and far less exceptionable, than that of the other statements which I have mentioned, at the beginning of this essay. It does not however appear to be perfectly precise and satisfactory. Authority on the one part, and obligation on the other, necessarily imply each other. The former cannot be ascribed to any being, without supposing a corresponding obligation to belong to some other being. They are essentially related, and must have the same foundation; and in the instance of which we are speaking, they are founded upon the relation which God sustains to his rational creatures. To make the subject perfectly plain, it must be observed that the following questions, Why am I under obligation to obey the commands of God? and, Why am I under obligation to perform a particular action, or pursue a particular course of conduct? although somewhat resembling each other, require a very different answer. The first is the ultimate question, and that to which I have endeavoured to give an answer, in the preceding part of this inquiry. The proper answer to the second question, Why am I under obligation to perform a particular action? undoubtedly is, because God commands it. This however implies that he has authority to give laws for the regulation of our actions; and also that we are bound to obey them. But if the ultimate question be asked, Why am I under obligation to obey the laws and commands of God? it will not be sufficient to reply, that this obligation is founded on the Divine authority. This is doing little, if any thing, more than repeating the sense of the question in other words. That God has authority to command, and that we are under obligation to obey, are really expressions of entirely equivalent import, and therefore one cannot be employed to account for the other. They both result from the relation which

exists between the Supreme Lawgiver, and the subjects of his government.

Attention to the distinction which I have now stated, appears neces sary to a correct understanding of the grounds and reasons of moral obligation. By overlooking it, we shall be in constant danger of falling into confusion and error.

That rational creatures are under moral obligation to obey the laws of their Creator is an ultimate truth, a fundamental maxim in morals and theology. To attempt, therefore, to assign reasons for this primary truth, would be no less absurd than a similar attempt would be, in regard to the primary axioms of mathematicks. Nothing more can be done than to develope and illustrate the ideas which the proposition essentially involves; but if, after all, any man should not perceive the indispensable obligation under which he is laid to obey the glorious Author of his nature, and the bountiful Giver of all his comforts, he must be looked upon either as a monster of impiety, or as one destitute of reason.

It will readily be admitted, that if our obligation results from our relation to our Creator, the sentiment of moral obligation must result from a view of that relation. Indeed, the latter proposition is no less evident than the former, and, if admitted as correct, necessarily establishes the former. In what manner, then, would a wise man proceed in the endeavour to impress upon the minds of others, sentiments of duty and obedience to their Maker? Not, surely, by telling them that their welfare depended on their obedience. They could infer nothing more from this representation than that it is a matter of prudence to do what God commands. Would he tell them that obedience will conduce to the general welfare? From this they could infer nothing more than that it is expedient to act in conformity

to the Divine commands. Both these ideas, that of prudence and of expediency, are essentially different from the idea of duty and moral obligation; and, consequently, whatever is done from a regard to them, solely, cannot be considered as obedience to God. He would certainly direct their attention to the infinite majesty and glory of God; his relation to us, as our Creator and Benefactor and Sovereign Lord; and our absolute dependence upon him, for all that is excellent in our nature, and desirable in our existence. This is the manner of scripture. When God promulgated his law to Israel, he prefaced it with these words: "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt; out of the house of bondage." In that most beautiful address to the Church, contained in the forty-fifth Psalm, the foundation of our obligation is stated very distinctly. "For he is thy Lord; and worship thou him." "Know therefore," said Moses to Israel, "that the Lord thy God, he is God, the faithful God, which keepeth covenant and mercy with them that love him, and keep his commandments-Thou shalt therefore keep the commandments, and the statutes, and the judgments, which I command thee this day, to do them." How incomparably more sublime and rational is the view which these passages afford of the reasons and ground of obligation, than that which is afforded by the futile theories which some have ventured to advance on this subject! Indeed, these theories evidently amount to a disavowal of obligation to obey God. Their authors virtually say, although we judge it right to do what God has commanded, yet this is not because we consider ourselves under the obligation of duty or obedience to him, but because the performance of what he has commanded appears most conducive to personal happiness; or to general utility; or is agreeable to the na

ture and fitness of things. It is absurd to suppose that acceptable obedience can proceed from any of these principles, or indeed, that the actions which they produce can have any thing of the nature of obedience.

A regard to our own welfare, and that of others, is not to be condemned; it may concur, as a useful auxiliary, with the higher principle of duty. But these principles are perfectly distinct; and so far as our actions have the nature of obedience, they must proceed from the principle of duty.

