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Wednesday 6th, 11 o'clock, P. M. Harriet was carried from her bed to the barge, which brought us off at 4 o'clock this afternoon, and is now quietly reposing in the after cabin, far from the noise of the ship. Mr. Ruggles and his family are also on board, and the two queens with their suite. When we came on board we fully expected to proceed to the leeward of the island for 8 or 10 days; but when Lord Byron saw how very ill Harriet is, partly that she might meet her children as soon as possible, and partly on account of a letter he has received respecting a piratical squadron, he an hour since determined to bear away directly for Oahu. This is joyful tidings to us, for we had much reason to fear that H. would not have survived to see Honoruru by the other route. We feel overwhelmed by the kindness and affectionate attention of Lord B. He has insisted on our occupying his own private accommodations, that we may be as free as possible from all the inconvenience of shipboard. Mr. Davis, who manifests deep solicitude for H., on hearing of the determination to proceed immediately to Oahu, said to her-"In his lordship, madam, you have really found a brother-he is one of the kindest of men." He has our warm gratitude.

Friday, 8th, 10 o'clock at night.We are still on board the Blonde. Though we cleared the harbour early yesterday morning, we made little progress till in the evening, owing to a calm. During the night and today, however, we have had a delightful breeze. The brightness of the sky-the beauty of the sea-the wild and romantick scenery of Maui and Morakoi, along the wind

ward sides of which we have been coasting-the stateliness of the frigate as she ploughed the deep, with the strains of musick swelling on the breeze, would all have tended to excite cheerfulness and pleasure, but for the extreme illness of H. She has scarce spoken to-day, and I have watched by her sofa, fearing to leave her for a moment, lest on returning I should find her sleeping the sleep of death. She is exceedingly low, and we scarce know how she can bear the fatigue of landing. Two hours more of daylight would have brought us to an anchor at Honoruru, but not being able to double Diamond Hill before dark, we wore ship after sunset, and are now standing off land till midnight.

Mission House at Oahu, Saturday night, July 9th, We passed Diamond Hill this morning at sunrise, and shortly after came to an anchor. Soon after breakfast, the barge came along side to carry us on shore. H. was removed to the deck, and lowered to the boat (where a mattress and cot were ready to receive her) in an arm-chair. Sir Geo. Ayre and Mr. Bloxam accompanied us. On reaching the shore we met Mr. Bingham, Charley and Betsey. They were greatly rejoiced at our arrival, but sadly disappointed in seeing H. so ill: they had hoped to have found her greatly benefited by the voyage. The crew of the barge carried her in her cot to Mr. Bingham's cottagewhere she was safely placed in her own room, less exhausted than we had feared she would be. It was thought advisable that she should take an apartment at the Mission House, on account of the greater quietude of the upper rooms-every part of Mr. B.'s residence being exposed to the noise of the ground floor. She was accordingly, at 4 o'clock, removed to the apartment we occupied during our visit to Oahu last summer. The meeting with the children in good health, &c. has produced an excitement of spirits which

makes her appear better this evening. I myself have been greatly refreshed and comforted, not only by the same circumstances, but more especially by large communications from America, including the packets and letters accompanying the kind remembrance of our Otsego friends, sent to Boston in October. Harriet was not able, however, to hear one syllable from any of the letters. We thank you all for your remembrance, and trust, as long as we dwell on these distant and degraded shores, we shall continue to be cheered and animated in the same way.

Tuesday, July 12th.-The report from the Spanish main has hastened the departure of the Blonde. Yesterday some of the gentlemen, who did not expect to be on shore again, paid us a farewell visit. Among others, Lieutenants Ball and Talbot,

and Mr. Wilson the purser, all of whom requested permission to say farewell to Harriet. This morning I met Lord B., Mr. Davis, and Mr. Bloxam at breakfast at Mr. Bingham's, after which they came over to express to Mrs. S. the interest they felt in her situation, and leave their best wishes for her recovery. Immeditely afterwards, they went to the point where the captain's gig was waiting. Gratitude for their very polite and unwearied attentions, led me to accompany them to the beach, where, with affection and sincere regret, I gave them the parting hand for the last time in this world. In the course of an hour the frigate got under weigh, under a salute from the fort, and early in the afternoon she had faded from our sight forever. CHARLES SAMUEL STEWART.

Heview.

TWO DISCOURSES ON THE NATURE OF

SIN; delivered before the students of Yale College, July 30th, 1826. By Eleazar T. Fitch. New Haven. Printed and published by Treadway and Adams. 1826. pp. 46. 8vo.

These discourses claim the attention of THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE, not only because they contain a discussion of one of the most important doctrines of revelation; but also, because they are understood to convey the sentiments, not merely of the writer, but of the school from which they proceed. The publick cannot be too vigilant in regard to the doctrines taught in our colleges and theological schools, for these are fountains from which many streams issue; and erroneous opinions inculcated in them, will be widely diffused through the community.

