object of the institution of the latter court, when considered, strongly marks the distinguishing point between them. In its ordinary jurisdiction the Admiralty takes cognizance of mere questions of meum and tuum arising between individuals. Its extraordinary or prize jurisdiction is vested in it for the purpose of revising the acts of the sovereign himself, performed through the agency of his officers or subjects. A seizure on the high seas by an unauthorized individual is a mere trespass, and produces no change of right, but such a seizure made by a sovereign authority vests the thing seized in the sovereign; for the fact of possession must have all the beneficial effects of the right of possession, as the justice or propriety of it cannot be inquired into by the courts of other nations. But as this principle might leave the unoffending individual a prey to the rapacity of cruisers, or a victim to the errors of those who even mean well, and as every civilized nation pretends to the character of justice and moderation, and to have an interest in preserving the peace of the world, they constitute courts with powers to inquire into the correctness of captures made under colour of their own authority, and to give redress to those who have been unmeritedly attacked or injured. These are denominated Prize Courts, and the primary object of their institution is to inquire whether a taking as prize be sanctioned by the authority of their sovereign or the unauthorized act of an individual. From this it would seem to follow, that the decision of such a court is the only legal organ of communication, through which the sanction of a sovereign can be ascertained; and that no other court is at liberty to deny the existence of sovereign authority for a seizure which a prize court has declared to be the act of its sovereign.

The propriety of such an act may correctly become the subject of executive or diplomatic discussion; but the equality of nations forbids that the conduct of one sovereign, or the correctness of the principles upon which he acts, should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of another. From these considerations I infer, that the capture and continued possession of the Sarah and her cargo, confirmed by the approba

tory sentence of a court of the capturing power, vested a title in the claimant which this Court cannot, consistently with the law of nations, interpose its authority to defeat.

Having briefly stated the grounds upon which I originally formed, and now adhere to an opinion in favour of the claimants, I will consider the objections stated to the jurisdiction of the Court, on the ground that the seizure was contrary to the law of nations.

It is admitted, if the Court of St. Domingo had jurisdiction of the subject matter, that the condemnation completed the divestiture of property. But it is contended that the subject, in this case, was not within the jurisdiction, because it was seized for a cause not sanctioned by the law of nations. I am unfortunate enough to think, that neither the premises nor the conclusion of this argument is maintainable. The conclusion is subject to this very obvious objection, that it defeats the very end for which such courts were created.

To contend that a violation of the law of nations will take away the jurisdiction of a court which sits and judges according to the law of nations, appears to approach very near to a solecism.

The occurrence which gives it jurisdiction, takes it away. If the object and end of constituting a Prize Court be to give redress against unlawful capture, and, as the books say, in such case to restore, velis levatis, how can it make reparation to the injured individual, if it lose its jurisdiction. Because there has been an injury done to him, the court can give him no redress. The argument admits that a capture, consistent with the law of nations, would give jurisdiction; but how is the legality or illegality of a capture to be determined, unless a court can take jurisdiction of the case? The legality of the capture is the very point to which a Court is to direct its inquires, and yet that inquiry is arrested in its inception. The cause or circumstance of a capture can never be known to a Court without exercising jurisdiction on the subject. To maintain, therefore, that Prize Courts can only exercise jurisdiction over captures made consistently with the law of nations, is, in effect, to deprive them

not noticed, or even not known to the judges who pronounce them.

But if we are to look into the grounds upon which a decree is professedly founded, extravagant as that upon the case of the Sarah is said to be, there is one view in which it may admit of justification. General Ferrand in his preamble declares it to be his leading object to remove the contrariety of opinion which existed among the officers of government relative to existing laws respecting captures of vessels taken upon the coasts of St. Domingo. If their Judges thought proper to consider this arrêt as only declaratory of pre-existing laws, and that the words in the first article, "ceux expediè pour les portes en leur possession en sortant avec ou sans chargement," authorized the capture of the vessel outward bound, I know no reason that we can have to declare it a misconstruction or incorrect opinion, or, if incorrect, to nullify their decree on that account. The conclusiveness of a foreign sentence appears to be at an end, the moment other courts undertake to look into the cause for which a capture was made. If the possession of the captor be the possession of his sovereign, and his courts have a right therefore to adjudicate property captured, or carried into a foreign port, it appears to me to be immaterial on what ground the capture is made. The fact of dispossession by sovereign authority, judicially ascertained, deprives all other courts of the right to act upon the case.