To strengthen our convictions of moral obligation, we ought frequently to reflect upon the transcendent glory and majesty of God; our dependance upon him for our existence, our powers, and all our en joyments; and, consequently, that it is our indispensable duty to acknowledge him in all our ways; and to subject every principle of our nature, every desire of our minds, to his supreme and righteous authority. Holiness in man consists essentially in obedience; in the direction and regulation of every part of our constitution in conformity to his command, and from a regard to his authority and will. How important then is it, that a conviction of our indispensable obligation to the glorious Author of our being, should be deeply and constantly impressed upon our minds. How carefully should we avoid whatever may have a tendency to weaken or efface it; and how diligent should we be, in using the means by which it may be preserved and strengthened.

The obligation under which we are laid to obey our Creator, being admitted, all that remains for us is, to discover what he commands, and what he forbids; and to regulate our conduct accordingly. Whe ther we can assign any reason why he has enjoined a particular rule of duty, or not, will not affect our obligation. It is sufficient, if it has

the stamp of his authority. To refuse compliance until we can perceive its tendency to promote our own happiness, or the happiness of others, would be rebellion against the authority of God.

nature. No such division can now be amicably made. If such an event ever takes place, it must be by some violent schism, bringing discord, jealousy and contention in its train. Neither the good of the church nor the glory of our Master, can be promoted by such unhallowed scenes.

Something, however, must be

Remedies Proposed.

Dear Sir,-You know it has sometimes been suggested that the General Assembly should meet triennially. I confess, if it must be divested of its judicial capacity, so far that no appeals or complaints can be heard in its sessions, when the interests of the church require them to be heard, I shall care little whether its meetings are oftener than septennial. But a triennial session would divest the body of its judicial character, and render it no longer useful or desirable, as a court of review.

Such a measure would break up almost the entire relations of that court-and I should deem it labour lost to state in detail objections to a scheme so utterly impracticable. I cannot persuade myself that it has been seriously approved by any Presbyterian.

There is a project, which has assumed a more serious aspect, and been advocated by some wise men.I have heard it spoken of as inevitable. To divide the Presbyterian Church into two Assemblies, having correspondence with each other by delegation.

Such an event I should deprecate. It would awaken and cherish local interests-promote jealousies-and I should anticipate a complete failure, in attempting to preserve harmony and fellowship.

If all difficulties, connected with the funds of the Assembly and the direction of theological seminaries, could be avoided in the division, I should fear others of a more serious VOL. V.-Ch. Adv.

cession will be the result. To me the course seems plain-and I can see but one adequate remedy for all the existing evils:-A synodical representation, on an equitable ratio, is such a remedy.

Let the constitution be so altered as to abolish the present mode of sending commissioners from presbyteries, and give to synods the right of sending one minister and one elder, for every twenty-five ministers

subject to a diminution when the number shall reach a certain maximum. Let the principle of fractional representation be applied to the new system as it is to the oldand we shall have a remedy; but it may be sought in vain with a representation from presbyteries.

The plan I propose would preserve the radical principles of Presbyterianism, as entire as on the existing plan. A synod is in fact, only a larger presbytery, including all the pastors, and having a representation from all branches of the church within its limits. A delegation from the larger, instead of the smaller presbytery, can invade no presbyterial principle-and the body so constituted, will as really represent the whole church as when the delegates come from the smaller presbyteries.

The representation will be more equal, because the fractional proportion will be less-and because synods will be more likely to secure a full delegation and punctual attendance. The lay delegation will be more full, and the Assembly become a much more just representation of the church than it ever can be on the present plan.

The Assembly will not then be so2 D

unwieldy. There will be a convenient number for deliberation, perfectly competent to transact all the business of a session, in less than two weeks. We shall then hear no more of invading the radical principles of our government to get rid of business, or to save the reputation of our highest court. Less time will be spent in the political concerns of the meeting-less in useless debate-and the time of all the members will be appropriated to some profit, instead of many of them retarding, as they now do, the business of the Assembly. More than half the expense may be saved-and the intolerabic burden upon the citizens of Philadelphia be removed. The miserable custom of indiscriminate rotation in sending delegates will be discontinued, or be come less injurious to the reputation of the Assembly and interests of the church. Complaints against decisions of the highest judicatory will be lessened and murmurs of dissatisfaction hushed, because confidence will be felt in the wisdom of the court. The secular character of the proceedings will be corrected, and the undue importance of mere tech nicality lost, in the wisdom, experience and fear of God pervading the Assembly.

A consideration of no small moment seems to be overlooked by the Assembly, in submitting expedient after expedient to the presbyteriesThe stability of our constitution and consistency of our highest judicatory.

