the opinion proposed to be proved, this mode of investigation can be of small utility for the discovery of truths relating to facts or real existences. In such inquiries its principal use is to develope

the judgments which we have im. plicitly adopted, by showing that they are virtually implied in judg ments or propositions which we acknowledge. But the first princi. ples upon which we proceed must be established by an appeal to facts, to the original and appropriate sources of information by which alone they are brought to our knowledge. Morals and religion would indeed rest upon a very precarious foundation, if their first principles, relating to the perfections and determinations of God, depended for their proof upon abstract or syllogistick reasoning. It remains to be proved therefore, not by a syllogism, but by an appeal to ascertained facts, or explicit testimony, that God must necessarily choose that system which is best, and mest for the good of the whole.

2. This argument proceeds upon the very unwarrantable assumption that we are capable of judging, a priori, of what it is necessary and proper for God to determine and to do.

A slight acquaintance with the history of religious opinions, a correct view of the weakness of the human mind, and especially an accurate consideration of the origin and limits of human knowledge, must convince us that all attempts of this kind are in the highest degree irrational, presumptuous, and dangerous. Nothing is more certain than that among those who equally profess to believe in the infinite perfections of God, very different and sometimes opposite opinions are entertained, respecting what infinite perfection requires or forbids him to do. That we can know nothing of God beyond what he has been pleased to reveal, is little, if any thing, more than an identical proposition. We proceed upon safe ground when our opinions are formed by a just interpretation of scripture, or by a legitimate deduction from well-established facts in the constitution and order of na

A

ture. All beyond this is the region of conjecture, uncertainty, and impenetrable darkness.

The conceptions, which the human understanding is capable of forming, concerning infinity, are in most instances too imperfect and inadequate to enable us to draw positive conclusions from them. The most ingenious speculations of this sort are extremely unsatisfactory, and fail of producing complete conviction. In speaking of Dr. Clarke's celebrated argument, a priori, for the existence of God, from our conceptions of immensity and eternity, Dr. Reid remarks, "These are the speculations of men of superior genius; but whether they be as solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination in a region beyond the limits of the human understanding, I am at a loss to determine." "After this candid acknowledgment from Dr. Reid, I need not be ashamed, says Mr. Stewart, to confess my own doubts and difficulties on the same question." Is it not then presumptuous for us to pronounce with dogmatical confidence, that from the infinite perfection of his nature, the Divine Being must necessarily determine in this way or that way, according to our weak conceptions of fitness and propriety?

3. It is by no means certain that the ideas involved in the statement of this theory are applicable to the purposes and dispensations of God. It is taken for granted that the present system was chosen upon a comparison with other possible systems. How this can be proved, I confess I know not. To represent the Divine Being as deliberating upon the comparative advantages and disadvantages of an infinite number of different possible systems, and as the result of the comparison giving the preference to the present system, appears to be rather the work of imagination, than the dictate of sober reason. If I mis

take not therefore, the statement of this scheme assumes what may well be refused, and which, if refused, cannot be extorted. Let the advocates of this theory first prove the preliminary assumption, that the present system was chosen upon a comparison of an infinite number of possible systems, and it will be time enough afterwards to assign the reasons why it was chosen in preference to every other.

Attentive reflection will satisfy us, that we know far less respecting the purposes and plans of Divine wisdom, than upon a superficial view we are apt to imagine. Our knowledge and conceptions are furnished by real existences. The exercise of our external senses first awakes the powers of the mind, and serves either directly or indirectly to excite the various thoughts of which the human understanding is susceptible. The imagination can make a new disposition and modification, within certain limits, of the materials thus furnished by the senses; but it is not in our power to form an idea, or combination of ideas, totally dissimilar to any thing which has previously come to our knowledge, and of which the elements are not furnished by the works of God. We have no faculty analogous to that by which the conception of created existences was originally formed, and consequently we cannot form any notion of the manner in which the Divine understanding was exerted, in originating the plan of the created universe, or of any of its parts. The formation and the execution of the Divine plan in regard to creation, are equally above the capacity and the comprehension of man. We have the power of modifying the materials which creative power has produced, but we have no creative power, nor can we form any notion how creative power was exerted, in producing all things out of nothing. It will be apparent therefore that we cannot, from the manner in

