continue to wear an aspect less auspicious to their future good understanding, than is wished for by those who are the friends of both.

That his majesty has a right to make such municipal regulations as he may deem proper with regard to foreign commerce, neither is, nor has been denied: for example, he may forbid the entry into the ports of France of American ships which have touched in England, or been destined to England; and he may either sequester or confiscate such vessels of the United States as shall infract these laws, after due promulgation and notice thereof; but beyond this the United States hope and believe that his majesty will not go.

M. de Champagny will not fail to seize the distinction which these remarks present, between the authority of municipal regulations, and that of public law, and will decide whether it does or does not offer a ground on which the good understanding, so long and so usefully maintained between the United States and France, may be preserved, and a degree of intercourse between them revived, which shall have the effect of reanimating their former industry.

Does his majesty fear, that the balance of trade, arising from this renewed industry, would go to the advantage of England? Means are certainly not wanting to prevent this consequence. Would it not be entirely avoided by making it a condition of the commerce in question, that all ships leaving France shall take (in some article or articles of her produce or manufacture) the full amount of the cargoes they bring hither?

Ships, sailing under this regulation, would, or would not, go voluntarily to England. If they went voluntarily, it would only be, because that country afforded the best markets for the productions of France; in which case the habitual results would be entirely changed; and England, ceasing to receive a balance for her manufactures, would begin to pay one to the United States on the productions of France. Could France wish a state of commerce more prosperous than this?

If, on the other hand, the American ships did not go voluntarily to England, but were captured and sent in for adjudication, it may be fairly presumed, that the United States could no longer hesitate about becoming a party to the war against England.

Thus, in either case, the interests of his majesty would be directly advanced by the measure: in the one, the wants of France and her colonies would be not only regularly supplied, but she would herself become an entrepot for the supply of the continent; in the other, the wishes of his majesty, as expressed in February last, would be directly promoted.

Mr. Armstrong has the honour of renewing, to M. de Champagny, the assurances of his very high consideration."

Extract of a letter from the Same, to the Secretary of State, dated "Bourbon l'Archambault, August 28, 1808.

"Since my arrival at this place I have been honoured by the receipt of your despatch of the 21st ult. and would immediately return to Paris, to renew my discussions with M. de Champagny, either personally, as you suggest, or by writing, had I not the most solemn conviction, that any new experiment, made at the present moment, in either form, and of official character, would certainly be useless and probably injurious."

(To be continued.)

REVIEW.

ARTICLE I.'

Sugden on the Law of Vendors and Purchasers of Estates.

A Practical Treatise of the law of Vendors and Purchasers of Estates, by Edward Burtenshaw Sugden, of Lincoln's Inn; first American from the second London edition. William P. Farrand and Co. Philadelphia.

W

E do not recollect to have encountered this gentleman before in the ranks of literature. But whether he appears as a novus hospes or a veteran we can assure him of a cordial reception. The present time, which may very properly be styled the age of quackery, has produced little of a juridical nature besides digests, abridgments and republications of some of" the wise masters of the law." Mr. Sugden has honourably distinguished himself from this class of humble pioneers. The subject which he has undertaken to discuss has never been so amply nor so ably treated. He does not content himself with transcribing the titles and marginal notes of cases; but he boldly investigates the original principles upon which they were decided; and his inductions are therefore clear and, in general, indisputable. The style of this work is perspicuous and nervous; but it has none of those softer graces which captivate the attention and relieve the aridity of a practical treatise.

As a specimen of his manner, we shall quote the introductory chapter, being one which appears the most generally interesting,

"Moral writers insist, that a vendor is bound, in foro conscientia, to acquaint a purchaser with the defects of the subject of the contract. Arguments of some force have, however, been advanced in favour of the contrary doctrine; and our law does not entirely coincide with this strict precept of morality.

"If a person enter into a contract, with full knowledge of all defects in the estate, no question can arise: scientia enim utrinque par pares facit contrahentes.

"So if, at the time of the contract, the vendor himself was not aware of any defect in the estate, it seems, that the purchaser must take the estate with all its faults; and cannot claim any compensation for them.

"And even if the purchaser was, at the time of the contract, ignorant of the defects, and the vendor was acquainted with them, and did not disclose them to the purchaser; yet if they were patent, and could have been discovered by a vigilant man, no relief will be granted against the vendor.

"The disclosure of even patent defects in the subject of a contract, may be allowed to be a moral duty; but it is, what the civilians term, a duty of imperfect obligation. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus jura subveniunt, is an ancient maxim of our law, and forms an insurmountable barrier against the claims of an improvident purchaser.

"In this respect, equity follows the law. But it has been decided, that if a vendor, during the treaty, industriously conceal a patent defect, he is not entitled to the extraordinary aid of a court of equity: and it is conceived, that he could not even sustain an action against the purchaser for breach of contract.

"And if a vendor know of a latent defect in his estate, which the purchaser could not, by any attention whatever, possibly discover, he is bound to disclose it, although the estate be sold, expressly subject to all its faults.

"By the civil law, vendors were bound to warrant both the title and estate against all defects, whether they were or were not conusant of them. To prevent, however, the inconveniences which would have inevitably resulted from this general doctrine, it was qualified by holding, that if the defects of the subject of the contract were evident, or the buyer might have known them by proper precaution, he could not obtain any relief against the vendor.

"The rule of the civil law also was, “simplex commendatio non obligat." If the seller merely made use of those expressions, which are usual to sellers, who praise at random the goods they are desirous to sell; the buyer, who ought not to have relied upon such vague expressions, could not procure the sale to be dissolved upon any such pretext.

"The same rule prevails in our law, and has received a very lax construction in favour of vendors. It has been decided, that no relief lies against a vendor for having falsely affirmed, that a person bid a particular sum for the estate, although the vendee was thereby induced to purchase it, and was deceived in the value.

"Neither can a purchaser obtain any relief against a vendor for false affirmation of value; it being deemed the purchaser's own folly to credit a nude assertion of that nature. Besides, value consists in judgment and estimation, in which many men differ.

"But if a vendor affirm, that the estate was valued by persons of judgment, at a greater price than it actually was; and the purchaser act upon such misrepresentation, the vendor cannot, at least in equity, compel execution of the contract.

"And a remedy will lie against the vendor, for false affirmation of rent; because that is a circumstance within his own knowledge. And the purchaser is not bound to inquire further: for the leases may be made by parol, and the tenants may refuse to inform the purchaser what rent they pay; or the tenants may combine with the landlord, under whose power they frequently are, and so mis. inform and cheat the purchaser. In Lysney v. Selby, lord C. J. Holt said, that where the vendee does not depend upon the affirmation of the vendor, but sends to inquire into the value of the houses, what they let for, &c. there it is not reasonable he should recover against the vendor. The court, however, took time to consider and look into the record of Ekins and Tresham's case; and after long considering, and upon view of that record, a judgment which had been given in favour of Lysney the purchaser, was affirmed, although, according to the statement of the chief justice, the purchaser did not depend on the vendor's assertion, but did inquire what the estate let for. It appears, therefore, that a purchaser can recover against a vendor for false affirmation of rent, although he did not depend upon the statement; but where it can be satisfactorily proved, that the purchaser did not rely upon the vendor's assertion, a jury would undoubtedly give very trifling damages.

It seems that the same remedy will lie against a person not interested in the property, for making a false representation to a purchaser of value or rent, as might be resorted to in case such person were owner of the estate; but the statement must be made fraudulently, that is, with an intention to deceive; whether it be to favour the owner, or from an expectation of advantage to the party