that the absolute holiness of God is the original fountain, and ultimate standard, of all holiness in the universe. Our judgment of right and wrong, however, is formed, not by the immediate contemplation of the Divine nature-this is beyond the reach of our faculties; but by the revelation of his will, which he has given in his laws and dispensations. To the view of the Divine mind, the standard of all moral excellence is the absolute and unchangeable holiness of his own nature; but to us the only standard of moral excellence is the law which he has revealed, according to which we are bound to regulate our judgments and our conduct. This law is holy, just and good, because it is agreeable to his holy nature, and because, so far as it goes, it is a transcript of it.

It may perhaps be thought by some, that the principles and conclusions of mathematicks furnish an example in opposition to the doctrine which I have stated, that there are no necessary and eternal truths distinct from the Divine Being. This example is adduced by Dr. Emmons, for this express purpose. And it must be conceded, that the principles of mathematicks have often been pronounced to be eternal and necessary, independently of the nature and will of any being whatever. Nor does this representation appear destitute of plausibility, when we contemplate the clearness and cogency of mathematical reasoning, and the absurdity of attempting to invalidate its legitimate deductions. To obviate the objection derived from this source, I beg leave to observe, that it proceeds upon a mistaken notion of the peculiarity of the demonstrative sciences, and of the kind of truths about which they are conversant. Truth relates to real existences, to God and created beings; or it is merely hypothetical, expressing a connexion between certair. suppositions and certain consequences. Of the latter kind are the truths of Geometry, and of the other sciences which are properly called

demonstrative. Their object is not to ascertain truth strictly speaking, that is, truth relating to real existences, but to prove the logical connexion between conclusions and premises, between consequences and an assumed bypothesis.

This is the opinion entertained by that most accomplished philosopher and profound metaphysician, Mr. Dugald Stewart, who with equal originality, and sound judgment, establishes what evidently appears to be a correct view of the subject. "It was already remarked," says he, "in the first chapter of this part, that whereas, in all other sciences, the propositions which we attempt to establish, express facts real or supposed,-in mathematicks, the propo sitions which we demonstrate only assert a connexion between certain suppositions and certain consequences. Our reasonings therefore in mathematicks are directed to an object essentially different from what we have in view, in any other employment of our intellectual faculties;-not to ascertain truths with respect to actual existences, but to trace the logical filiation of consequences which follow from an assumed hypothesis. If from this hy pothesis we reason with correctness, nothing, it is manifest, can be want ing to complete the evidence of the result; as this result only asserts a necessary connexion between the supposition and the conclusion.The terms true and false cannot be applied to them; at least in the sense in which they are applicable to propositions relative to facts. All that can be said is, that they are, or are not, connected with the definitions which form the principles of the science; and, therefore, if we choose to call our conclusions true in the one case, and false in the other, these epithets must be understood merely to refer to their con nexion with the data, and not to their correspondence with things ac tually existing, or with events which we expect to be realized in future.”

To these excellent remarks, in

the justness of which I apprehend every reader capable of comprehending them will acquiesce, it may not be improper to add, that the use of pure reasoning, in every instance, is merely to evince the logical connexion between certain premises and their legitimate consequences. Whether our premises correspond with facts or not, does not affect the clearness and validity of the reason ing process. If our premises be truths relative to real existences, our conclusions will be of the same character; but if they be mere assumptions, our conclusions will be nothing more than the logical consequences of mere assumptions. To determine whether the principles of our reasoning correspond with facts or not, requires a different, and in most cases, a higher exercise of our intellectual faculties; an exercise to which many persons, who are able to pursue with accuracy the longest train of reasoning, appear, in many instances, to be incompetent.

These observations are I trust sufficient to show, that mathematical propositions do not furnish an example of truths, in the strict sense of the word, that are necessary and eternal, and consequently that a reference to them, will be of no avail to those who attempt to prove that moral truths are necessary and eternal in the nature of things. It is readily conceded, that truths relating to the being and perfections of God are necessary and eternal, because his being and perfections are so; and that, as it was his eternal purpose to bring active and rational beings into existence, he determined to give them laws which are holy, just and good, because perfectly agreeable to the absolute perfection of his nature, and wisely adapted to their constitution, faculties, relations and circumstances. But that the nature of things is constituted independently of the will of God, and that virtue and vice in all their different degrees, take their origin from the nature of things, does not appear to mean any thing intelligible.

The following quotation from a distinguished advocate of the theory we have been considering, contains an exhibition of his views on the subject, and a specimen of the reasoning employed in support of them. "Every thing," says Dr. Emmons, "has a nature which is peculiar to itself, and which is essential to its very existence. Light has a nature, by which it is distinguished from darkness. Sweet has a nature by which it is distinguished from bitter. Animals have a nature by which they are distinguished from men. Men have a nature by which they are distinguished from angels. Angels have a nature by which they are distinguished from God. And God has a nature by which he is distinguished from all other beings. Now such different natures lay a foundation for different obligations; and different obligations lay a foundation for virtue and vice in all their

different degrees. As virtue and vice, therefore, take their origin from the nature of things; so the difference between moral good and moral evil is as immutable as the nature of things from which it results."

The reasoning employed in this passage, notwithstanding a show of precision, is very inaccurate and illogical. Nor can we concede the soundness of the principles which are assumed. It cannot be granted that different natures alone, lay a foundation for different obligations. Light and darkness, sweetness and bitterness, and the various tribes of inferior animals, as they are not rational beings, are not susceptible of obligation, notwithstanding the diversity of their natures. Nor is this true in relation to rational beings. It is agreeable to the scriptures, and to those judgments which the constitution and order of society naturally suggest to our minds, to believe, that our relation to the Author of our being must, at least, be taken into the account, in stating the grounds of our obligation to yield obedience to his commands.