Upon these considerations I have adopted the opinion, that we are not at liberty to enter into the inquiry, whether the capture of the Sarah were made in pursuance of belligerent or municipal rights. But if we are to enter into the inquiry, I am of opinion that the evidence before us plainly makes out a case of belligerent capture, and, though not so, that the capture may be justified, although for the breach of municipal law.

In support of my latter position, both principle and the practice of Great Britain and our own government may be appealed to. The ocean is the common jurisdiction of all sovereign powers; from which it does not result that their powers upon the ocean exist in a state of suspension or equipoise, but that

every power is at liberty upon the ocean to exercise its sovereign right, provided it do no act inconsistent with that general equality of nations which exists upon the ocean. The seizure of a ship, upon the high seas, after she has committed an act of forfeiture, within a territory, is not inconsistent with the sovereign rights of the nation to which she belongs, because it is the law of reason, and the general understanding of nations, that the offending individual forfeits his claim to protection, and every nation is the legal avenger of its own wrongs. Within their jurisdictional limits, the rights of sovereignty are exclusive; upon the ocean they are concurrent. Whatever the great principle of self-defence, in its reasonable and necessary exercise, will sanction in an individual in a state of nature, nations may lawfully perform upon the ocean. This principle, as well as most others, may be carried to an unreasonable extent: it may be made the pretence instead of the real ground of aggression, and then it will become a just cause of war. I contend only for its reasonable exercise. The act of Great Britain of the 24 Geo. 3. 6. 47. is predicated upon these principles. It subjects vessels to seizure which approach with certain cargoes on board within the distance of four leagues of her coast, because it would be difficult, if not impossible to execute her trade laws if they were suffered to approach nearer in the prosecution of an illicit design. But if they have been within that distance, they are afterwards subject to be seized on the high seas. They have then violated her laws, and have forfeited the protection of their sovereign. The laws of the United States upon the subject of trade appear to have been framed in some measure after the model of the English statutes; and the 29th section of the act of 1799 expressly authorizes the seizure of a vessel that has, within the jurisdiction of the United States, committed an act of forfeiture, wherever she may be met with by a revenue cutter, without limiting the distance from the coast. So also the act of 1806, for prohibiting the importation of slaves authorizes a seizure beyond our jurisdictional limits, if the vessel be found with slaves on board hovering on the coast; a latitude of expression, that can only

be limited by circumstances and the discretion of a court, and in case of fresh pursuit would be actually without limitation. Indeed after passing the jurisdictional limits of a state, a vessel is as much on the high seas, as if in the middle of the ocean; and if France could authorize a seizure at the distance of two leagues, she could at the distance of twenty.

But the capture of the Sarah may fairly be considered as an exercise of belligerent right, and strictly analogous to seizure for breach of blockade. The right of one nation to exclude all others from trading with her territories exists equally in war and in peace. Had the exclusion in this case been merely calculated for the interests of trade, it may have been considered as purely municipal. But there existed a war between the parent state and her colony. It was not only a fact of the most universal notoriety, but officially notified in the gazettes of the United States, by the proclamation of the French resident Mr. Pichon, who at the same time published the prohibition to trade with the revolters, with a declaration that seizure and confiscation should be the consequence of disobedience to this prohibition. Here, then, was notice of the existence of war, and an assertion of the rights consequent upon it. The object of the measure was not the promotion of any particular branch of agriculture, manufacture or commerce, but solely the reduction of an enemy. It was therefore not merely municipal, but belligerent in its nature and object. If France had a right to subdue the revolted colony, she had an undoubted right to preclude all nations from supplying them with the means of protracting the war. To confine her to her own jurisdictional limits, in the exercise of those acts of force which were necessary to carry into effect her right of excluding neutrals, would be a mere mockery, when, by the very state of things, she was herself shut out from the limits. Seizure on the high seas for a breach of the right of blockade, during the whole return voyage, is universally acquiesced in, as a reasonable exercise of sovereign power. The principle of blockade has, indeed, in modern times, been pushed to such an extravagant extent, as to become a very justifiable cause of war, but still it