Mr. Fitch is understood to be the professor of Theology in Yale College; and has it as a part of his duty, to preach to the students, statedly,

on the Sabbath: and it appears, that these sermons were prepared as a part of the regular course of instruction, that they were both delivered on the same day, and were published at the solicitation of the Theological students of the college. Whether these discourses afford a fair specimen of the professor's usual style of preaching in the chapel of Yale, we cannot say; but if such be the fact, every judicious and enlightened friend of religion must regret, that the large number of young men under the care of that institution,should not be supplied with instruction better calculated to make them sound and sincere Christians. For our own part, we must say, that we have seldom read discourses less adapted to be useful to young men, in a course of academical education.

The text selected as the foundation of the doctrine inculcated in these discourses, appears to us to stand in a very unfortunate place, for one who aims to overthrow the orthodox doctrine of original sin. It

forms a part of that famous passage in which this doctrine is more clearly revealed, than in any other part of Scripture; and the very next words to the text of these sermons, have been understood by all orthodox commentators, to inculcate the opinion which professor Fitch endeavours with all his might to overthrow -Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. These words have, generally, been considered as relating to infants, and as furnishing clear proof, that sin was also imputed to them. But the learned professor has given himself no trouble about the context, and does not even advert to this old and generally received opinion. It is true, in a part of these sermons, he attempts to give the sense of the passage cited, but it might readily be shown, that his exposition cannot be sustained. If the professor wished to examine, in the light of scripture, the doctrine of original sin, he could not have done better than to give a clear and consistent exegesis of the passage, or context, from which his text is taken.

But whether the preacher of these discourses is right or wrong in his doctrine, he has certainly subjected himself to criticism, as a sermonizer; for the superstructure is much broader than the foundation. The text simply declares "that sin is not imputed where there is no law;" but the doctrine which the preacher says the apostle warrants him to deduce from it is, "that sin, in every form and instance, is reducible to the act of a moral agent, in which he violates a known rule of duty." Now, certainly, the text does not contain the latter part of this proposition. Suppose the professor able to establish its truth from other parts of scripture, or from reasoning on general principles, (which with him seems to be the preferable method of investigating truth,) still he can never deduce this doctrine from this VOL. V. Ch. Adv.

text; and he had no warrant from the apostle to construct such a proposition from the words.

The text, moreover, does not declare that all sin consists in acts, and nothing else. It says not a word about acts. If the law may extend beyond acts, to principles, as most theologians have heretofore believed, then sin may be imputed where there are no acts. The plain doctrine of the text is one that all agree in holding-that where there is no law there is no sin: but this determines nothing respecting the nature of sin-nothing in regard to the point whether it must necessarily consist of nothing but acts.

There is also great want of clearness and accuracy in the professor's definition of the kind of acts, in which sin consists. "There are," says he, "certain powers and properties essential to constitute a being a moral agent, capable of willing in a manner that is morally right or that is morally wrong. Now it is of such an agent in the actual exercises of his will; in the volitions, choices, or preferences, which he makes, that I predicate either sin or holiness." Is there then no degree of sin in those desires and inclinations, in a moral agent, which do not result in choice or volition? Suppose a man feels a covetous desire for another's wealth, but better principles counteract it, so that the mind never forms a volition to do any thing dishonest; yet is not the least inclination of this kind sinful? A man may feel a secret envy towards his brother wooking in his breast, and inclining him to detraction, but if brotherly love prevail, or that he does not choose to defame him, is the envy of which he was conscious not sinful? If it is, then the definition is inaccurate or very obscure. If all our sinful acts are confined to volitions, preferences, and choices, then the deep humiliation of many Christians, on 'account of the evils which they suppose to exist in other acts, is founded in error. And the obscurity is not removed S

by the quotation which the preacher makes from president Edwards.

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But the author seems to us to have failed, still more in the illus tration of the nature of sin, than in its definition; especially as it relates to sins of omission. These, according to him, are those acts of the moral agent, which employ him in ways that differ from the positive requirements of duty." To call sins of omission acts, seems to us not a little strange. We had supposed that there was no act in bare omission; and that the fault of the agent consisted in not acting. The professor passes very hastily over this point. Indeed, if he had paused long enough to take an impartial view of the subject, he must have perceived that the admission of any such thing as sins of omission, was fatal to his whole hypothesis. He ought, in consistency, to have denied the propriety of the distinction between sins of omission and sins of commission; for surely, all unlawful acts are sins of commission. But let us look at this subject a little. The divine law requires men to love God with all the heart; now if men omit, or fail to love God, is not this omission a sin? Is it not the radical sin of our nature? Here, then, is a sin, and a great sin, without an act. Its nature consists in failing to act as the law requires. And it will not do to attempt to evade this, by saying that the sin really consists in loving something else, as the world for instance, more than God; for whether there be inordinate love to another object or not, it is plain that we cannot disobey the law of God more directly and essentially, than by neglecting to perform the chief duty which it requires. Grant that this is always attended, as Mr. F. endeavours to show, with positive acts of transgression; still the omission is itself sin, and the radical sin; not consisting in acts, but in the defect of such acts as are required. How then can that proposition be true, which traces all sin to acts? A just view of this single point is, in our opinion, suffi

cient to overthrow the primary proposition of the professor.