As his conclusions relate exclusively to beings having reason and understanding, it is manifest that beings should be substituted in place of things. After this correction the argument will stand thus: Men have a nature by which they are distinguished from angels. Angels have a nature by which they are distinguished from God. And God has a nature by which he is distinguished from all other beings. Now such different natures lay a foundation for different obligations; and different obligations lay a foundation for virtue and vice in all their different degrees. As virtue and vice therefore take their origin from the nature of beings; so the difference between moral good and moral evil is as immutable as the nature of beings from whom it results. His theory vanishes when his argument is reduced to the rules of logic. The nature of things disappears upon adjusting his conclusions to his premises.

In regard to the opinions of those who make virtue to consist in fitness, it may be observed that their language is very defective in perspicuity and precision. The mind of the reader is perplexed by the use of certain words, in a way which is altogether different from that in which they are commonly employed. In common language, fitness uniformly expresses or implies the relation of means to an end. Any thing is said to be fit when it is adapted to promote the end in view. But according to this system, fitness does not express the adaptation of means to an end; it is absolute fitness.

The reader will be gratified with the following acute remarks of Dr. Campbell upon this mode of speaking: 'Moral good, says a celebrated writer, consisteth in fitness. From this account any person would at first readily conclude, that morals according to him, are not concerned in the ends which we pursue, but solely in the choice of means for attaining our ends; that if this choice

be judicious, the conduct is moral; if injudicious, the contrary. But this truly pious author is far from admitting such an interpretation of his words. Fitness in his sense hath no relation to a further end. It is an absolute fitness, a fitness in itself.

We are obliged to ask, what ther is that fitness which you call absolute? for the application of the word in every other case, invariably imply. ing the proper direction of means to an end, far from affording light to the meaning it has here, tends directly to mislead us? The only answer, so far as I can learn, that hath ever been given to this question, is neither more nor less than this, That alone is absolutely fit, which is morally good. So that in saying moral good consisteth in fitness, no more is meant than that it consisteth in moral good."

The system of those writers, therefore, who make virtue to consist in fitness, or who assert that right and wrong have their origin in fitness, deserves no other notice than a verbal criticism, showing the im propriety and utter insignificance of the term, when applied in this

manner.

I acknowledge that the account which represents virtue as consisting in propriety, is much less exceptionable. There is a propriety in every kind of virtuous conduct, and every kind of vice is improper and unbecoming. Yet this word is very inadequate to express the peculiar nature and excellence of moral goodness. The most worthless of mankind may in certain situations act with perfect propriety. Many ac tions are strictly proper, which have nothing of the nature of moral excellence. Virtue and holiness possess a kind of excellence distinct from mere propriety, and far superior to it. Propriety of language, of dress, and behaviour, gives pleasure to the beholder; he regards it with approbation. Every person, however, must be conscious that this pleasure and approbation are very

had been very abundant for some time preceding.

From Manchester, I proceeded to Liverpool, where I tarried a week, waiting for the packet to sail. The evening of my arrival at Liverpool succeeded a wet day, in which, of course, the travelling had been unpleasant and fatiguing. The inn at which the stage stopped was crowded: but I was solitary and dejected, without a being to take the smallest interest in any thing that interested me. After moping some time by the coal fire, which the rawness of the evening rendered very necessary, I ventured to accost a genteel looking man, whose countenance indicated complaisance and good nature. I found in him nothing of the shyness and distance I have usually met with from the English, when an introduction was wanting. He proved to be a merchant belonging to a town in Wales, very communicative, and I hope a man of piety. On hearing that a merchant of New York, a friend of his, was also a friend of mine-a man who has laid the religious community both in Europe and America under some obligations, he appeared at once to take a particular interest in me, and I spent a very pleasant evening in his society. The next morning he took me to the house of a widow lady of his acquaintance, with whom I was accommodated with comfortable private lodgings while I remained in the place. The frank, open-hearted kindness of this man, has left a relish on my mind, which will not soon wear off; and made me reflect on what has often occurred to my mind before-the immense happiness which would accrue to society, if mankind were generally well instructed Christians, disposed to treat each other whereever they met, with confidence and kindness. Then would the stranger find friends wherever he went, and enjoy the solace of kind atten

• The late Divie Bethune, Esq.

tion in every inn, where he only tarried for a night. What a substitute would this be for the shyness, the neglect, the suspicion, the scrutinizing inquiry, and ill-natured remark, so frequently to be encountered by the traveller, in all countries.

The week spent in Liverpool, afforded as much opportunity for enjoyment as could well be desired, had I possessed the buoyancy of animal spirits incident to health, with a heart less hankering after home. A few letters of introduction gave me access to some excellent families of the Baptist denomination. Of this connexion there are two congregations in Liverpool, and both of them thriving. There are three congregations of Independents, one of Scotch Presbyterians, and one of Seceders. The different denominations live together in much harmony, and hold alternate meetings for divine service in each other's churches, on week evenings. I was present at one of these meetings, in a Baptist church, when the Rev. Dr. Stewart of the Seceder connexion, took a share of the exercise. He was just returned from Glasgow, where he had been attending the union, lately taken place, between the Burgher and Antiburgher synods. He gave, publickly, a very interesting statement of that occurrence. The coalition took place, by design, in the same church, where many years ago, the lamentable separation had occurred, preceded by bitter contentions, relative to the burgess oath. The joy and gladness, the mutual greetings and cordial shaking of hands, between the members of the two bodies, at their coming together, surpassed, he said, any thing he had ever witnessed; and produced an excitement of feeling, never to be forgotten. The whole scene seemed to partake of the joy of heaven, and indicated a new order of things as beginning to come about; when forbearance, harmony and union, shall take place of