do what my duty requires." This was the beginning of that disturbance; what followed may be learned from the ACTS which are published in the following volumes.

In this same year, Philip Melancthon was invited by prince Frederick, to teach the Greek language; without doubt, that I might have a helper in my theological labours; and what God wrought by this instrument, not in literature only, but in theology, his works sufficiently testify, however Satan and all his adherents may rage.

The following year, A. D. 1519, in the month of February, Maximilian deceased, and Frederick became by right the viceroy of the empire. The tempest, now for a while, ceased to rage, and by degrees a contempt for excommunication, or the papal thunder crept upon me; for when Eckius and Caracciolus brought the pope's bull from Rome, by which Luther was condemned, the elector was at that time at Cologne, where he had gone to receive the newly elected emperor Charles, together with the other princes of the empire. He was much displeased with these emissaries of Rome, and with great constancy and boldness reproached them for daring to excite disturbances within his government and that of his brother John; and treated them so roughly, that they departed from him with confusion and disgrace.

This prince, endued with an extraordinary sagacity, understood well the arts of Rome, and well knew how to treat them, for he possessed an exquisite discernment, and penetrated into the designs of Rome, far beyond all that they feared or hoped. Therefore, after this they made no farther attempts on the elector, and were rather now disposed to flatter and cajole him; for in this very year the golden rose, as they call it, was sent to him by Leo X.; but the prince despised the honour intended for him, and even turned it into ridicule; so that

the Romanists were obliged to desist also from attempts of this sort to deceive so wise a prince. Under his protection the gospel made a happy progress, and was widely propagated. His example also powerfully influenced many others, who, knowing that he was a most wise and discerning prince, were persuaded that he would never consent to cherish and defend heresy or heretical men: which thing brought great detriment to the papacy.

In this same year, a disputation was held at Leipsick, to which, EcKIUS challenged CARLSTAD and myself; but I was unable by any letters, to obtain a safe-conduct from duke George, so that I attended not as a disputant, but as a spectator; for I entered Leipsick under the protection of the publick faith which had been given to CARLSTAD. But what prevented my obtaining a safeconduct, I never learned, for I had no reason to believe that duke George was peculiarly inimical to me. ECKIUS came to me at the inn, and said, he understood that I declined disputing. I answered, how could I dispute, since I was unable to obtain a safe-conduct from duke George. He said, "If I cannot dispute with you I will not with CARLSTAD; for I have come hither to dispute with you; what if I should obtain a safe-conduct for you? will you dispute with me ?" Procure it, said I, and it shall be done. He went away, and in a short time, a safe-conduct was delivered to me, and permission to dispute. ECKIUS pursued this course, because he perceived, that in this disputation, he could acquire great honour and favour with the pope, since I had denied that he was head of the church by divine right. Here there appeared to be a fine field open before him, not only of flattering the pope and meriting his favour, but of overwhelming me with hatred and envy. And through the whole disputation he aimed at these objects; but he was neither able to establish his

own positions, nor to refute mine. At dinner, duke George addressing ECKIUS and me, said, "whether he is pope by human or divine right, he is pope;" which, unless he had been somewhat moved by the arguments which I used, he never would have spoken. However, his publick approbation was given to Eckius alone. And here see, in my case, how difficult it is, for men immersed in errors, to emerge and struggle into the light; especially when error is strengthened by the example of the whole world, and by inveterate custom; for, according to the proverb, "it is difficult to relinquish old customs, for custom is a second nature." And how true is that saying of Augustine, "if custom be not resisted it will become necessity." At that time I had read the scriptures much in publick and private, and had been for seven years a teacher of others; so that I had almost the whole contents of the Bible in my memory, and had, moreover, drunk in some beginnings of the true knowledge and faith of Christ, so as to know that

we could not be justified and saved by works, but by the faith of Jesus Christ; and although I had publickly contended that the pope was not the head of the church by divine right, yet the consequence of this I did not see, namely, that the pope must necessarily be of the devil. For that which is not of God is of necessity of the devil. But I was so swallowed up by the example and title of THE HOLY CHURCH, and by long custom, that I conceded human right to the pope; which, however, if it rest not on divine authority, is a diabolical lie; for we obey parents and magistrates, not because they command it, but because it is the will of God. Hence I can more easily bear with those who are devoted to the papacy, especially if they are persons who have not had the opportunity of reading the scriptures and other books, since I myself, after I had for many years most diligently read the scriptures, still adhered tenaciously to the pope.

(The remainder in our next.)

PHILOSOPHY SUBSERVIENT TO RELI

GION.

Essay II.

(Continued from p. 65.) The use of language, as the medium for conveying to successive generations a great variety of moral conceptions, deserves to be particularly noticed. Language was given to our first parents by divine inspiration; and was especially fitted to be an instrument of thought and communication on religious subjects. Whilst this language remained substantially unchanged, it would be the source of important instruction. The mere process of learning its words and phrases, could not fail to intimate various

ideas upon moral and religious subjects. Nor has this advantage been entirely lost; notwithstanding the multiplication of languages, and the changes which they have undergone. During their diversified changes, words, expressing moral and religious conceptions, continued to form a part of them; and would therefore be the occasion of suggesting these conceptions to the mind, whilst engaged in learning them. We may, then, consider language itself as a medium, by which moral conceptions are communicated through successive generations.