He is equally unfortunate in his attempt to illustrate the distinction between sins of ignorance and sins of knowledge; for as before he confounded all distinction between sins of commission and omission; so here he does the same, as it relates to sins of ignorance and sins of knowledge. Indeed, he could not do otherwise, in conformity with his main proposition; for there he makes sin to be "the act of a moral agent, in which he violates a KNOWN rule of duty." What place, then, we ask, is there for sins of ignorance? We have been accustomed to think that knowledge and ignorance are the exact opposites of each other. But yet Mr. F. wishes to be considered as not denying this distinction. His words are, "Nor do I in this deny the distinction between what are popularly called sins of ignorance and sins of knowledge. For in either case a known obligation is violated, to constitute the sin of the act; but the obligation in the one case does not, and in the other does, arise from the knowledge of the specific law. For instance; sins of ignorance are those acts in which the moral agent transgresses the known obligation to acquaint himself with laws that were applicable, or some known general obligation of morality, from which he might have inferred the given law; while those of knowledge are the acts in which he violates the obliga tion which arises from a knowledge of the given published law itself." Now, if we understand the writer, (for it must be confessed there is much obscurity in this passage) the whole sin of a man who sins through ignorance, consists in his neglect or refusal to make himself acquainted with the laws by which he was bound-Whatever other acts he may perpetrate, however atrocious, in consequence of his ignorance, they have nothing of the nature of sin. Indeed Mr. F. can have no other meaning, unless he will contradict himself; for, according to him, in every form and instance, sin is "a violation

But let us now attend to the proofs which the writer adduces, to confirm the proposition which he has laid down in the beginning of his dis

courses.

"The first proof which I allege, on this subject, (page 6,)" says he, "is the operation of our consciences.

"The conscience manifests itself in the which precedes, attends, and follows our feeling of obligation we experience, actions. Its very decisions respecting guilt, consequently, are resolvable into a strong perception of our own personal obligations which we have violated: and no accusation of conscience, therefore, our having violated a known obligation. can ever arise, except on the ground of I have never felt a compunction of conscience in my own case but on such grounds; and as men are constituted alike, I assume it as a fact that no others

ever have."

of a known rule of duty." Where, then, is the difference between these two classes of sins? for in either case, as he says, "a known obligation is violated." What is said about the obligation arising in the one case from a knowledge of the specific law, and in the other from some different kind of knowledge, we are free to confess, is unintelligible to us. The fact is, according to the showing of the author, each violates a known law; and the ignorant sinner violates no law but that which binds him to use diligence to know the laws under which he is placed. For as to his acts committed through real ignorance, there is no sin in them, however flagrant and injurious they may be in themselves, since they are not committed against a known specifick law. But is this a There is something extremely sound doctrine? Is it safe? Is it vague and unsatisfactory in this arscriptural? Take an example from gument; for the dictates of conthe New Testament. Paul, while a science in different men, are exceedPharisee, verily thought that he ought ingly diverse, according to the eduto do many things contrary to the cation which they have received, and religion of Jesus. While in this the knowledge of the divine law state of ignorance, he persecuted the which they possess. If the appeal Christians even unto death, and is made to the great majority of caused them to blaspheme the name men, the argument will prove too of Christ-to be dragged to prison much-It will go to establish the and death. In all these acts, did opinion, that there is no sin in huPaul commit sin? Yes; according man volitions, which are followed by to our author, in not making himself no external acts of transgression: acquainted with his obligation; but For such is the blind and stupid conin these acts of persecution, blas- dition of by far the greatest part of phemy, and murder, there was no mankind, that their conscience never sin at all, for "sin is the violation of condemns them for mere exercises of a known rule of duty." But what- the mind, which result in no action; ever our theological professor may and it may be doubted whether this say, Paul entertained a very differ is not the fact in regard to a large ent view of this subject. He ac- majority even of those who have been knowledges that he was a blasphemer, educated in Christian countries. and a persecutor, and injurious-But it is probable, that the appeal is and that he was the chief of sinners. We should be very reluctant to charge the professor of theology in Yale College with such an opinion as the one here stated, if it did not follow as an inevitable consequence of his theory: but, in our apprehension, his main proposition clearly contains the objectionable doctrine, and all his illustrations go to confirm it.

made to those only whose minds are enlightened. Indeed, the learned professor seems to think it unnecessary to travel farther for proof than to his own breast. "I have never felt a compunction of conscience," says he, "in my own case, but on such grounds; and as men are constituted alike, I assume it as a fact that no others ever have."

We scarcely know what name to

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