[merged small][ocr errors]

which our imaginations are employed in relation to actual existences, infer any thing with certainty, in regard to the manner in which the Divine understanding was exerted, in forming the conception and plan of things which had no existence. The theory of Optimism is founded on an unphilosophical and superficial view of the causes of natural phenomena, and of the nature of the connexions which we observe to exist between different events. This charge I hope to substantiate by the following remarks. From the constancy and uniformity which we witness in the succession of natural events, we are led to consider certain connexions and tendencies as necessary in the things themselves, independently of the appointment and immediate efficiency of God. This erroneous view we carry along with us, when in our imaginations we form conceptions of other worlds and systems. We ascribe to them certain laws, connexions, and tendencies, similar to those with which observation has supplied us; and to complete the delusion, we consider the Divine Being as proceeding in the same manner-as forming notions similar to our own of different systems, having various laws, and connexions, and consequences, inherent and necessary, separate from any determination and efficiency of his respecting them. When it is supposed that God views this as the best possible system, the supposition implies that he regards certain connexions and tendencies as necessary in the nature of things, apart from any determination of his concerning them. If the foregoing statement be correct, which I think no person who reflects attentively upon the operations of his own mind will deny, it will follow that the theory we are considering is a mere delusion of our imaginations. That the connexions and tendencies which we observe among natural events are not owing to any sup

posed necessity in the nature of things, but to the will and operation of God, must be evident to every person upon the slightest reflection. And it is equally evident that in speaking of different possible systems as better or best, the mind proceeds on the contrary supposi tion;-a supposition which cannot without the greatest absurdity be ascribed to Him who ordained the constitution of nature, and whose immediate operation secures those connexions and tendencies which we foolishly attribute to necessity and the nature of things.

A delusion, somewhat resembling the preceding, is involved in the arguments advanced in favour of this scheme from the nature of the determinations of the human mind. The manner in which human choice is directed and regulated is a legitimate and becoming subject of inquiry; and it is readily admitted that in all instances our choice is founded upon reasons real or sup posed; but that the present system of the universe was chosen in a manner perfectly analogous to the way in which we choose one object in preference to others, is by no means evident. Our determinations proceed upon the supposition of the separate and independent existence of those objects to which they relate, and of the stability and permanence of the laws of nature which God has ordained; and in most instances at least, they are influenced by events and circumstances which are independent of us, and over which we have no control. But nothing of all this can be said of the determinations of God. He was not influenced by any thing extrinsick. Nothing ex isted separate from himself, by which his purposes could be influenced or modified. To make the cases at all analogous, so that the laws which belong to the one may be legitimately referred to the other, it is necessary to have recourse to the nature and fitness of things,

[ocr errors]

cording to which it is supposed that the Divine determinations are influenced and regulated. As this appears to be nothing better than a groundless imagination, it unavoidably follows that no conclusion can be fairly drawn from the nature of human choice, to prove the necessity, or the reasons of the Divine determinations.

4. An unanswerable objection against the theory of Optimism is, that by ascribing to goodness or benevolence the peculiar characteristicks of justice, it confounds all our natural conceptions and language, in relation to these different attributes. The most accurate and enlightened moralists have, with great clearness, distinguished between them, and pointed out the remarkable peculiarities of each. The exercise of justice is necessary and indispensable. That is not properly speaking an act of justice, which may be omitted without injustice. Hence it is that the rules of justice among men may be laid down with precision, and enforced by compulsion. On the contrary, acts of pure beneficence are left in some measure to our own will, and when they are not enforced by the claims of justice, gratitude, fidelity, nor enjoined by the commands of a superior, they are always free. "The rules of justice," says Dr. Adam Smith, "may be compared to the rules of grammar: the rules of the other virtues, to the rules which criticks lay down for the attainment of what is sublime and elegant in composition. The one, are precise, accurate, and indispensable. The other, are loose, vague, and indeterminate." "And upon this is founded, says the same writer, that remarkable distinction between justice and all the other social virtues; that we feel ourselves to be under a stricter obligation to act according to justice, than agreeably to friendship, cha rity, or generosity; that the pracfice of these last mentioned virtues

seems to be left in some measure to our own choice, but that, somehow or other, we feel ourselves to be in a peculiar manner tied, bound, and obliged, to the observation of justice."

The theory of Optimism confounds these obvious and universally recognised distinctions, and attributes to the exercise of pure beneficence the language and maxims which apply only to justice. That the creation of the world and the communication of happiness to created beings were acts of beneficence, of mere goodness, as distinguished from justice, no person perhaps will directly deny; yet they are not unfrequently spoken of as acts of justice, in the confused and shuffling phraseology which is used by some writers on the subject. "Publick or general justice," says Dr. Maxcy, "respects what is fit or right, as to the character of God, and the good of the universe. In this sense, justice comprises all moral goodness, and properly means the righteousness or rectitude of God, by which all his actions are guided, with a supreme regard to the greatest good." Accordingly, this thor does not scruple to apply to justice, when thus used as synonymous with benevolence, the language and ideas which belong to justice, in its ordinary and legitimate acceptation. Justice, considered in this view, he says, forbids, requires, is satisfied, is done to the universe, &c. To assert directly that benevolence requires that God should promote the greatest good of the whole system, would be an inconsistency too gross to escape detection. To keep out of view the incompatibility of their notions with the common judgment and language of mankind, it is found necessary to substitute justice in some shape or another, in the room of benevolence; and by this dexte rous management it is possible to give some degree of plausibility to

au

« AnteriorContinuar »