We have reason to believe, that many opinions prevalent among pagan nations, are the remains of a

primitive revelation handed down by tradition; and preserved with greater or less purity among different nations. The researches of the learned have proved, that many of their notions and rites were originally derived from divine revelation and divine institutions.

What would be the precise condition of mankind, if left, from the beginning, to the exercise of their native powers and resources, without any supernatural instruction, it is perhaps impossible to determine. But so far as we can judge, it would seem, that if capable of existing at all, they would be in a condition far more ignorant and degraded, than that of any nation of barbarians that ever lived upon earth. The impossibility of making any considerable intellectual improvement without the use of language; and the difficulty of inventing language without this improvement; seem to show the necessity of divine teaching for the cultivation of the human understanding, if not for the continuance of the hu

man race.

The written word of God is the only full and adequate source of instruction, in regard to those subjects which man, as an accountable and immortal being, is most interested in knowing. So much is the human mind blinded and perverted by the deceitfulness of sin, by the corrupt customs and maxims of the world, and by the subtle devices of Satan; that although God has fur nished sufficient means of information to all men, to render them accountable for their conduct, and inexcusable in not acknowledging and worshiping him as the only true God; yet all men have not that knowledge of God and of his will which is necessary to salvation. Whatever important purposes the wisdom of God may accomplish, by those common notices of his will which he has given, in some measure, to all men; we know from scripture and universal observa

tion, that they are not ordinarily employed as the means of saving illumination and sanctification.

Man, from his limited knowledge and power, is compelled to form his purposes according to events as they transpire; and to employ, for the accomplishment of his purposes, the means that are brought to his knowledge by unforeseen circumstances. But the case is very different with God, who knows the end from the beginning, and whose resources are infinite. Whatever purposes are accomplished by any of his works, we may be assured they were known and designed from the beginning. He does not, like man, avail himself of unforeseen events, and accidental circumstances. To him there is nothing fortuitous or contingent. All his designs are eternal and unchangeable; both in regard to ends, and the means of their accomplishment.

The constitution of the world, and the arrangements of Divine Providence, may be viewed as an elementary school of instruction, to prepare our minds for understanding divine truth as revealed in scripture. The constitution and order of nature were designed by the allwise Creator to furnish similitudes and analogies; to originate conceptions and judgments, which would admit of an easy transfer to spiritual and divine things.

Thus the relations of society, the arrangements of civil government, and, in general, the fundamental laws of the present state of things, were designed and adapted to facilitate our conceptions in relation to spiritual and eternal things. When therefore, natural things are employed in scripture to illustrate those that are spiritual, we are not to imagine that this application was suggested by the accidental similarity of some circumstances between them. We are rather to believe, that natural things were constituted with the express design of answering this, as well as the other

purposes of infinite wisdom. Thus the wisdom of God is conspicuous: the material world is subservient to the intellectual; natural things are subservient to spiritual; and temporal to those that are eternal.

These remarks account in the most satisfactory manner for the fact, that the greater part of our language, in reference to intellectual subjects, is derived from the objects of our external senses; and that the greater part of our language, in reference to spiritual and divine things, is derived from natural things. From the natural process in which our information is obtained, the fact could not be otherwise. Man, as he is at present constituted, acquires his knowledge by slow and almost insensible gradations, according to the various occasions which are presented for call ing into operation the powers of his understanding. Our attention is first directed to material and natural things; and the language employed in relation to them, is afterwards transferred, by analogy, to those of an intellectual and moral nature, as soon as they become the subjects of examination and reflection.

It deserves however to be particularly considered, that this process of the mind furnishes the occasion, through want of due attention, of numerous errors in metaphysical and moral science. Language is transferred from the qualities of matter to the operations of the mind, and from human to divine things, without that variation of meaning, which the different nature of the subject indispensably requires. We are in constant danger of falling into error, from the ideas suggested by the literal and primary signification of words. Close attention to the peculiar nature of the subject, and great caution in the use of language, are necessary to guard us against mistakes from this source. A number of plausible errors, in various parts of intellectual and moral sciVOL. V.-Ch. Adv.

ence, have no other support than an unfounded analogy. Ideas are attached to words in their secondary and figurative application, which can only belong to them in that which is primary and literal. And sometimes, through want of proper attention, words are transferred from the movements of matter to the operations of mind, and from natural to spiritual things; although in the latter applications they can have no distinct meaning whatever.

As the constitution of nature is adapted to prepare our minds for understanding moral and religious subjects, in like manner, the scriptures of the Old Testament are adapted to prepare our minds for understanding the more full revelation of divine truth contained in the New. The rites and institutions appointed before the coming of Jesus Christ, were, to those who lived during that period, types and shadows of good things to come; to us, they serve the purpose of suggesting and establishing many important principles, in relation to the sublime truths of Christianity.

Hence we may see the wisdom and goodness of God in providing those means of instruction which are best suited, or rather which are alone suited, to the nature and faculties of the human mind. On a superficial view of the subject, we are apt to conclude that it would be preferable if divine truth had been presented in a systematical formin the manner of modern treatises of science; and not obscurely intimated by symbolical representations, and blended with numerous historical details. This conclusion, however, is precipitate and erroneous. It proceeds from inattention to the natural progress of the mind in acquiring knowledge. Modern systems of divinity may be easily intelligible, and very useful to those whose minds are already furnished with a great variety of information, derived from the scriptures and from numerous other sources. But withP