The whole system of temporary expedients for removing present evils, is calculated to cherish the spirit of innovation-unsettle the whole instrument and place in jeopardy the best principles of church order; to say nothing of the doctrines contained in our confession of faith. We already begin to feel the unfavorable influence of such a course. In 1818 the spirit of innovation began, under the almost hallowed name of reform. The ratio of representation was altered. In 1819 the whole constitution of government

was put into the hands of presbyteries for revision-In 1820 it was altered and fully revised. The confession and constitution were published with great care under the direction of the Assembly, and pains taken to circulate the copies. Along with that cir culation was conveyed the opinion, that this was now to be a permanent instrument. The work was stereotyped, and an unprecedented number of copies put into the hands of the church. In 1825 another alteration was proposed in the ratio of representation, which was consummated last year. Before the last proposition I felt no alarm-nor did I then fully appreciate some fears expressed by Fathers in the church, that the spirit of innovation might lead to disastrous results.

But did the decision of the presbyteries to alter the ratio satisfy the Assembly? Far from it. The current of reform has unsettled the minds of many, and produced dissatisfaction with many parts of the constitution. This age of wonderful improvement must impart its salutary influence to remodelling the church. It is now proposed to set aside one of the radical principles of presbyterial government. Where shall we stop? Not with the proposed alterations now submitted. Year after year must give birth to some new expedient, until such an alienation is produced, that some violent schism, or an entire dissolution of the Assembly, will mark the termination.

I do not find fault with the alteration of the ratio of representationit was a measure called for by cir cumstances beyond control:-only in the last instance I think it would have been much better to have introduced synodical representation, and thus stop the spirit of innovation as soon as possible. But never let the radi cal principles of Presbyterianism be invaded. One precedent of this kind will soon be followed by another and another, until the Assembly will meet to revise, not the proceedings of lower courts, but its own laws and princi ples of government.

I am aware that the force of the argument, derived from the influence of precedent, depends upon two things-the character of the alteration-and the prospect of further in novation. Now test the argument by these two considerations-and it should lead us to pause and think well before we touch a vital principle of our constitution. Let not the abuse of a good principle lead us to expunge it from our system. While there remains a remedy consistent with presbyterianism, let it be applied. But when there can be found no remedy, without breaking in upon those radical and tried principles, it cannot be long before the General Assembly must cease to represent the whole Presbyterian church in this country-Evils producing such a dire necessity must cure them selves by violence, or the body be annihilated.

I am well convinced that the plan which I have proposed will meet with opposition. The attention of the church has not yet been directed to the subject. It was introduced into the Assembly at a late hour last spring, and just upon the heels of an untried alteration in the ratio of representation. There was of course little prospect of even an examination into the principles, much less the details of the plan.

But it must be brought before the church, canvassed, and, I trust, adopted.

I might enlarge on several topics, but you now have possession of my object, and some of the most prominent views which I entertain on this very important subject.

Feb. 26th, 1827.

Yours, truly,

TRAVELS IN EUROPE FOR HEALTH IN 1820. BY AN AMERICAN CLERGYMAN OF THE SYNOD OF PHILADELPHIA.

(Continued from p. 157.) Cheltenham, Sept. 16th, 1820. Dear Friend, Shortly after the

date of my last, I bade adieu to London; and felt both regret and joy in doing so. Regret, at leaving the busy metropolis of the world (as London, regarding influence and magnitude together, may be called) having seen so little of it-Joy at the thought of making progress towards home. The weather during my stay, was raw and rainy, and this, with rather over exertion, to make the most of my time in seeing and hearing, seemed to operate rather unfavourably on my health; which made me the more willing to get away. Having derived so much benefit from the waters of Bagniers, and being informed that those of Cheltenham were much of the same nature, I determined to spend some time at this place, which is nearly in the route from London to Liverpool, where I intend to take the packet for New York, the first of October. The weather, on the day I set off, compelled me to take the inside of the coach; which was a great drawback on the gratification of seeing the country. We had gone but a little way from the suburbs, until my attention was taken by a vast tract of heath country, level, desolate, and bare, except of cattle browsing upon it. To see such a wild region, on the skirts of such apopulous city, strikes the mind as an astonishing contrast. Its surface, though poor, did not indicate invincible sterility; and its state of commons, I was told, is owing to its original grant as such; which offers some legal barriers in the way of its being enclosed, and brought under cultivation. It would seem that what was charity, in the first instance, has resulted in great injury. The value of such lands as commons, is a trifle, compared with the benefit which would result from their improvement. Could those waste grounds be brought under cultivation, and the product applied to the moral cultivation of the poor, for whose use specially they have been given, how great would be the gain, both to them and the community.